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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Kara E. Barnette Doctor of 
Philosophy Department of 
Philosophy March 2012 
Title: Necessary Error: Josiah Royce, Communal Inquiry, and Feminist Epistemology 
 
 
 
Feminist epistemologists have often argued that our relationships with structures 
of power shape the content, expression, and social force of what we know. While 
feminist standpoint theorists have often maintained that experiences on the margins of 
social power can lead to better understandings of the roles of systems of oppression in 
society, more recent writings on epistemologies of ignorance examine the reverse, how 
experiences from positions of social power limit our understandings.  In this project, I 
draw on the concept of epistemic privilege as it has been formulated by feminist 
standpoint theorists, criticisms of objectivity and fixed, transcendent truths, and analyses 
of the relationships between structures of power and concepts of knowing. By 
considering the works of Sandra Harding, Lorraine Code, and Patricia Hill Collins, 
among others, I argue that knowledge is situational and contingent and that some 
individuals possess privileged understandings due to their positions on the margins of 
power structures. However, I also argue that, in order for feminist epistemology to utilize 
the concept of epistemic privilege successfully, it must incorporate a concept of error into 
its considerations of constructions of knowledge. 
Thus, throughout this dissertation, I examine how a concept of error could bolster 
efforts to subvert the dominant approaches to knowledge that have upheld male privilege 
v 
 
and undermine the patriarchal power structures that rely on them. I propose a form of 
feminist inquiry that incorporates a method of error sensitivity, which will enable 
inquirers to recognize when institutions of power, individual limitations, and cultural 
myths are restricting knowing subjects’ perspectives and leading them to commit errors. 
This concept of error, and the related approach to error-sensitive inquiry, relies upon a 
commitment to continuous and ever-expanding inquiry by a community, rather than an 
isolated individual. Thus, I derive much of my conceptual framework from the work of 
Josiah Royce and his concepts of the Beloved Community, loyalty to loyalty, and 
communities of interpretation. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY, COMPETING “VIEWS FROM BELOW,” 
 
AND THE NEED FOR ERROR SENSITIVITY 
 
Introduction 
 
In this project, I contribute to the growing body of work on feminist 
epistemology. In particular, I draw on the concept of epistemic privilege as it has been 
formulated by feminist standpoint theorists, criticisms of objectivity and fixed, 
transcendent truths, and analyses of the relationships between structures of power and 
concepts of knowing. By considering the works of Sandra Harding, Lorraine Code, and 
Patricia Hill-Collins, among others, I argue that knowledge is situational and contingent 
and that some individuals possess privileged understandings due to their positions on the 
margins of power structures. However, I also argue that, in order for feminist 
epistemology to utilize the concept of epistemic privilege successfully, it must 
incorporate a concept of error into its considerations of constructions of knowledge. 
Thus, throughout this dissertation, I examine how a concept of error could bolster 
efforts to subvert the dominant approaches to knowledge that have upheld male privilege 
and undermine the patriarchal power structures that rely on them. I propose a form of 
feminist inquiry that incorporates a method of error sensitivity, which will enable 
inquirers to recognize when institutions of power, individual limitations, and cultural 
myths are restricting knowing subjects’ perspectives and leading them to commit errors. 
This concept of error, and the related approach to error-sensitive inquiry, relies upon a 
commitment to continuous and ever-expanding inquiry by a community, rather than an 
isolated individual. Thus, I derive much of my conceptual framework from the work of 
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Josiah Royce and his concepts of the beloved community, loyalty to loyalty, and 
communities of interpretation. 
I develop my argument through five chapters and a conclusion. In the first 
chapter, I address the ways in which contemporary discourse about knowledge 
perpetuates beliefs and assumptions that maintain existing privileges. In particular, I look 
at the discussions surrounding the confirmation of Justice Sotomayor to the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the criticism she received for suggesting that her gender and race could 
positively influence her decision-making process. I build upon this example by 
examining the work of feminist standpoint theorists and the importance of developing a 
means for determining when an epistemologically privileged view may be in error. My 
second chapter continues this discussion by reviewing a wider range of works in feminist 
epistemology and the means that they offer for supplementing and modifying and the 
concept of epistemic privilege in order to maximize its potential for promoting better 
knowledge production. In this chapter, I also propose that feminist epistemology should 
uphold four commitments and review the ways in which existing works establish and 
fulfill those commitments before arguing that a method of error sensitivity is still 
necessary. 
In the third chapter, I examine how Royce develops his concept of error 
throughout his work and how his concept of error could promote a method of error- 
sensitive inquiry that would affirm the value of testimony. This examination leads 
directly to the discussion in my fourth chapter, which focuses on Royce’s concepts of the 
beloved community and loyalty to loyalty. In this chapter, I argue that Royce’s theories, 
which emphasize pluralism, communal knowing, and contingent knowledge, are 
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consistent with the commitments of feminist epistemology. Thus, in the fifth chapter, I 
address potential objections to using Royce’s theories to address problems in feminist 
epistemology, review how an error-sensitive method of feminist inquiry could operate, 
and examine how the existing U.S. court system prevents this kind of inquiry. Finally, I 
conclude the dissertation by discussing how the Navajo Peacemaker courts reveal an 
alternative to the adversarial methods of the typical U.S. court. Although I do not 
promote adopting all of the Peacemaker’s courts’ methods, I consider how they offer a 
framework upon which new approaches to legal inquiries could be based. 
Identity, Knowledge, and The Supreme Court 
 
The 2009 confirmation of Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor instigated a 
moment when a discussion of feminist epistemology dominated cable news and 
newspaper op-eds.  In the months surrounding Sotomayor’s confirmation, politicians and 
pundits asked philosophical questions about what determines reliable knowing, what is 
the place of the knower in creating knowledge, and can and should the knower’s identity 
affect knowledge. These questions mirror the concerns of feminist epistemologists who 
reject the concept of a universal, idealized knower in favor of diverse, communally- 
situated knowers. Critics often suggest that feminist epistemologists rely on a straw man 
depiction of modern epistemology and that Western epistemology has never actually 
lauded the isolated, unconstrained, and unbiased knower they critique.i However, the 
 
controversy over Sotomayor’s appointment showed that the concerns of feminist 
 
epistemologists remain relevant. 
 
Sotomayor became a controversial figure after media outlets widely reported that 
 
in a 2001 lecture at Stanford University she claimed, “I would hope that a wise Latina 
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woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better 
conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life.”ii To those who have been 
educated in feminist epistemology and strive to institute various ways of better knowing, 
Sotomayor’s comments might seem inspiring, honest, or even benign. Her suggestion that 
her identity as a “wise Latina” has given her perspectives that those in privilege lack 
could have appeared verbatim in early writings in Feminist Standpoint Theory from the 
 
1980s or any of the plethora of feminist epistemologies that have been written since this 
time. As Linda Martín Alcoff states, “Judge Sotomayor has simply stated upfront what 
most of us know full well: identity affects experience, and experience makes a difference 
in our judgment.”iii   Since feminist epistemologists start from the position that identity 
will affect knowledge and judgment, Sotomayor’s remarks acknowledge that all justices 
start from their own identities rather than making an argument that her approach to 
interpretation is radically different. 
Although Sotomayor’s remarks might not have stirred much controversy amongst 
feminist epistemologists and those who take identity politics or feminist epistemology 
seriously, they were met with outrage by Republican law makers and conservative media 
pundits. Many commentators like Rush Limbaugh and Newt Gingrich claimed that her 
comments were blatantly racist.iv Sotomayor’s nomination indicated that the first African 
American President of the United States was in fact promoting an anti-white agenda that 
threatened white citizens and that Sotomayor herself opposed the American value that 
“all men are created equal.” Moreover, Sotomayor’s comments were also called a “poor 
choice of words”v by President Obama’s administration, and liberal news outlets 
described them as the kind of thing that can be said by an academic but not a political 
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nominee. Other criticisms of Sotomayor included the claim that she “is just not that 
bright,”vi an interesting and unlikely remark by any means considering her position and 
her place on the law review of the highest ranked law school in the nation. Although none 
of these pundits or media outlets mentioned the work of Sandra Harding, Patricia Hill 
Collins, Donna Haraway or Lorraine Code, they criticized their works. These 
epistemologists have all argued that good knowing requires attention to the interpreter’s 
identity and community and that women’s experiences, as well as the experiences of 
those of color and the colonized, present the foundations for better knowing. When the 
unique epistemological position of a “wise Latina” was called biased, racist, and an 
unworthy starting point for interpretation, feminist epistemology itself was attacked. 
By the end of her confirmation, Justice Sotomayor distanced herself from her 
Stanford remarks and claimed that her legal philosophy was “a simple fidelity to the 
law.” Thus her final confirmation at least appeared to be dependent upon her advocating 
a legal epistemology where the identity and experience of the interpreter was separate 
from the job of a judge, which is to appeal to the kind of “law” that has the answers for 
justice, and agreeing that this kind of pure interpretation of the law was the only course 
towards “fairness.”vii 
 
In the year following her confirmation, the news media’s attention turned again to 
the US Supreme court when Justice John Paul Stevens retired. Justice Stevens, a white 
male from Chicago, served on the Supreme Court for 35 years. In reflections on Justice 
Stevens’s career, some of the same media outlets that covered Justice Sotomayor’s 
controversial remarks implied that Justice Stevens’s experience in the US Navy 
influenced him as a judge. These comments were not controversial. Rather than 
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remarking that Justice Stevens’s reliance on his veteran status was an “unfair” influence, 
many conservative columnists lauded this aspect of his identity.viii Rather than claiming 
that Justice Stevens’s identity as a veteran would get “in the way” of a “simple fidelity to 
the law,” many conservative columnists seemed to find this status as compensating, at 
least in a small way, for his “liberal” rulings on key decisions, including Roe v. Wade and 
Gore v. Bush. 
When President Obama nominated Elena Kagan as Justice Stevens’s successor on 
the US Supreme Court, her sexuality was the source of public speculation, but she had 
not produced public remarks about her gender to scrutinize. Nonetheless, many pundits 
still argued that she was under qualified for the position as a Supreme Court Justice and 
that President Obama nominated her primarily because of her gender. Pat Buchannan 
claimed that Justice Kagan’s nomination marked a policy of discrimination against white 
Anglo-Saxon men by the Obama administration.ix In this manner, Justice Kagan’s 
 
identity as a woman and “possibly lesbian” was used to undermine the claim that she was 
a qualified appointee. The comments from Fox News, Pat Buchannan and others stem 
from the assumption that gender only plays a role in political appointments when a 
woman is appointed. By drawing attention to the existence of qualified men as an explicit 
critique of President Obama’s choice to nominate a female appointee, Buchannan implies 
that Kagan was chosen because of her gender rather than her qualifications as a legal 
expert. Yet Justice Kagan’s lack of public comments on her gender, sexuality, and Jewish 
heritage saved her from having a “wise Latina” moment even as these parts of her 
identity were scrutinized. 
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The media scrutiny of Sotomayor and Kagan may provide a more accurate 
account of popular epistemologies than academic philosophical texts contain. Nearly 
three decades into feminist epistemology, one might claim that the idea of the isolated 
knower gathering pure unadulterated knowledge is a straw man, or a caricature of a myth 
that never really existed. As Alan Sobel and others might claim, the work of feminist 
epistemology was ill formed from the beginning and even less relevant in a world with 
contemporary analytic accounts of knowledge making. However, Sotomayor’s original 
claims were not radical in comparison to contemporary feminist epistemology. Simply, 
she claimed that her identity as a Latina gave her a perspective that those of the dominant 
gender and race did not share, and that this identity influences the decisions she makes. 
Yet, the reaction to, as well as her ultimate retraction of, her statements highlighted a 
much more popular epistemology: Male or female, white or Latino, Queer or straight, the 
judgments we make, especially when these judgments have legal significance, ought to 
bare no relation to an identity. Instead, they ought to capture a pure interpretation of 
external events and facts. With this in mind, even in our supposedly post-racial 
existence,1 we can see the need for progressive epistemologies. Moreover, these 
 
epistemologies offer substantial ways to alter social discourse, legal proceedings, and 
politics. 
The reaction from the news media, especially the conservative news media, to 
Justice Sotomayor’s “wise Latina” remarks in comparison with the response to Justice 
Stevens’s biography and the scrutiny of Justice Kagan’s gender and presumed sexual 
orientation reveals that critics did not require that judges be blank interpreters of the law, 
 
 
 
1    Please note that I am not advocating that we are in any way “post-racial” but rather I am using this term 
to highlight this contemporary assumption. 
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abstracted entities that can practice complete fairness, rather they maintained that their 
identities can influence their decisions but only if that identity is in some way an 
approved identity. Both Justice Stevens and Justice Sotomayor argued that their own 
experiences can lead to better legal decision making. For Justice Sotomayor, this comes 
in the form of gaining experience from being Latina, for Justice Stevens, it comes from 
having an exclusively male experience of being in the Navy during WWII. By 
condemning Justice Sotomayor’s comments while commending Justice Stevens’s, critics 
implicitly authorize white, male, and American identities as valid sources of knowledge 
while disregarding the value of Latina and female identities as sources of knowledge. 
They also cast aspersions about queer identities as sources of knowledge in the inquiries 
surrounding Justice Kagan’s nomination. 
By authorizing some identities while disregarding others, institutions of power 
hamper the process of developing better ways of knowing because the approved identities 
lack the capacity and incentive to recognize the limits of their own knowledge. Bolstered 
by a media that upholds the “Greatest Generation,” history courses that valorize 
American veterans from WWII, and political allies who want to ensure his political 
legacy, Justice Stevens has no reason to doubt his own commitment to the law or 
question the possibility of a disparity between his experiences and legal precedence. As a 
result, Justice Stevens’s identity gives him no reason to question the validity of the laws 
and their possible racist or sexist roots and implications. It is not a stretch to imagine that 
the conservative pundits decrying the nominations of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan by 
the first African American President of the United States may be reacting to the fear that 
the Justices may alter laws which uphold white privilege and patriarchy. 
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Sandra Harding and the Idea of Epistemic Privilege 
 
The kind of alteration that conservative pundits fear Justices Sotomayor and 
Kagan will create in the United States’ legal system is the same kind of alteration that 
Sandra Harding advocates in the sciences. In Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? 
Harding claims that conventional research within racist, sexist, and heterosexist societies 
will only reproduce the vision available to those in power. Conventional research in these 
instances is not only partial but also distorted by the effects of the dominant power 
structures. For example, when socio-biologists such as E. O. Wilson argue that traditional 
gender roles have their bases in natural, evolutionary biology, they can readily interpret 
data in order to support their hypotheses while ignoring other possible interpretations. 
Thus, Harding argues that those outside of the “view available to the rulers” share an 
epistemic privilege. In this context, the views of people who possess epistemic privilege 
need to be given the utmost credence and consideration by others because they have the 
most incentive to question not only what they see but also what influences their 
perceptions. Harding claims, “Feminist standpoint theorists argue that not just opinions 
but also a culture’s best beliefs—what it calls knowledge—are socially situated. …It is 
[the knowledge claims made from women’s situations] which are not used by 
conventional researchers, that enable feminism to produce more accurate descriptions and 
theoretically richer explanations than does conventional research.”x The standpoints of 
women and anyone who is on the periphery of social privilege provide access to a view 
that is “less partial and distorted than the picture of nature and social relations that 
emerges from conventional research.”xi Only from the periphery can knowers recognize 
the distortion caused by the power structures that define social relations. 
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Harding articulates eight reasons to value women’s standpoints: First, women’s 
lives have been neglected as starting points for scientific research and as a result 
represent an underutilized resource.xii Second, women are “strangers” to the existing 
social order and, therefore, will be able to perceive its harms and limitations better than 
those ensconced within it.xiii Third, women’s oppression gives them fewer interests in 
maintaining ignorance about patriarchy.xiv  Fourth, looking at women’s specific political 
 
struggles is the only way to understand gender oppression.xv Unlike conventional 
scientific research, women’s perspectives come from everyday life and thus they provide 
a better understanding of the everyday domestic tasks that underlies the research of 
men.xvi Sixth, the political situation in the United States means that women’s labor, such 
as care work and mothering, has forced them to spend more time and effort than men do 
in negotiating philosophical dualisms, such as a nature and culture divide.xvii Seventh, 
women who are in academic and scientific fields of research represent outsiders within 
institutions of power who can critique conventional research methods.xviii Finally, 
 
Harding argues that the time of Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? was the right time to 
look towards women because feminist researchers were then able to provide better 
accounts of patriarchal institutions by looking at nature and social relations through 
analyses of conflicts in the sex/gender system.xix 
While feminist standpoint theory historically focuses on women’s experience as 
 
the starting point of more objective inquiry, the same principles that underlie the move to 
look at the standpoints of women also mean that good inquiry ought to look towards the 
standpoints of those oppressed by structures of power other than patriarchy. Women lack 
investment in maintaining ignorance about patriarchy and provide an outsider perspective 
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to conventional research, and their labor has negotiated dualisms. Since the standpoints of 
those oppressed by racism, classism, religious bigotry, and heterosexism similarly 
critique situations of power, they warrant equivalent epistemic privilege. 
 
For Harding, any standpoint of oppression has some epistemic privilege. She 
argues “the social structures of race relationships are interlocked with gender and class 
structures.”xx Epistemic privilege is the ability to understand structures of power. For 
Harding, this privilege is the result of suffering oppression, those who are oppressed 
share an epistemic privilege by way of their identity. However, those of privilege can 
achieve greater objectivity by adopting what Harding calls “a view from below.” Harding 
claims, “Men’s thought too will begin from women’s lives in all the ways that feminist 
theory, with its rich and contradictory tendencies, has helped us all—women as well as 
men—understand how to do.”xxi In order to adopt the view from below, researchers must 
accept working in collaboration with others and foregoing the social privileges afforded 
by ideologies of white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity. Harding goes on to 
claim, “The lives that provide starting point for African American thought will then also 
be providing the starting points for feminist, socialist, gay and lesbian, and other 
emancipator thought. They are part of the multiple subject or agent of every emancipatory 
thought. Thus it is not only African Americans who have an obligation to generate 
knowledge from the perspective of African American lives.” xxii In these examples, 
people who maintain oppressed standpoints have a particular investment that helps create 
 
epistemic privilege while those with privileged identities share the obligation to cultivate 
research from the standpoints of those who are oppressed. 
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In addition to Harding, Patricia Hill Collins also describes various aspects of 
epistemic privilege. Although both authors emphasize different attributes of the concept, 
several elements of epistemic privilege remain consistent from work to work. First, 
epistemic privilege is not inherent; instead, individuals in oppressed groups develop 
epistemic privilege through their situations living on the margins.xxiii Second, because 
individuals from oppressed groups often must recognize and negotiate structures of 
power in order to succeed at their endeavors, they can develop uniquely insightful 
understandings of those structures of power. In particular, they can become adept at 
identifying the ways in which structures of power invalidate knowledge claims and 
curtail experiences in order to sustain themselves.xxiv Third, although experiences remain 
individualized, oppressed groups can begin to develop communal knowledge through a 
shared understanding of common experiences with the ways in which structures of power 
disenfranchise them.xxv Fourth, as a result of their insights into structures of power and 
their sense of shared experiences, individuals from oppressed groups can develop a 
sophisticated understanding of how both oppressed and privileged groups function as 
groups, as well as how they are identified and responded to as groups.xxvi In contrast, 
individuals from privileged groups tend to focus on how they function as individuals and 
react to others as individuals. 
While these attributes of epistemic privilege indicate how individuals and 
communities within oppressed groups can develop vital knowledge that may be 
unavailable to others, these attributes do not immediately suggest how communities 
should respond to individuals with epistemic privilege, especially in situations in which 
individuals with epistemic privilege present knowledge claims that contradict the 
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knowledge claims presented by other individuals. Although it may be tempting to suggest 
that communities should always assume individuals with epistemic privilege are 
providing the better accounts of the events in question, this policy would not, ultimately, 
enhance the community’s knowledge because it would not promote understanding how 
all the claims are situated. As a result, it would not help the community as a whole 
develop better knowledge in the future. 
However, communities could benefit from responding to individuals with 
epistemic privilege by shifting the burden of understanding to the audience of a claim, 
rather than expecting the individual making the claim to persuade her audience of its 
validity according to the dominant standards. As I suggest throughout this dissertation, 
the community could develop better ways of knowing by accepting the responsibility of 
recognizing, understanding, and acknowledging the claims presented by individuals with 
epistemic privilege. For example, when a woman testifies about the experience of being 
raped, she may emphasize the pain and embarrassment she feels and, subsequently, fail to 
discuss the circumstantial details that clarify how she was coerced into a sexual act. If the 
community hearing the testimony expects the woman to prove that she was raped 
according to an established set of standards that emphasizes codifiable details, it may not 
find her explanation convincing. In contrast, if the community hearing the testimony 
accepts the responsibility of trying to understand how her explanation relates to her 
claim, it may be more likely to recognize the connections between her descriptions of 
what she felt and her initial statement about what happened. 
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Sexual Assault and the Case for Women’s Epistemic Privilege 
 
Although Harding’s work focuses on reforming scientific research, her arguments 
in favor of standpoint theory implicitly promote reform in how legal inquiries are 
conducted because both scientific research and legal inquiries emphasize gathering 
empirical evidence in order to arrive at a value-neutral conclusion. Where scientific 
researchers observe phenomena in nature and objects in laboratories, judges, juries, and 
legal advocates witness conflicts in society. In both situations, institutions of power 
influence ostensibly neutral knowledge-making process through the distribution of funds, 
the perpetuation of cultural myths, and control over education and professional 
certification (i.e. being a board certified physician or a member of the American Bar 
Association). The influence of patriarchy on the legal system is particularly evident in 
cases that involve crimes which disproportionately harm women, such as domestic 
violence and sexual assault. 
In “Sexual Terrorism,” Carole Sheffield claims, “Sexual assault is the system by 
which males frighten, and by frightening dominate and control females. It is manifested 
through actual and implied violence. All females are potential victims…The 
subordination of women in all other spheres of society rests on the power of men to 
intimidate and to punish women sexually.”xxvii Sexual assault represents one of the 
defining pillars of patriarchy. Female sexual assault survivors share an understanding that 
 
their accounts will likely not be believed, that prosecuting their victimizers will likely 
lead to their own lives and virtue being put on trial, and that as women they are always 
potential victims. Understandably, feminist scholars have argued that, in cases of sexual 
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assault, women share an epistemic privilege and that insisting on this privilege is crucial 
to undermining the oppression of women. 
As Sheffield argues, the prosecution of male/female sexual assault in the United 
States reproduces patriarchy. Partly by reinforcing the male-active/female-passive 
stereotype, partly by perpetuating oppressive standards of sexual virtue, and partly by 
relying on the standard that women’s testimonies about their experiences are 
untrustworthy, the legal representations of sexual assault have buttressed the political 
harms of specific acts of violence. Feminist legal scholars, ethicists, and epistemologists 
have argued for new ways of negotiating these power dynamics to help ensure that 
female victims of sexual assault will have more success in prosecuting their cases in the 
Justice System. 
The high instances of sexual assault and its correlation with overarching 
 
structures of patriarchy has meant that women’s own testimonies and experiences of rape 
have been downplayed, dismissed, and ridiculed in both social and legal settings. In 
particular, victims of assaults deemed “acquaintance rape”2 have had a hard time getting 
their experiences of sexual assault prosecuted or accounted for. In “Women’s Voices, 
Women’s Words: Reading Acquaintance Rape Discourse,” Molly Dragiewicz claims that 
the terms “acquaintance rape” and “date rape” entered the public lexicon as a way of 
acknowledging the experiences of sexual assault victims whose assaults did not fit the 
common understanding of rape: “The experience of these terms reveals the substance of 
dominant ideas about rape. …If acquaintance rape were not part of the cultural 
 
 
 
2 The qualification of “deemed” is used here to imply that I understand and am sensitive to the arguments 
of Mary Daly and others who have claimed that the linguistic distinction between various forms of rape has 
been used to imply that victims of rape who were in relationships with their attackers were somehow “less 
raped” than those who are victimized by a stranger. 
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vocabulary, however, women would currently have no term available to them to describe 
any rape that differs from dominant connotations of Rape (usually a violent rape 
committed by a stranger).”xxviii In instances of acquaintance rape, instances that account 
for the vast majority of all rapes committed, accounts of women’s experiences of 
victimization are often disregarded by law enforcement agents, peer groups, and the 
media as not being “as bad” as “real rape.” As Dragiewicz points out, popular editorials, 
such as Katie Rophie’s “Date Rape Hysteria” and the 1993 Newsweek issue on “Sexual 
Correctness” have at various points dominated the public discussion of acquaintance 
rape, all of these accounts have suggested that assaults that fall under the category of 
“acquaintance rape” are in some way not violent or hurtful enough to deserve the title of 
“rape.” Rophie in particular has gone so far as to claim that much of what might be called 
“acquaintance rape” by feminist activists and scholars is really just “bad sex.”xxix 
Dragiewicz notes that the move to regulate what counts as “real rape” has often 
 
been used to delegitimize studies that show the extremely high rates at which women 
suffer from sexual assault, and by delegitimizing these statistics, those with positions of 
power, such as law makers and college boards and administrators, have been able to 
create suspicion around those who advocate for political and campus action to prevent 
rape. In particular Dragiwicz contends that this was the explicit strategy of several 
conservative law makers as they attempted to justify rejecting the 1990 Violence Against 
Women Act.xxx 
 
The example of acquaintance rape offers one of the most important examples of 
the need for accounting for the epistemic privilege of women’s standpoints. Because 
sexual assault is such an important tool for maintaining existing structures of patriarchy, 
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men, especially men in power, have an invested interest in maintaining ignorance about 
the staggeringly high rates of sexual assault against women.xxxi If acquaintance rape and 
other forms of sexual assault can remain an unacknowledged disciplinary power against 
women, then there will be few public and political actions taken that could reduce its 
occurrence. Moreover, acknowledging the rates of acquaintance rape and the social 
conditions that perpetuate it would require men to take action, “such as teaching little 
boys that ‘women are equals, that sex demands consent, that violence is unconscionable, 
that rape is one of the gravest crimes of all.’”xxxii The fact that men have an interest in 
maintaining high levels of sexual assault points directly to Harding’s third reason for 
granting women epistemic privilege; in cases of rape, women have fewer interests in 
maintaining ignorance around rates of sexual assault and thus would be more likely to 
consider a wide range of research methods on sexual assault. 
Moreover, dominant research methods that stem from patriarchal interests will 
maintain the dominant myth of rape as primarily stranger driven assault. The only way to 
move beyond this myth would be to look to the experience of women’s lives in 
accordance with Harding’s second reason for the epistemic privilege of women’s 
standpoints. The research methods that uncovered high rates of acquaintance rape on 
college campuses were driven by female researchers who asked women in-depth 
questions about their experiences rather than surveying police reports, medical records, or 
other official tallies or even survey’s that asked women simply if they had ever been 
sexually assaulted. When women were asked several questions about their experiences, 
researchers found much higher rates of instances of sexual intercourse without consent, 
(i.e. instances that would fulfill the legal definition of rape) than previous studies.xxxiii In 
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this instance, discovering the extent of acquaintance rape on college campuses required 
looking at women’s experience, not simply at their rates of identifying themselves as 
having been raped. Without much more in-depth accounts that considered that women 
themselves might not have access to the language they require to be recognized as 
victims of sexual assault, this information would not be available. 
Since the rate of acquaintance rape is much higher than the rate at which men are 
prosecuted for rape, women live with the knowledge that their testimonies will be placed 
under intense suspicion and that, in order to prosecute their attackers, they must submit 
their own virtue and sexual lives to public and legal scrutiny. By granting women’s 
testimonies about acquaintance rape epistemic privilege, a progressive justice system 
could not only encourage more women to come forward with accounts of sexual assault 
but also develop better accounts of incidents described by the women who do come 
forward. 
Although a focus on helping female victims of sexual assault successfully 
prosecute their cases is essential, this focus alone fails to rid the justice system of all 
harmful stereotypes, and in some cases fails to account for all of the power structures in 
place in a specific case. While the vast majority of rapes are intraracial, interracial sexual 
assault cases in which the alleged victim is white and the alleged perpetrator is a man of 
color present a particular challenge for feminist epistemology. While feminist standpoint 
theorists such as Harding, Code, and Collins have all advocated that better knowing 
requires privileging a view from below, instances of alleged interracial sexual assault 
place two differing and opposing views from below in conflict. Adjudicating these cases 
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requires not only adopting a view from below but also being sensitive to the potential for 
error in both sets of claims. 
The Myth of the Black Rapist and Lynching in America 
 
While sexual assault has been one of the most effective forms of social control of 
women, myths surrounding sexual assault have also been used as a means of social 
control of men of color. Although the vast majority of sexual assault cases involve 
someone the victim knows, the primary depiction of sexual assailants is that of a stranger 
who prompted by deviance or perversion rapes victims after dark. Prompting the myth of 
what Jackson Katz calls the “Crazed Rapist”xxxiv concept of sexual assault helps women 
 
maintain a constant level of fear while also promoting further dependence on men around 
them. Along with the prototype of sexual assault as an encounter with a stranger the 
ultimate “boogie man” rapist is also a man of color who preys on white women. In 
actuality the vast majority of sexual assaults are intraracial.xxxv 
Even though the vast majority of sexual assaults involve members of the same 
 
race, the myth that men of color are violently promiscuous has worked to justify violence 
against African American men. In Black Sexual Politics, Patricia Hill Collins argues that 
African American sexuality has been controlled in the United States by racism: “Black 
sexuality is controlled by the rape of black women by white men and of black men 
through lynching.” A history of lynching has a created a subjugated knowledge in 
African American men that is similar to the subjugated knowledge about sexual assault in 
women. Just as women know that their accusations about acquaintance rape will be 
derided and dismissed, African American men know that their pleas of innocence in 
sexual assault cases involving white women will be disregarded. Throughout history, this 
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situation has made it dangerous for African American men to pursue romances with 
white women or even be in the company of white women. 
While interracial rape cases are rare, specific instances of Black on White 
interracial rape cases have garnered media attention and perpetuated multiple myths 
about both race and women’s sexuality. Two of these cases, the 1931 Victoria Prince 
sexual assault case, also known as the “Scottsboro Boys” case, and the 1989 Tricia Meili 
sexual assault case, also known as the Central Park Jogger case, are infamous on their 
own and examples of the pervasiveness of the myths that surround sexual assault and 
race. Both cases became symbols for the policing of women who somehow step out of 
bounds by being alone in public and for the white justice system’s response to African 
American men’s alleged violent promiscuity, which Angela Davis coined the “Myth of 
the Black Rapist”xxxvi in Women, Race and Class and Collins, Kimberlé Crenshaw, and 
 
others have followed her use of this label. 
 
In the 1931 Scottsboro Boys case, two women who were designated as runaways 
by the police, Ruby Bates, who was a minor, and Victoria Prince, who was not, were 
riding trains, or hoboing, between Chattanooga and  Memphis. Following a fight between 
a gang of white men and twelve young African American men, the women were 
discovered dressed as men by officials when the train crossed over the border into 
Alabama. When asked if the African American men had harmed them in any way, 
Victoria Prince claimed that she and Bates had been raped. 
Police gathered all the African Americans on the train they could catch, and the 
nine who failed to escape were brought to Scottsboro, Alabama where a mob of white 
male residents had gathered to lynch them. These nine men would become known as the 
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Scottsboro Boys. Though National Guard forces escorting the Scottsboro Boys prevented 
the lynching, the men were tried and found guilty by all white juries. Their cases went 
through multiple appeals and two Supreme Court reversals, but in the final case, eight of 
the nine Scottsboro Boys were convicted of rape. 
During the trial and in media depictions of this case, the myth of the Black rapist 
was used as justification for proposed lynchings and convictions, while the sexual 
character of Prince was repeatedly called into question. Prince and Bates were both 
depicted as prostitutes and women of low moral character, while Prince—the only one to 
claim formally that she had been raped—was painted as an adulterer, swindler, and 
prostitute on the stand as the defense attempted to present her as unrapable. Meanwhile, 
the guilt of the nine African American men was widely assumed, and the presumed rape 
of the white women by African American men was depicted as the most heinous of 
crimes against the white race.xxxvii 
 
Sixty years later, the Central Park Jogger case reestablished similar myths. In the 
 
1989 case, investment banker Trisha Meili was raped and severely beaten while jogging 
through New York’s Central Park during day light hours. As a result of her beating, Meili 
slipped into a coma and retained no memory of the attack. Police at the scene assumed 
the attack to be the work of several African American and Latino young men. Ultimately, 
five young African American men were arrested and convicted of the crime. All five 
were convicted and sentenced to prison. 
 
In 2003, after repeated claims that their confessions had been coerced, all five 
men’s sentenced were voided when convicted serial rapist and murderer, Matias Reyes 
confessed to the crime and claimed he had acted alone. Reyes’s confession was 
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corroborated with DNA evidence that indicated that he was the only one who had 
engaged in sexual intercourse with Meili. Despite Reyes’s confession and DNA support, 
the original prosecutor vocally opposed the voiding of the original five convictions. As of 
2003, a New York City Police panel still claimed that the original five suspects were 
guilty.xxxviii 
As Collins argues in Black Sexuality media representations of the Central Park 
Jogger Case led to a widespread panic that was built on a longer legacy of the myths 
about African American and Latino sexuality: 
The attack in Central Park occurred in this political, social, and cultural context. 
The “park panic” that followed the incident drew upon this fear of young Black 
men in public space, as evidenced by their loudness, their rap music, and their 
disrespect for order (graffiti). In doing so, it referenced the primitivist ideology of 
Blacks as animalistic. Media phrases such as ‘roving bands’ and ‘wolf pack’ that 
were used to describe young  urban Black and Latino males during this period 
were only comprehensible because of long-standing assumptions of Black 
promiscuity.xxxix 
 
Unlike Prince and Bates from the Scottsboro Boys case, Meili’s sexual virtue was not 
officially or widely called into question. In this instance, Meili’s status as a wealthy, 
Yale-educated, white woman protected her from extensive media criticism. However, her 
rape did serve as a cautionary tale for other white women, since it involved entering a 
space occupied by African American and Latino youth. 
The Scottsboro Boys case and the Central Park Jogger case highlight key aspects 
 
of the “black rapist myth”: First that the act of sexual assault of a white woman by a man 
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of color is not an individual act of assault. Rather, it is depicted as a crime against 
“whiteness” broadly. Second, the guilt of the accused is assumed. In cases of lynching the 
justice system is circumvented. In the case of the Scottsboro boys, lynching was 
prevented by National Guard troops but the assumed guilt of the nine defendants was 
maintained throughout their numerous trials, even when the US Supreme Court found 
insufficient evidence. More recently than the Scottsboro case, the Supreme Court did not 
overturn the conviction of the men accused in the Central Park Jogger case until 2002. 
The fact that it took more than a decade to overturn this conviction marks another 
example of the power of the assumed guilt of men of color. Moreover, Marcus found that 
men of color convicted of rape in interracial sexual assault cases receive harsher 
sentences than white men convicted of similar crimes.xl Third, in cases of lynching or 
 
attempted lynching, there is often a rational that “any black men will do.” In the 
Scottsboro Case Prince claimed that twelve African American men had raped Bates and 
herself. Rather than trying to find the specific twelve men Prince referred to, police 
rounded up all African American men on the train. 
Both of these cases, the cultural myths surrounding them, and the history of 
lynching demonstrate that African American men exist on the periphery of social power, 
and as a result, warrant epistemic privilege in manner similar to female victims of sexual 
assault. The fact that white culture has an interest in perpetuating the myth of the black 
rapist relates to Harding’s third reason for supporting standpoint theory because African 
American men have a direct interest in learning about the effects of this myth and 
resisting the ignorance that surrounds it. Furthermore, in accordance with Harding’s 
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fourth reason, looking at African American men’s struggles with false accusations of rape 
 
and a culture of lynching creates a means of understanding racial oppression. 
 
Competing “Views from Below” in Incidents of Interracial Acquaintance Rape 
 
In “Race-ing Justice,” Kimberlé Crenshaw claims, “In feminist contexts, sexuality 
represents a dominant narrative trope. In antiracist discourses, sexuality is also a central 
site upon which the repression of Blacks has been premised; the lynching narrative 
embodied as its trope. (Neither narrative tends to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
other).’”xli In both the Scottsboro Boys case and the Central Park Jogger case, myths 
surrounding feminine virtue and propriety and myths of racism came into competition 
with one another. Cases such as these two, where the victims and the prosecuted are 
differently oppressed, leave anti-racist feminists in a difficult situation. To grant greater 
epistemological privilege to female sexual assault victims involves disregarding the 
significant role racist myths play in the American justice system and media. Similarly, to 
unequivocally grant greater epistemological privilege to accused men of color continues 
the trajectory of disregarding the personal experience of female sexual assault victims, 
while perpetuating oppressive standards for acceptable women’s behavior. Both options 
carry tremendously harmful results, but the justice system and the community at large 
have to make a decision between these directly conflicting accounts. 
In these cases, both parties are oppressed by existing myths and power structures. 
Both racism and sexism are perpetuated in the prosecution and in media representations 
of these situations, and feminist standpoint theory is left in the difficult position of 
deciding whose account is the “truer” view from below. Whichever choice it makes will 
perpetuate the harmful view that patriarchy and racism are separable in cases of sexual 
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assault. Yet a decision must be made. Those accused of rape cannot go on indefinitely 
without either being sentenced or cleared, and their accusers require that some kind of 
communal condemnation take place. 
Hence, I claim that in these cases, feminist epistemology needs a method of error 
sensitivity that takes into account the epistemic privilege of those suffering oppression. 
Error sensitivity, the ability to recognize when claims are in error, requires the ability to 
look beyond your own perspective, even if your identity grants an epistemically 
privileged standpoint. In order to be error sensitive, communities must resist making 
assumptions about the epistemic privilege of either white women or African American 
men at the onset of evaluating an instance of possible sexual assault; instead, they must 
interpret these situations on a case by case basis. This requires acknowledging that either 
side can make claims that are in error with regards to the events in question. 
The limitations of feminist standpoint theory as it is currently articulated are 
recognizable in cases that involve possible interracial acquaintance rape. These cases 
bring two sources of epistemic privilege into conflict, the subjugated knowledge and 
epistemic privilege that women have as the result of the ubiquity of sexual assault and 
their recognition that their accounts of victimization will be downplayed and disregarded 
in cases of acquaintance rape and the subjugated knowledge and epistemic privilege that 
African American men have as the result of understanding that they will not necessarily 
be seen as “innocent until proven guilty” and that the mere accusation of raping a white 
woman can lead to the violence of lynching. Furthermore, instances of acquaintance rape 
are less likely to be resolved on the basis of things like DNA evidence and other 
seemingly straightforward matters of fact than cases that involve stranger rape. Instead of 
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focusing on the identity of the rapist or the question of whether or not sexual contact 
occurred, cases involving acquaintance rape center on the much more nebulous question 
of what constitutes consent and whether or not it was provided. 
Under Harding’s qualifications both women of all races and African American 
men have an important epistemic privilege in understanding the political reality of and 
reaction to interracial sexual assault. However, in cases of interracial acquaintance rape 
between a white woman and an African American man there are competing “views from 
below” to look towards with contradictory accounts of the incident. In this example 
epistemic privilege alone does not provide a means of determining what happened, what 
its significance of the occurrence is, or what the community’s response should be to the 
incident. Moreover, in the example of interracial sexual assault cases, the oppressions of 
patriarchy and race act concurrently. For both white women and African American men, 
their sexuality is essentialized in the incident. The incident becomes a lesson for white 
women about what happens to those who not only failed to attend to their own sexual 
virtue properly enough but also disrespected the purity of their whiteness by fraternizing 
with men of color in the first place. With regards to African American men, the 
accusation of rape acts to confirm the myth that men of color are hypersexual and violent. 
At the same time, outcries over the supposed action reinforce the idea that they are 
stepping out of line by taking the sexuality of white women, the assumed domain of 
white men. 
 
In “Marginality and Epistemic Privilege” Bat-Ami Bar On critiques the feminist 
use of epistemic privilege for relying upon an underdeveloped account of systems of 
power. Bar On claims, “[t]he attribution of agency to a marginality that is not at the same 
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time a centrality problematizes the attribution of epistemic privilege to the socially 
marginalized subjects. The source of the problem is the existence of multiple socially 
marginalized groups; is any one of these groups more epistemically privileged—does 
epistemic privilege matter?”xlii Bar On argues that when one position is chosen as the 
most epistemically privileged position it implies that that position is the farthest from a 
center of power. In the example of an interracial acquaintance rape, both the African 
American man and the white woman are on the peripheries of a central power, but as Bar 
On claims, these two standpoints are on the peripheries of different centers of power. 
The white woman is on the periphery of patriarchy while the African American 
man is on the periphery of white supremacy. While both could be considered on the 
periphery because they are not white men, Bar On warns against conflating sources of 
oppression. Drawing on Iris Marion Young’s concept of “the five faces of oppression” 
Bar On claims, “Instead of attempting to unify the oppression by providing a theoretical 
framework that will explain each and every kind of oppression and order that different 
kinds of oppressive relations, [Young] provides a theoretical framework that explains 
why one should resist the impulse to unify and how to go about politics in a 
heterogeneous world.”xliii While both African American men and white women are 
 
oppressed in relationship to white men, for Young and Bar On, the vast differences in the 
nature of racist oppression and sexism require that these be understood as different 
experiences in relation to different sources of power. This means that it is impossible to 
judge who is more on the periphery of power between white women and African 
American men because they are on the periphery of two separate centers of power. 
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Along with the difficulty in determining whose epistemic privilege takes 
precedence when they come from different sources of oppression, the act of trying to 
rank oppression also has harsh social consequences. In “Toward a New Vision,” Collins 
explains why the ranking of oppression is a dangerous proposition: “Adhering to a stance 
of comparing and ranking oppressions—the proverbial, ‘I’m more oppressed than you’— 
locks us all into a dangerous dance of competing for attention, resources and theoretical 
supremacy.”xliv For Young, unity is possible and helpful if people of different sources of 
oppression come together for political action, however, moves to determine who is the 
most oppressed often results in competition for political privileges. Rather than 
promoting unity to overcome oppression, the act of ranking oppression to find a “view 
from below” leaves both groups with fewer resources and prevents future political unity. 
Theorists inspired by feminist standpoint theory have often responded to 
intersecting standpoints of oppression by relying on the language of negotiation or 
mapping of systems of oppression rather than the language of epistemic privilege. 
Lorraine Code provides an example of this work in Ecological Thinking. Code’s 
approach in this work is to map structures of power when constructing knowledge. While 
the standpoints of women of all races, men of color, those who are colonized, and 
LGBTQ peoples are crucial to constructing better knowledge, the process of ecological 
thinking requires responsible knowers “to set high standards for the understanding that 
responsible action requires, yet to act on the best available explanation when definitive 
conclusions are elusive. It is, and it promotes thoughtful practice.”xlv While Code draws 
 
heavily on feminist standpoint theory including the work of Sandra Harding, ecological 
 
thinking goes farther than standpoint theory. Rather than providing a clear “view from 
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below” to ascribe to, Code’s concept of ecological thinking requires that the effects of 
structures of power on guiding myths be examined in order to provide the best possible 
course of action. The work of feminist epistemology for Code is “to produce ‘faithful 
accounts of the real world’ by working through genealogical, power-, and situation- 
sensitive inquiry to destabilize the imaginaries that confer a critical immunity upon states 
of fact whose historical-material contingency attests to their vulnerability to critique.”xlvi 
 
Producing better knowing means mapping the specific power structures in each incident, 
and a person’s identity and experience is a crucial component to understanding how to 
produce knowledge in each situation. Code never tries to claim that there is an ultimate 
standpoint “from below,” and ecological thinking requires a mapping process that could 
take into account multiple centers of oppression. 
In relation to women’s standpoints in sexual assault cases, Code argues that 
structures of patriarchy have silenced and discredited female rape victims.xlvii As a result, 
Code claims that rape victims ought to work within a network of advocates in order to 
develop their own testimonies. These advocates may give the rape victim a better chance 
at recognition in North American courts, but this is not the sole reason Code calls for 
advocacy. She explains that prejudices against women in general, and rape victims in 
particular, have prevented women from being able to represent their experiences to 
anyone. Advocacy could not only lead to better treatment for women in the courts but 
also lead to better knowledge about rape in the community.xlviii The job of advocates is to 
understand and negotiate the particular power structures that are at work in the 
oppression of the women they represent. 
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Yet Code’s account of rape testimonies in the legal system does not address the 
ways in which the system can silence both accusers and defendants. North American 
courts have certainly discredited female rape victims; however, the same courts have 
punished the men of color who were wrongly accused of rape, denied proper legal 
counsel, indicted by false or coerced confessions, or silenced by harassment and 
lynching. Code never discusses these histories, though it would not be hard to imagine 
her response: men of color have been silenced by structures of racism, and as a result 
they need advocacy in developing their testimonies as well. Although Code never 
addresses the possibility of advocating for African American men in interracial 
acquaintance rape trials directly, if good knowing requires mapping structures of 
oppression in academia, medicine, and the courts, it would follow that responsible 
ecological thinking requires that men of color also have access to advocacy to negotiate 
structures of racism in the court system. Advocates could be just as important for 
understanding the structures of power that oppress men of color as they would be at 
understanding white women’s oppression. In both cases, since the advocate is focused on 
a particular case and a particular person, there is nothing that would prevent her from 
focusing on the center of power that is most pertinent to her client without reducing all 
institutions of power to a single structure like the one Bar On warns against. 
Although providing all parties with advocacy may nullify the adverse effects of 
gender or race on knowing within the legal system by enabling expert negotiation of 
power structures, it does not create a mechanism for choosing between accounts of an 
incident. Making all accounts as clear as possible can be beneficial for resisting the 
influence of existing power structures, but it does not make it any easier for a judge or 
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jury to know that a testimony is wrong. Just as feminist standpoint theory cannot 
determine which “view from below” ought to take precedence without creating a 
potentially dangerous hierarchy of oppression, Code’s concept of advocacy cannot 
resolve conflicts between clear testimonies. Both theories continue to rest on the 
assumption that at some point in the knowledge-making process the parties involved will 
be able to recognize the truth. While feminist standpoint theory expects that the parties 
will be able to designate the appropriate view from below, Code anticipates that 
testimonies guided by expert advocacy will reveal what really happened. 
Code’s account of ecological thinking and advocacy opens up an important 
position in which epistemic privilege is changing and needs to be determined within each 
particular situation. Advocacy of both parties giving interracial acquaintance rape 
testimonies could provide a community with better understandings of the power of both 
racism and sexism in creating myths of sexuality. However, developing clearer accounts 
of the incident will not resolve the conflict between the two testimonies by itself. 
Harding’s and Code’s focuses are both on finding better knowleges. Harding relies on the 
term of “strong objectivity.” Finding more accounts and accounts that take recognize 
more structures of power provides knowledge that is less partial and more objective than 
conventional approaches. However, in cases where two accounts directly conflict and 
where a reaction is required from the community gathering a more objective account will 
not be enough to determine responsible action. 
The Importance of Error Sensitivity 
 
Creating better knowing in communities requires that feminist epistemology seek 
 
methods that are not only “more objective,”—as feminist standpoint theory and Code do 
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by recognizing otherwise disregarded points of knowledge—but also better at sensing 
how any particular account, even a “view from below” can be in error. The goal for 
feminist epistemology ought to be not only finding a less partial view but also developing 
methods of error sensitivity. In “Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis” 
Deborah G. Mayo argues that Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of induction can provide 
an important tool to the sciences that contemporary statistical methodology lacks because 
Peirce’s theory of induction claims that inductive methods are justified to the extent that 
they can recognize and correct errors in experimental tests. Mayo argues that, for Peirce, 
the progress of science depends upon its ability to self-correct errors in hypotheses and 
methods. This requires two things: first, science must “asymptotically approach truth in 
the long run,” and second, it must replace “rejected hypotheses with better (truer) 
ones.”xlixMayo defines induction for Peirce as “a matter of ‘trustworthy’ or reliable 
 
experimental testing. Evaluating the ‘trustworthiness of inductive procedures’ requires 
determining how reliably the detect error.”l Mayo uses an example of testing weight gain 
to explain how this might work. If ten scales are used to measure changes in weight and 
all ten of them show either no weight gain or minimal weight gain then the results of this 
study would be more trustworthy than a study that used only one scale. However, Mayo 
explains what is important from this example is not that more data can help researchers 
get closer to truth but rather that having multiple scales provides a way of determining if 
an error is occurring in the study: “[w]hile it is true that averaging more and more weight 
measurements…one would get asymptotically close to the true weight, that is not the 
rational for the particular inference. The rationale is rather that the error probabilistic 
 
properties of weighing procedure…inform one of the correct weight in the case at 
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hand.”li It is not just that the weights collected from multiple scales could be averaged to 
find a closer approximation of the true weight that matters, rather it is that by having 
multiple scales the researchers are able to judge if any scales that are being used in the 
testing are in error. 
In the much more complex example of feminist epistemology, the goal for 
feminist epistemologists ought not only be to reach the most objective account possible, 
as is the case with feminist standpoint theory, but also to be able to determine when 
accounts of knowledge, even feminist accounts of knowledge and accounts from 
oppressed standpoints, are in error. If feminist epistemologists only strive to attain 
objectivity by adopting the view from below they risk not being able to detect when 
views from below are reproducing errors, including errors caused by myths from various 
power structures. In the example of an interracial acquaintance rape case, both accounts 
cannot represent the whole truth, and trying to find the most oppressed standpoint as the 
deciding factor results in a dangerous ranking of oppression. In light of the critiques from 
Bar On, an approach like Code’s, which looks at the structures of power involved in each 
particular testimony provides the best way of reacting to structures of power. However, it 
is important that even a method such as this one be able to detect and self-correct its own 
errors. 
In this regard, the needs of feminist epistemology differ from the needs of science 
described by Peirce and Mayo because the subjects included in feminist inquiries have a 
different relationship with the methods of feminist inquiry than the subjects of scientific 
research have with scientific procedures. The most pressing difference is that the subjects 
of scientific research, for Peirce and Mayo, do not necessarily possess subjectivity while 
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the subjects of feminist inquiry always do. In the example of measuring changes in 
weight, a broken scale does not alter the mass of the subject being measured because the 
subject’s mass exists independently of the scales. In contrast, African American men and 
white women never develop identities as African American men or white women or 
present accounts of knowledge independently from the structures of power that surround 
them. Hence, racist myths and controlling structures of patriarchy can alter individuals’ 
understandings of themselves and their experiences. As a result, changing the methods of 
inquiry directed at African American men and white women can destabilize structures of 
power, or reinforce them, and provide either libratory or repressive means of creating 
knowledge. 
As an alternative to Peirce’s account of induction for the sciences that Mayo 
discusses, the work of Josiah Royce in The Problem of Christianity and his 1912 “Error 
and Truth” provides a concept of error that focuses on communal interpretation. For 
Royce, we establish error sensitivity by looking towards a larger viewpoint. As 
individuals, we look towards this larger viewpoint in our respective communities. As 
communities, we seek this larger viewpoint by relating to viewpoints outside of our 
community and viewpoints in the past. Royce’s community-oriented approach to error 
sensitivity provides feminist epistemology with a means of detecting error in both claims 
and methods while taking subjects’ standpoints and subjectivities into account. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
KNOWING, AGENCY, AND EPISTEMIC PRIVILEGE: A REVIEW OF 
CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY 
In the last chapter, I claimed that Harding’s approach to epistemic privilege is 
incapable of dealing with the challenge posed by Bar On, that feminist epistemology 
needs to conceive of multiple sources of oppression. While Code’s work may be able to 
conceive of multiple sources of oppression, her approach of advocacy does not give us a 
means of distinguishing between conflicting views from below. In this chapter, I will 
explore how contemporary feminist epistemology has addressed four commitments that I 
argue are necessary for answering the concerns of the previous chapter. After outlining 
the four commitments in the first half of the chapter, I assess how the resources available 
in existing feminist epistemology can be utilized to satisfy these commitments by 
examining epistemic privilege, responsible knowing, ecological thinking, and mestiza 
identity. Finally, I conclude by arguing that, if pooled together and utilized concurrently, 
these existing resources of feminist epistemology can satisfy the first three commitments; 
however, in order to satisfy the final commitment, feminist epistemology requires a 
concept of error and a method of error sensitivity. 
In order to both take into account multiple structures of power and distinguish 
between conflicting accounts from below, this chapter argues that a new model of 
feminist inquiry must, first, acknowledge that conventional epistemology and knowledge- 
making in the natural and social sciences has depended upon myths that maintain and 
reproduce social structures of power, such as sexism, racism, homophobia, classism, and 
colonialism. Second, while conventional knowledge-making processes have perpetuated 
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pernicious structures of power, better knowing will not just look beyond or question these 
structures of power but actually destabilize them, and in doing so, will be part of a 
liberatory social project. Third, better knowing requires that knowledge-making 
institutions such as academia, law, and the sciences, look to the lived experiences of 
those on the peripheries of power. In order to know well, communities must practice an 
intellectual pluralism that looks towards the ways of knowing that have most often been 
ignored by conventional epistemology. Finally, in order to maintain the liberatory social 
effects of feminist epistemology, a new account of feminist inquiry must be able to 
distinguish and judge between conflicting knowledge claims within communities, 
including conflicting claims that stem from the lived experiences of those on the 
peripheries of social power. 
Feminist inquiry must uphold these four commitments in order to avoid 
replicating the harms perpetuated by conventional methods of knowledge production. 
The problems introduced in the previous chapter stem from an ignorance of or a disregard 
for these commitments among the agents involved. In the courtroom, an emphasis on the 
conventional epistemology of the empirical sciences can lead to the dismissal of 
testimony that is not corroborated with empirical evidence like DNA or videotape. 
Without a commitment to a liberatory social project, the courts have no incentive to 
examine the roles that sexism and racism may be playing in their decisions. Likewise, if 
they do not look towards the experiences of those who are on the peripheries of social 
power, the courts will have no means of detecting or understanding the effects of those 
structures of oppression. By rooting knowledge in the lived experience of these Others, 
the courts can take into consideration the particularities of the situations necessary to 
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avoid falling into dangerous abstractions and basing judgments on the sweeping 
generalizations promoted by these abstractions. 
Commitment One: Conventional Epistemology Has Depended upon Myths that Maintain 
 
Existing Power Structures 
 
The call for a feminist understanding of knowing in Anglo-American feminism is 
rooted in critiques of canonical classic and Ancient philosophy , in particular, the 1980s 
and early 1990s works of Nancy Tuana, Genevieve Lloyd, and Susan Bordo. These three 
theorists critique the work of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Beacon, Kant and Hegel. While 
the critiques by Tuana, Lloyd, and Bordo vary, they all argue that traditional 
epistemology has relied upon metaphors of femininity to define proper knowing as 
separated from the bodily senses and the private. Pure knowing under these 
interpretations became  defined as something isolated from bodily needs, family life, and 
utilitarian function. 
Through these metaphors, canonical philosophers have defined feminine ways of 
knowing as intuitive, emotional, domestic, ruled by caprice and lacking focus. Masculine 
ways of knowing became defined as rational, unemotional, focused on public life, 
universal, and inspired by or mimicking God. Due to the gendering of these 
characteristics, the knowledge that women produce as a result of their political situation 
has never been acknowledged as valuable. Therefore, women have never been seen as 
properly intelligent or capable of worthwhile expertise. 
Like Tuana, Lloyd, and Bordo, Harding claims that conventional epistemology 
has perpetuated sexism. For Harding, the harms of masculinist epistemology are that the 
myths of “pure reason” and the “universal knower” have camouflaged existing prejudices 
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and motivations in the sciences. Thus, masculinist traditions make the knowledge 
produced in the sciences “less objective.” In Sciences From Below, Harding summarizes 
the core arguments of feminist standpoint theory: “the argument has been that gender 
relations have shaped not just who gets to do science, but also the content and 
philosophical framework of even the most highly regards sciences. … The consequences 
of this androcentrism are bad for social justice. But they also deteriorate the adequacy 
and, thus, legitimacy of scientific claims themselves.”i Sciences that depend on 
 
conventional epistemology are harmful to the extent that they present a biased account of 
the world as neutral, natural, and outside of time.  The unwillingness of sciences based in 
conventional epistemology to look inward and to acknowledge the biases and monetary 
commitments of its practitioners and institutions results in a lack of objectivity: 
“[conventional] science is epistemologically under developed insofar as it cannot detect 
how androcentric commitments can, and all too often do, shape every stage of the 
research process. … Feminist Science studies has proposed scientifically more competent 
and politically progressive standards for objectivity, rationality good method, and ‘real 
science.’”ii Better knowing, for Harding, is more objective knowing. Harding uses the 
term “strong objectivity” to denote knowledge that is created by individuals and 
institutions that are able to not only recognize their own biases but also adopt a view from 
below locations of privilege. By recognizing their own biases and adopting a view from 
below, these individuals abandon the myth of “pure reason” in favor of recognizing their 
own accounts as limited perspectives from situations of social privilege. 
The claim that conventional sciences are not objective enough is shared by 
 
Nelson, who argues that the problem is not concepts of empiricism or rationality 
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themselves; instead, Nelson argues, the individualism of traditional methods of inquiry 
needs to be replaced with a concept of the community as the knowing subject. Although 
feminist epistemologists ought to reject the individualism of traditional epistemology, 
they should maintain a form of naturalized empiricism to serve as a standard of evidence. 
Nelson argues that the basics of empiricism are uncontroversial and that feminists ought 
to maintain standards of rationality and evidence. In “Who Knows: From Quine to 
Feminist Empiricism,” Nelson claims that there are parallels between feminist science 
scholarship and the work of W.V. Quine. Nelson contends that Quine has a 
thoroughgoing historicism and challenges distinctions between metaphysics and science 
as well as between ‘common-sense’ and science. Furthermore, she contends that his 
naturalist positions are especially promising for feminist philosophies of science. In 
particular, she uses Quine to establish theories of feminist empiricism.iii 
 
However, in contrast to Nelson and Harding, who argue primarily that the harms 
of conventional epistemology and conventional sciences result from a situation where the 
institutions and practitioners are either not objective enough as a result of sexist and racist 
biases or fail to uphold the core of empiricism, theorists like Code and Sarah Lucia 
Hoagland have argued that the problem is not just that the sciences have irrationalities, 
particularities, and biases that they cover up; rather, appeals to objectivity and reason in 
themselves are flawed. Thus, while Nelson and Harding primarily launch their criticisms 
of dominant epistemologies and conventional science at specific racist or sexist practices 
and the concept of individualism, Code and Hoagland go farther to undermine the 
supposed goals of reason and objectivity. In “Resisting Rationality,” Hoagland claims 
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that women ought to separate themselves from labels of objectivity and rationality all 
together. 
Hoagland maintains that discussing situated knowledges does not do enough to 
undermine dominant ideas of objectivity and rationality. Instead, she calls for scholars to 
study relativity with the kind of attention and complexity which they have devoted to 
objectivity.iv She claims that moving to a model of knowing persons rather than things, as 
Code suggests in What Can She Know?, offers a new logic. The social harms that are 
created by conventional accounts of knowing are not simply the results of bad practice 
for Code and Hoagland; rather, concrete social harms are the result of the fixation on 
unattainable and misleading concepts of objectivity and reasonability that spring from the 
myths of “pure reason” and the “universal human knower.” 
Beyond the myth that good knowing is the product of a universal human knower who 
practices pure reason untouched by particularities, the body, or emotion Code also argues that 
traditional epistemology has perpetuated oppression by abstracting what is being known. The 
result is that traditional epistemologies fail to take into account the subjectivity of what is being 
known. Code argues that while there are notable exceptions, the majority of Anglo-American 
epistemology is based on what she calls the “S knows p” structure. In order to complete the 
epistemological project, philosophers would need to justify the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of “S knows p” and do so in a way that would satisfy an idealized skeptic. However, 
Code argues that it is harmful to assume that this could be the end of an epistemological project, 
or that it ought to be the ultimate aim. 
The “S knows p” model marks what Code calls the positivist-empiricist orientation of 
epistemology. She uses this term to highlight that epistemologies in this model promote the idea 
that necessary and sufficient conditions can be found. Code explains this problem in “Taking 
Subjectivity into Account”: “For positivist epistemologists, sensory observation in ideal 
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observation conditions is the privileged source of knowledge, offering the best promise of 
certainty. Knowers are detached, neutral spectators, and the objects of knowledge are separate 
from them; they are inert items in the observational knowledge-gathering process.”v   By ignoring 
the potential subjectivity of the known, the “S knows p” model forces conventional epistemology 
to objectify all that it attempts to know. 
Commitment Two: Better Knowing Must Participate in Destabilizing Systems of 
 
Oppression 
 
While Harding, Nelson, and Code have all claimed that the idea of universal and 
neutral knowing has coincided with existing power structures of racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and classism, feminists have also argued that good knowing requires both 
investigating these structures and undermining them. In relationship to the sciences, 
Harding’s view from below implies that when science is geared towards those who are 
oppressed, it can produce liberatory effects.  Both Harding and Code argue that, when 
responsible, science’s liberatory effects could be geared towards overcoming poverty, 
creating healthy communities with the environment, and improving the physical health of 
human beings globally. Harding concludes, “the model for good science should be 
research programs explicitly directed by liberatory political goals.”vi   Better knowing 
 
does not lead to progressive politics by coincidence; good knowing is always geared 
towards the purpose of overcoming oppression. However, accepting that good knowing 
has a purpose is impossible when knowers accept the myth that knowledge can and 
should be “pure” and separated from political concerns. 
In order to destabilize systems of oppression, good knowing has to produce good 
practice. Code describes this relationship as responsible knowing. Responsible knowing 
requires a relationship that takes into account the subjectivity of the known. In particular, 
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responsible knowing involves recognizing that the knower  must accept the known as a 
subjective perspective that should not be appropriated or dismissed. Practically, this 
means that responsible knowing stands opposed to projects of dominance that prevent 
those who are oppressed from telling their own stories. In her 2004 Ecological Thinking, 
Code expands upon the relationship between knowledge and action by claiming that 
ecological thinking requires “thoughtful practice.”vii 
 
In order to adopt “thoughtful practice,” feminist epistemology requires that good 
knowing aims at bettering the lives of those at the peripheries of power. Thus, Code’s 
examples of good knowing include scientists who discover links between pesticides and 
breast cancer and, therefore, strongly advocate changes to agricultural standards, patient 
advocates who trace the relationship between gender and women’s lack of proper pain 
management in medicine and, in doing so, create better practices of pain management, 
and advocates of sexual assault victims who both help construct better accounts of the 
assault and provide legal assistance to victims. 
Commitment  Three: Better Knowing Is Situated within the Lived Experiences of Those 
on the Peripheries of Power 
Academia, law, and science have deemed believable, credible, and true only those 
epistemic judgments made by the most privileged members of society. Rarely have these 
institutions of power called upon women, men of color, those who have been colonized, 
and those with the least economic clout to determine or deliver “the truth.” As a result 
that which has been accepted as true by knowledge-making institutions reflects the 
experiences and interests of those in power. Thus, feminist epistemologists argue that, in 
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order to create more just communities and seek better knowing, the knowledge-making 
process must include more views from a diversity of social locations. 
The strategies for better knowing presented by feminist epistemologists rely on 
the understanding that a knower’s situation influences her knowledge-making process. 
From this understanding, many feminist epistemologists share a commitment to locating 
better knowing within the everyday lived experiences of women, people of color, the 
colonized, and other oppressed peoples. From Harding’s focus on the view from below to 
Code’s claim that advocating the testimonies of oppressed peoples produces good 
knowing that was discussed in the last chapter, these theorists maintain that individuals 
outside the center of power develop knowledges that are unavailable to and often 
discredited by conventional authorities. Code summarizes this dynamic in Ecological 
Thinking: 
Feminists are well aware that within the insider/outsider structures that frame the 
politics of public knowledge and the prestige of scientific knowledge, ‘ordinary’ 
women’s voices—like those of other disenfranchised knowers—often go unheard 
and fail to achieve autonomous acknowledgement. Their reports of violence, 
sexual assault, domestic abuse, racism and sexism in the work place and in the 
world are often discredited.viii 
 
Code’s reference to sexual assault in her description of “insider/outsider structures” 
highlights the ways in which all knowledge claims about sexual assault are controversial 
subjects involving politics of gender and sexuality. Thus, individuals making these claims 
are subject to disenfranchisement under patriarchy. 
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In order to develop a method of knowing that refrains from discrediting those on 
the peripheries of power, feminist epistemologists contend that all knowledge claims 
must be viewed within the contexts of the knowers’ communities, commitments, and 
political situations. Good knowing does not take place exclusively in the laboratory, the 
university, or the courtroom. Instead, good knowing arises from an interaction between 
individuals, their communities, and their environments. In her 2008 Sciences from Below, 
 
Harding notes that “the feminist standpoint mantra” is “start off research and politics 
from women’s lives.”ix She puts this mantra in contrast to “the conceptual frameworks of 
the research disciplines.”x Conventional, authoritative models of knowing fail to the 
extent that they remove knowledge from these situations or ignore the insights of those 
whose knowledge-making processes have never been accredited by traditionally 
dominant institutions of knowledge.  While feminist standpoint theorists start from the 
position that good knowing needs to be grounded in women’s experience, this foundation 
remains controversial. Joan Scott argues in “Experience” that theories that begin with 
experience as a foundation risk utilizing an ahistorical, acontextual concept that resists 
examination. Scott claims that an unanalyzed concept of experience will reinforce 
existing ideological systems: “Talking about experience in these ways leads us to take the 
existence of individuals for granted (experience is something people have) rather than ask 
how conceptions of selves (of subjects and their identities) are produced. It operates 
within an ideological construction that not only make individuals the starting point of 
knowledge, but that also naturalizes categories such as man, woman, black, white, 
heterosexual, or homosexual by treating them as given characteristics of individuals.”xi 
 
She goes on to note that taking individuals for granted prevents us from questioning how 
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“subjects are constituted as different in the first place.”xii For post-structuralist feminists 
like Scott, starting at “experience” means taking for granted an ideology of individual 
subjectivity and agency. Because every concept exists within discourses of power, every 
foundation that escapes analysis is problematic. 
In “Phenomenology, Post-structuralism, and Feminist Theory on the Concept of 
Experience,” Linda Martín Alcoff argues that Scott and other post-structuralists have 
taken their arguments to a troubling extreme by posing an uncomplicated account of 
experience: “feminist theory has swung from the extreme of taking personal experience 
as the foundation for knowledge to discrediting experience as the product of 
phallogocentrism.”xiii Although Scott frames experience as a particular form of discourse, 
 
Alcoff argues that, when one moves past a naïve view of experience as uninvestigatable, 
it can guide an understanding of knowledge along with the deconstruction of ideologies. 
Hence, she claims that the process of making experience visible has disrupted ideologies. 
In particular, she argues that looking at women’s experience has positively impacted the 
political realities for survivors of acquaintance rape. With regards to descriptions of these 
experiences, she claims, “Such subjective descriptions have often had subversive political 
effects when they challenge existing epistemic hierarchies concerning what kinds of 
embodied speakers have credibility and authority, and when they raise questions about 
the benign status of institutionalized heterosexuality.”xiv Thus, Alcoff argues that 
 
methods that place epistemic value on women’s experiences, especially phenomenology, 
 
can subvert patriarchal ideologies. 
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Summarizing Commitments One through Three 
 
Up until this point Harding and Code have shared and upheld three common 
commitments of feminist epistemology. By forcing those producing traditionally 
dominant knowledge to acknowledge their own situations of social privilege and 
encouraging knowledge producing institutions to look towards the view from below 
Harding’s feminist standpoint theory requires that the oppressive myths of conventional 
epistemology are examined and rejected in favor of starting from the experiences of those 
on the peripheries. Likewise, Code’s rejection of the “S knows p” model of conventional 
epistemology allows her work to take into account subjectivity in a way that is closed off 
to epistemology relying on practices of abstraction to achieve pure knowledge. 
Both Harding and Code claim that good knowing has to be set towards a purpose 
of improving the lives of those on the peripheries of power. For Harding this means that 
good science (both natural and social sciences) have to be explicitly directed at 
improving the lives of those who are oppressed. Because she rejects the myth of pure 
knowledge, knowledge producing institutions are held responsible for moves that have 
harsh oppressive consequences and good knowing will be directed at producing 
liberatory effects. For Code good knowing destabilizes oppression by linking knowledge 
making to advocacy and connecting knowledge to thoughtful practice. 
Moreover, Harding and Code both advocate not limiting good knowing to 
traditional knowledge producing institutions, such as laboratories, academia, and the law. 
Instead good knowing is found within the context of communities and must be 
understood in relationship to the specific situations from which it arises. 
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Commitment Four: Feminist Inquiry Should Be Able to Adjudicate between Conflicting 
 
Accounts from Below 
 
While none of these authors explicitly argue that there needs to be a way to 
adjudicate between conflicting claims from below Harding, Nelson, and Code all argue to 
some extent that a progressive epistemological project will have to understand 
epistemological communities as places of complex relationships and potential conflict 
and that good knowing must avoid essentializing the experiences of women and those on 
the peripheries of social power. Thus, for all three authors good knowing requires being 
able to recognize that the experiences from specific Others is situated within a particular 
location and that progressive epistemology must resist the temptation to fall into concepts 
of “women’s experience” in general. Starting inquiry with a view from below does not 
provide us with unified ‘laws’ of action, absolute truths, or unconditional standards of 
evidence. Rather good knowing requires starting at messy situations and determining 
workable methods of inquiry on a case by case basis. 
In Feminism Without Borders Chandra Mohanty articulates a common danger of 
western second wave feminism. When looking towards an uncomplicated view of 
“women’s experience” western feminists speaking of “third world women,” have 
engaged in discursive practices that idealize concepts of women in general or third world 
women in general “serve to distort Western feminist political practices, and limit the 
possibility of coalitions among (usually White) Western feminists and working class and 
feminists of color around the world. These limitations are evident in the construction of 
the (implicitly consensual) priority of issues around which apparently all women are 
expected to organize.”xv  Mohanty’s criticism that western second wave feminism has 
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perpetuated an inadequately nuanced ideal of “women” in which not all women can or 
would wish to be included highlights a colonialist move on the part of second wave 
feminism that limits its effectiveness in building coalitions around political causes and 
limits white western feminists’ ability to understand the needs or experiences of women 
globally. 
While Mohanty’s work in Feminism Without Borders has been one of the most 
commonly cited critiques of second wave feminism’s approach to women outside of the 
west many post-colonial feminists and women of color have made similar argumentsxvi 
that by assuming that there is such a thing as “women’s experience” that can be 
universalized has reinscribed the oppressive structures of racism, classism, and 
colonialism. The importance of such critiques has not been lost on several key thinkers in 
feminist epistemology. Both Code and Harding argue that good knowing has to avoid 
essentializing the positions of those on the margins. In the same way that Mohanty argues 
that there is no specific “third world women’s experience” both Code and Harding claim 
that good knowing cannot assume unified experiences of those on the peripheries of 
power. In order to avoid the harms articulated by Mohanty and others, Code and Harding 
remain adamant that good knowledge comes from the experience of “specific 
knowers.”xvii Gaining knowledge from specific knowers rather than relying on 
essentialized assumptions of groups in general Harding and Code claim means that good 
knowing can only take place on a case by case basis. In order to avoid the violence of 
essentializing diverse groups and communities good knowing cannot rely on fixed laws 
of truth, unwavering standards of evidence, or unified methodologies. 
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Harding admits that the logic of standpoint theory has the potential for falling into 
 
essentialist accounts of women’s experience. However, she claims that feminist 
standpoint theory can also be used to avoid essentialism when it understands the view 
from below as contradicting, multiple and complex. In Whose Science? Whose 
Knowledge? Harding states,   “Feminist standpoint theory is not in itself either 
essentialist or nonessentialist, racist or antiracist, ethnocentric or not. It contains 
tendencies in each direction; it contains contradictions, and its logic has surprising 
consequences: the subject/agent of feminist knowledge is multiple and contradictory, not 
just unitary and ‘coherent’.”xviii In her later article “Rethinking Standpoint 
 
Epistemology,” Harding develops this same claim, “So the logic of the directive to ‘start 
thought from women’s lives’ requires that one start one’s thought from multiple lives that 
are in many ways in conflict with each other, each of which itself has multiple and 
contradictory commitments. …The logic of standpoint theory leads to the refusal to 
essentialize its subjects of knowledge”xix Starting thought from women’s lives requires 
starting thought from multiple perspectives and when done well requires avoiding the 
pitfalls that Mohanty warns against. Because there is no essential unified experience of 
what it means to be a woman, (or impoverished, or racially oppressed, or a lesbian) then 
looking to the view from below always involves looking towards several often conflicting 
accounts. 
Theorists who theorize knowing as a communal process such as Nelson and to a 
different extent Code have the challenge of not only avoiding essentializing one view 
from below but also must be able to conceive of epistemic communities as complex and 
often contradictory. In “Epistemological Communities” Nelson explains, 
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“epistemological communities are multiple, historically contingent, and dynamic: they 
have fuzzy, often overlapping boundaries; they evolve, dissolve, and recombine; and they 
have a variety of ‘purposes’ and projects which may include (as in the case of science 
communities) but frequently do not include (as a priority) the production of 
knowledge.”xx Understanding from communities requires understanding the way in which 
 
the community is historically situated and therefore cannot lead to ahistorical accounts. 
Moreover, to understand from a community requires that we understand communities as 
changing and seeped in internal contradiction. Rather than getting clear perspective from 
epistemic communities Nelson argues that “epistemological communities are not 
monolithic. … to recognize that such communities have generated bodies of knowledge, 
adopted standards, and developed categories of which each member of these communities 
accepts some—while recognizing that not all members of feminist communities agree on 
all things that there may be no single belief that is held by all feminists.”xxi Members in 
 
communities share certain standards and may come up with sets of beliefs that determine 
action and future inquiry for the community but this process is constantly being 
reevaluated and debated amongst its members. 
For Code to avoid essentializing the experiences of Other and in order to 
understand epistemic communities as complex, contradicting entities often riddled with 
disagreement requires that feminist epistemology reject a strict objectivism. However, 
communities are also places that require decisions to be made and concrete actions to be 
taken. Therefore in Code’s “Taking Subjectivity into Account” she argues that feminist 
epistemology needs to adopt a kind of mitigated relativism: “A reconstructed 
epistemological project has to retain an empirical-realist core that can negotiate the 
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fixities and less stable constructs of the physical-social world, while refusing to endorse 
the objectivism of the positivist legacy or the subjectivism of radical relativism.”xxii 
Citing Haraway Code argues that an unmitigated relativism gives “a view from nowhere 
that pretends to be everywhere” but a positivist objectivism gives us a “view that is 
everywhere that pretends to be nowhere” neither side of relativism/objectivism is able to 
both understand knowledge as rooted in the particularities of subjects while also 
providing useful accounts of knowledge that are required for maintaining liberatory 
practices. Hence Code argues that knowledge claims must be related to specific 
conditions rather than abstracted into universalizable laws but that when action must be 
taken on the basis of knowledge claims we must look towards reasonable and workable 
solutions, even in this sense relying on empirical evidence: 
The position I am advocating is one for which knowledge is always relative to 
(i.e., a perspective on, a standpoint in) specifiable circumstances.  Hence it is 
constrained by realist, empiricist commitment according to which getting those 
circumstances right is vital effective action. …Practice will show, not once and 
for all but case by case, whether conclusions are reasonable and workable. Hence 
the position at once allows for the development of practical projects and for the 
corrigibility.xxiii 
 
Harding, Nelson, and Code all recognize the danger in essentializing the experiences of 
those on the peripheries of social power and assuming that communal knowledge is 
uncontested within communities. Effectively, this results in each author claiming that 
good knowing involves learning from each specific situation and evaluating that 
experience on a case-by-case basis. However, while each author refuses to essentialize 
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none explains what exactly should be done within specific cases that involve conflicting 
accounts from below. The closest solution to this question comes from Code who argues 
for finding the most practical and workable solution yet this in itself is vague. 
Because knowledge claims are always made within communities, resolving 
conflicts between claims is essential for any community’s ability to develop and progress. 
More specifically, because knowledge claims are always made within complex and 
diverse communities with multiple centers of oppression, resolving conflicts between 
claims made by situated knowing subjects drawing from their lived experiences at the 
peripheries of power is essential for any community’s ability to uphold a liberatory social 
project. Since communities cannot move forward without resolving conflicts between 
claims, resolutions cannot be delayed indefinitely. 
As explained in the previous chapter, neither Harding nor Code are able to 
 
provide an account of how to decide between conflicting views from below. In cases such 
as conflicting accounts of a sexual assault, the accuser, the accused, and the community 
at large need to resolve the conflict in order to progress. Possible victims require that 
their safety is provided for and that their accounts are met with action, and accused 
perpetrators of sexual assault cannot have their lives put on hold indefinitely while their 
guilt or innocence is debated. Moreover, there is little likelihood that the two parties can 
be expected to compromise between themselves as to whether or not a sexual encounter 
was assault. The community at large has to respond to cases such as these in a timely 
manner, and doing so requires being able to judge claims, even conflicting claims that 
both come from points of epistemic privilege. 
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Epistemic Privilege, Feminist Empiricism, and Responsible Knowing 
 
The work by Harding and subsequent feminist epistemologists to promote the 
concept of epistemic privilege of women and other oppressed peoples provides the basis 
for meeting the aforementioned commitments. However, the limitations of epistemic 
privilege addressed by previous critics and discussed in the previous chapter have lead 
several theorists, especially Code, to recontextualize it within the larger project of 
responsible knowing. In this section, I examine how Code’s concept of responsible 
knowing supplements and modifies Harding’s concept of epistemic privilege in order to 
establish how individuals who possess epistemic privilege still might be able to improve 
their knowledges. 
In the recent Sciences from Below, Harding continues to maintain her support for 
the concept of epistemic privilege. According to Harding in this work, the “main task” of 
progressive researchers is to “‘study up,’ to identify and explain the material and 
conceptual practices of power which are often undetectable by those who engage in 
them.”xxiv Yet Harding acknowledges that the sciences cannot simply look below to 
women’s lives. Instead, they need to look to how women’s lives are structured and 
experienced within the political situations of households. Furthermore, this requires that 
the sciences understand how structures of racism and colonialism have shaped 
households globally through concepts of modernity. 
 
Yet, even with these developments in her theories, Harding’s commitment to 
epistemic privilege remains problematic in the ways explained in the previous chapter. It 
still fails to provide a mechanism for dealing with competing views from below. 
57  
Furthermore, the concept of epistemic privilege does not present a method for helping 
those who possess a view from below to improve their knowledges. However, when 
epistemic privilege is understood as part of a larger project of epistemic responsibility, it 
becomes possible to create a means for improving the views from below. 
Throughout her work, Code promotes a concept of epistemic virtue. This begins 
with a concept of epistemic responsibility and evolves into her latest concept of 
ecological thinking. Unlike feminist empiricism, the concepts related to epistemic virtue 
do not attempt to promote better knowing through standards of evidence; instead, they 
promote better knowing through various strategies that help individuals negotiate 
structures of power in order to assert their knowledge claims. In her 1987 Epistemic 
Responsibility, Code argues that rather than choosing between foundationalist and 
rationalist epistemologies, we need to reconceive of epistemology in terms of an idea of 
“the responsibility to know.” Her claim in this work is not that traditional epistemology 
has been wholly useless but that its focus on abstract questions that presume abstracted 
and often isolated knowers limits its insights into meaningful questions that arise from 
experience: “The implicit view often seems to be that, if epistemologists could get clear 
about what justifies our claims that this is a hand and that is a doorknob, then all the rest 
would follow.”xxv  Epistemological questions that arise from experience involve knowing 
 
subjects that are situated within concerns of communities, ethics, and politics, and as a 
result, the answers to epistemological questions do not just have implications for 
epistemology; rather, good epistemological questions often carry moral significance. 
Hence, Code states, “[m]y aim is to understand epistemic life as it is, not in a tidied-up, 
abstracted version.”xxvi   Throughout her first two books, Code begins to radicalize 
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traditional conceptions of epistemology. While these two books work on different central 
themes, they interweave into each other and work to further inform her later work, 
especially her arguments in Ecological Thinking. In What Does She Know? Code begins 
a project that continues in all her later work. She begins to develop her idea of second- 
person knowing. “Second-person knowing” means not only accepting someone's account 
as genuine but also recognizing it as a perspective that we ultimately should not conquer 
and may be prevented from fully accessing. 
Responsible knowers become important aspects of their communities by tying 
moral obligations to ways of knowing. This becomes an even larger claim for Code when 
she states that human flourishing, in communities and as individuals, requires responsible 
knowing that entails throwing off the restrictive dichotomies of traditional epistemic 
practices as well as abandoning limiting prejudices. Responsible knowers examine both 
their own subjective knowledge and their systems of public knowledge, while 
understanding that the two are distinct aspects of both knowers and the known. Code’s 
concept of responsible knowing creates a broader context for the idea of epistemic 
privilege. Within this context, epistemic privilege has a purpose, to promote human 
flourishing. With this purpose in place, epistemic privilege is granted to certain 
knowledge claims because they serve that purpose better than other knowledge claims, 
and individuals with epistemic privilege can be more or less responsible as knowers, 
depending on how well they contribute to that purpose. As a result, it is possible to 
evaluate the knowledge possessed by individuals with epistemic privilege. Without the 
concept of responsible knowing, all knowledge claims made by individuals with 
epistemic privilege are equally unassailable. 
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Code claims that traditional epistemology focuses on a conception of the knower 
as an atomistic individual who knows the best when she is separated from an external 
world and community as much as possible. However, she contrasts this approach with 
traditional moral theories that seem to always work with the premise that humans are 
social beings. In contrast to the idea accepted by traditional epistemology that mingling 
the knowledges of multiple subjective selves dilutes the quality of the knowledge, Code 
claims that knowledge itself is created through communities, or as she puts it, “Human 
beings are cognitively interdependent in a fundamental sense, and knowledge is, 
essentially, a commonable commodity. ”xxvii    Human beings are incapable of ever 
 
attaining knowledge by themselves, and responsible knowers develop knowledge more 
fully both by situating their own knowledges in their communal settings and by 
interpreting others' knowledges in relation to their communities. Code notes that central 
to this account of knowledge is the idea that communities have to work through bonds of 
trust to establish knowledge. 
Feminist Epistemology and Structures of Power 
 
Throughout her criticisms mentioned in the previous chapter and articulated in 
“Marginality and Epistemic Privilege,” Bar On contends that the concept of epistemic 
privilege relies on an under-complicated notion of structures of social power. This section 
addresses Bar On’s criticisms in more detail. In particular, it examines how Bar On’s 
reference to the work of Iris Marion Young actually provides the resources necessary for 
making epistemic privilege viable in the face of overlapping sources of oppression. 
Finally, it analyzes how in Ecological Thinking, Code addresses how epistemic privilege 
might function amidst multiple sources of oppression. 
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“The view from below” implies that power is centralized and that social 
oppression echoes out from one place of privilege. Bar On argues that looking at 
epistemic privilege through the uncomplicated lens of one central source of power 
prevents theorists from understanding how agency and resistance could ever be possible 
at sites of oppression. Drawing on the work of bell hooks, which she criticizes for relying 
on a concept epistemic privilege, Bar On argues, “[t]he attribution of agency to a 
marginality that is not at the same time a centrality problematizes the attribution of 
epistemic privilege to the socially marginalized subjects.”xxviii She claims that the work of 
hooks in “Looking to the Margins as a Space of Radical Openness” and “On Self- 
Recovery” continues a project from the 1970s when Western second wave feminists 
began to look at women’s experiences as places of survival and resistance as well as 
places of victimization. Doing this requires “realizing as Hooks [sic] does, that an 
important form of a resistance that is at the same time the creation of a counterhegemonic 
discourse is a construction of the self through the creation of a memory of a past that 
either precedes oppression or is a memory of resisting voices.”xxix Recreating the self as 
an entity with agency and the ability to resist promotes empowerment outside of a 
centralized structure of power. Bar On recognizes that empowerment is important but 
claims that relying on epistemic privilege to do this results in essentializing agency and 
re-inscribes obedience to a knowledge authority. 
 
As an alternative to the conception of power as one central entity, Bar On 
suggests that feminist epistemologists look towards Iris Marion Young’s Five Faces of 
Oppression. In the introduction to this piece, Young claims, “[i]n the most general sense, 
all oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their 
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capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings.”xxx Although oppression always 
implies some kind of limitation, Young argues that, beyond the most abstracted concept 
of oppression as limitation, structures of oppression, such as racism, sexism, classism, 
heterosexism, and colonialism have to be understood as fundamentally different types of 
oppression as they are experienced concurrently by various social groups. Young 
theorizes, “oppression names in fact a family of concepts and conditions…exploitation, 
marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.”xxxi For Young, unity 
is not developed through experiencing oppression from the same power source. Instead, 
unity is a tool that various social groups can use for political progress. Those who suffer 
from sexism, racism, and heterosexism can form a political unity, but that unity is both 
voluntary and temporary. Such unity requires active participation, rather than shared 
identities, and it disappears when it is no longer politically useful. 
Although Bar On rejects the usefulness of epistemic privilege, by drawing 
attention to Young’s work, she highlights a means for understanding social groups in 
relation to multiple centers of oppression. By embracing this understanding, new theories 
could make epistemic privilege useful for the project of responsible knowing. In 
Ecological Thinking, Code continues to promote the epistemic privilege of oppressed 
peoples while conceiving of a feminist epistemology that works within multiple 
structures of power by defining how better accounts of knowing can take place within 
situations of overlapping structures of oppression. 
In the introduction to Ecological Thinking, Code explains that Epistemic 
Responsibility “relies on an excessively benign conception of community, imagined 
without contest to provide space for and uniform access to open debate, for deliberations 
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neither cluttered by hidden agendas nor thwarted by searing disputes or tyrannical 
oppressions—thus imagined to enable a relatively smooth journey toward 
knowledge.”xxxii While critiquing her own work, Code also illuminates the key challenge 
to feminist epistemology previously posed by Bar On: How can feminist epistemology 
uphold a commitment to communally situated knowledge, pluralist practices, and 
“locating knowledge at the ‘ground’ of the experience of specific knowers”xxxiii while 
simultaneously understanding communities as places of conflict influenced and often 
controlled by multiple oppressive power structures? 
Code endeavors to confront this challenge by posing the eponymous concept of 
“ecological thinking.” According to Code, Ecological thinking “reconfigures 
relationships all the way down” to relationships of politics, epistemology, science, and 
ethics as well as humans' relationships to the environment. In this manner, ecological 
thinking is an expansion of Code's commitments in her earlier work. Ecological thinking 
radicalizes epistemology as a whole to include a focus on situations and a move away 
from established and restrictive dichotomies, including dichotomies that perpetuate the 
concept of a single center of power, such as the feminine/masculine dichotomy. 
Code frames this project in reference to what she calls “social imaginaries,” that 
is, cultural assumptions and their influence on knowledge claims. Drawing on Michel 
Foucault and Gilles Deluze, Code claims that ecological thinking involves a conscious 
and reflective approach to understanding social imaginaries that work to both construct 
and complicate norms of what it means to adequately know something. “Thus contesting, 
infiltrating this entrenched imaginary is a reflexive process of requiring it to submit its 
assumptions of universal rightness to scrutiny, its residual totalizing unity-of-science 
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assumptions, and its governing beliefs about the nature of nature, knowledge and 
knowledgeable subjectivity.”xxxiv This overall focus on moving to reconstruct social 
imaginaries frees her term “ecology” from its association with the natural environmental 
and ties it to social, cultural, and legal work as well. 
In accord with the fourth commitment of feminist epistemology, reconfiguring 
large social imaginaries requires starting at the local level of embedded situations: “I am 
proposing that ecological thinking can reconfigure epistemology, piece by piece in 
detailed local inquiries whose effects often have global resonances.”xxxv Code heralds 
environmental scientist Rachel Carson's work with specific communities affected by 
insecticides and patient advocate Karen Messing’s commitments to the individual health 
concerns and situations of the workers she studied, as well as advocacy groups’ work 
with particular rape victims, for promoting this kind of local-to-global change. 
In order to situate knowledge within personal experience and promote this kind of 
local-to-global change, Code claims that feminist epistemology must uphold personal 
testimony as an essential source of knowledge. In particular, Code’s method of ecological 
thinking requires promoting the inclusion of testimonies from oppressed peoples into 
communal knowing.   By claiming that testimony is an important source of knowledge, 
Code is working not only to validate the experiences and knowledge of oppressed 
peoples but also to destabilize the commonly received epistemology of isolated 
individualism as well as the imaginary ideal of a “pure” knowing that can be separated 
from moral and political aims. As aforementioned, Code established this larger focus in 
Epistemic Responsibility. Yet, she states that her use of the term “ecological thinking” 
highlights that she wants to situate her new account of knowledge in both habitat and 
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ethos, that is, in order to know responsibly, we need to take into account the state of the 
current environment socially, communally, politically, sexually and ecologically, even as 
the process relies on acquiring certain epistemic virtues. In this manner, Code's account 
of ecological thinking draws on the major themes of feminist standpoint theorists, 
including the idea that knowing is always a matter of being situated within a certain place 
and that the situation affects not only what you know but also how well you know 
something. 
However, Code's account here goes beyond standpoint theory and its focus on a 
central structure of power. She specifically uses the term “ecological” to draw attention to 
the multitude of factors that must be accounted for in order to understand the patterns and 
long-term effects of structures of power. The first chapter of Ecological Thinking opens 
with the claim that her theory is based on a working definition of ecology that entails 
understanding through patterns, situations, and advocacy: “Broadly speaking, it is a study 
of habitats both physical and social where people endeavor to live well together; of ways 
of knowing that foster or thwart such living; and thus the ethos and habits enacted in 
knowledge and actions, customs, social structures, and creative-regulative principles by 
which people strive or fail to achieve this multiply realizable end.”xxxvi By articulating 
 
that that knowing requires an understanding of a situation and that the project of knowing 
involves active work to change social imaginaries that prevent communities from living 
well and inhibit situational accounts of knowing, Code’s statement reflects the second 
and third commitments of feminist epistemology. 
 
Later in Ecological Thinking, Code claims that the disregard for testimonials in 
the scientific, legal, and medical fields is based on a larger, misguided commitment to a 
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notion of individual autonomy that lies at the heart of the philosophical underpinnings of 
political liberalism within the Western politics of knowledge: “the image of the self- 
reliant knower directly confronting the world continues to play a regulative part in 
mainstream epistemology such that if it could not be held intact, the basic tenets of the 
system would no longer hold.”xxxvii   While testimony is immediately seen as 
untrustworthy because it is often uncorroborated, it is also distrusted because testimonials 
 
are most often presented within larger communities with shared loyalties and 
understandings. Rather than being an isolated bit of knowledge that one person was able 
to discover through her autonomous rationality, testimonial knowledge claims are the 
result of a communal context of interpretation and are understood through advocates and 
fellow testifiers. Testimony itself, Code claims, works outside of the ideal of an 
autonomous, isolated reasoner. In its presentation, interpretation, and accessibility, 
testimony is always reliant on others: “testimony challenges this [cognitive autonomy] 
imaginary, for it functions as a constant reminder of how minuscule a proportion of 
anyone's knowledge, with the possible exception of occurrent sensory input, is or could 
be acquired independently, without reliance on others.”xxxviii   Although it is often 
 
discredited in legal proceedings (with the exception of “expert testimony”), Code goes on 
 
to claim that most people rely on testimony as a source of everyday knowledge. 
 
As a remedy for the dismissal of testimonies from oppressed peoples by 
institutions of power, Code describes the epistemological importance of advocacy. In the 
chapter “Patterns of Autonomy, Acknowledgment, and Advocacy,” Code claims that 
testimony, especially in the legal format, requires that those who face the harsh side of 
institutionalized sexism, heterosexism, or racism need to have their accounts advocated 
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for by a third party in order to counteract the institutional forces that work against the 
believability of their account. Women who have suffered sexual assault, in particular, 
Code claims, are working against a system of patriarchy that uses realist language of “the 
facts” in such a way that it prevents their testimony from being accepted as a believable 
account of the pain and harm of the event.  By Code's account, we are required to 
advocate for women whose emotional distress, instituted distrust in their own accounts, 
and patriarchal courts stand in the way of providing a believable account of “the facts of 
the matter.” 
While advocacy in courts may help provide clearer testimonies from sexual 
assault victims it still fails to satisfactorily answer the question “how do we adjudicate 
between conflicting accounts from below?” In the same way Code claims that female 
sexual assault victims need to be advocated for to develop clear testimonies and negotiate 
power structures within the court system, she could claim that those accused of sexual 
assault may need similar advocacy to negotiate racism. In these situations, we are left to 
find a “reasonable and workable” practical solution on a case-by-case basis. However, it 
is unclear what a workable solution to this situation might be. Based on the description of 
responsible knowing outlined above, a workable solution may be any solution that best 
promotes human flourishing. Yet, the concept of “human flourishing” presumes a 
common purpose among the participants that may not exist dues to their sharp 
differences. As a result, assuming that human flourishing provides a common purpose 
may inadvertently mask the participants different perspectives about life. 
Nonetheless, a judgment cannot be put off indefinitely and a compromise between the 
two parties seems unlikely at best and dangerous at worst. 
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Moreover, while Code supplements Young’s account of how social groups 
operate in relationship to multiple structures of power by providing an account of 
progressive knowledge-making that exists within these overlapping structures, it is 
unclear throughout Ecological Thinking how those within structures of oppression can 
even possess the agency to appeal to an advocate, especially if those structures of 
oppression undermine an individual’s ability to recognize her own position as oppressed. 
Understanding how oppressed peoples could have the agency to participate in ecological 
thinking requires a new conception of the self. This understanding must encompass not 
only pluralist communities but also pluralist experiences of the self. Theories of mestiza 
consciousness provide a model for this understanding. 
Mestiza Consciousness and a Role for Agency 
 
While Code’s account of ecological thinking gives us a rich account of how 
multiple power structures are at work within complex communities, it still fails to give us 
a way of adjudicating between claims. However, Gloria Anzaldúa’s description of 
mestiza identity provides a way of understanding how individuals can relate to structures 
of power while possessing agency that comes from within the self, rather than being 
granted to the self by the these structures of power. Although most of the knowers 
conceived of by feminist epistemologists do not possess the racial, cultural, and linguistic 
background of the mestiza described by Anzaldúa, they can experience the “intense pain” 
and “continual creative motion” that constitutes agency by embracing ambiguity and 
impurity. 
The concept of mestiza consciousness, developed by María Lugones and 
 
Anzaldúa, conceives of a self that dwells within multiple structures of oppression and 
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establishes a plural understanding of the self that is better able to conceive of ambiguity 
than traditional models of the self. The mestiza consciousness allows individuals to 
occupy a borderland between structures of oppression that allows for movement between 
cultures and ontological frameworks. In Borderlands/La Frontera, Anzaldúa describes 
the traditional concept of mestiza. Commonly, this term refers to a Latin American whose 
racial make-up includes European and indigenous ancestry. Anzaldúa qualifies this 
description with the caveat that it also refers to someone who lives on the border of the 
United States and Mexico and is never recognized as either truly Mexican or truly 
American. Mestiza consciousness “is a consciousness of the borderlands.”xxxix Anzaldúa, 
who describes herself as mestiza, explains that this identity prevents mestiza individuals 
from being recognized as possessing a culture of their own. This is so because the mestiza 
cannot fit into established frameworks of race, culture, or language, in that they are not 
white, indigenous or African, their nationality is neither Mexican nor American, and their 
conversations are not held exclusively in Spanish, English or indigenous dialects. 
 
The mestiza consciousness stems from the intersection of all of these races, 
cultures, and languages. Anzaldúa notes that, while “it is a source of intense pain, its 
energy comes from continual creative motion that keeps breaking down the unitary aspect 
of each new paradigm.”xl Furthermore, she contends that mestiza consciousness is a 
“massive uprooting of dualistic thinking in the individual and collective 
consciousness.”xli 
 
In “Purity, Impurity, and Separation,” María Lugones defines mestizaje as an 
example of a location of impurity. Those who share a mestiza identity do not have racial 
purity, linguistic purity, or cultural purity; rather, all of these categories are established as 
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mixed identities. Lugones uses the example of making mayonnaise to explain the concept 
of purity. She explains that, when separating the yolk from the white, any mixture of the 
two “taints” the other. When a mixture occurs, the mayonnaise curdles. To participate in 
mestizaje consciousness means that the agent “defies control through simultaneously 
asserting the impure, curdled multiple state and rejecting fragmentation into pure 
parts.”xlii For Lugones, the conventional knower is a fragmented self composed of pure, 
 
abstracted components—a mind, a body, an historical situation and a sexuality—and, as a 
result of its abstraction, the fragmented self has no particularity. In order to maintain this 
purity, the conventional knower must be understood as ahistorical. By resisting this 
fragmentation into pure, abstracted components, the curdled mestiza subject can 
“perceive richly.”xliii Similarly, as responsible knowers mestiza can embrace their mixed 
 
identities as subjects in overlapping structures of oppression in order to develop the 
agency necessary to create distinctive knowledge of their worlds. 
Furthermore, Lugones contends in “Playfulness, ‘World’-Traveling, and Loving 
Perception” that the mestiza consciousness requires conceiving of the self as neither 
independent from others nor subordinate to others. Rather, the self is “incomplete and 
unreal without other[s].”xliv Knowers develop themselves and come to know each other 
through building relationships of loving perception. This means that knowing someone 
always requires caring about her. In this way, the mestiza knower needs to take 
subjectivity into account and avoid the violence of the “S knows p” relationship. By 
taking subjectivity into account through loving perception, responsible knowers can 
acknowledge not only their own agency but also the agency of others. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have endeavored to assess the current state of the field of 
feminist epistemology in relation to four commitments commonly espoused by its 
theorists. Despite insightful criticisms from Bar On and others, epistemic privilege 
remains an instrumental component of the project of responsible knowing. The concept 
of epistemic privilege carries an unparalleled potential for exposing the oppressive 
dimensions of traditional epistemologies and expanding knowers’ perspectives by 
drawing on knowledge claims from oppressed peoples in pluralist communities. As a 
result, feminist epistemologists continue to modify and supplement the role of epistemic 
privilege in order to make it viable in relation to multiple, overlapping, and sometimes 
competing structures of power. With its emphasis on testimony and advocacy, Code’s 
concept of ecological thinking demonstrates that this viability is possible. Yet Code’s 
theory assumes, despite its acknowledgement of structuralist limitations that oppressed 
peoples possess the agency to seek advocacy and deliver testimonies. Thus, ecological 
thinking requires a conception of the self that leaves room for individual agency within 
the overlapping structures of oppression in order to be truly successful. Fortunately, 
descriptions of mestiza consciousness offer the possibility of developing an agency in 
relation to overlapping sources of oppression that bridge epistemically distinct 
perspectives. 
The method of feminist inquiry proposed by this dissertation draws upon the 
epistemic privilege possessed by oppressed peoples’ testimonies, bolstered by advocacy, 
in Code’s ecological thinking by conceiving of the self in a manner similar to the 
theorists of mestiza consciousness. However,  even when epistemic privilege is conjoined 
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with this conception of the self, which presents individuals as more than representatives of 
or reducible to their political identities, it  remains unclear how feminist epistemology 
will confront the reality of conflicting claims from privileged sources. So long as there 
remains an inability to choose between conflicting accounts, feminist epistemologists will 
not be able to move past benign concepts of the community. In order to choose between 
such accounts, feminist epistemology must develop a method of inquiry that includes an 
account of error and a method of error sensitivity that can detect error within 
epistemologically privileged accounts. This method of inquiry depends upon the 
conception of the individual as both created within overlapping structures of oppression 
and through the building of a self via voluntary commitments in a community. As I will 
explain in the next chapter, feminist epistemology can look to Royce’s concept of 
communal interpretation as a starting point for these ideas. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
ERROR, IGNORANCE, AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In “How to Be Really Responsible,” Lisa Heldke claims that, while feminist 
epistemologists have avoided the term “objectivity” because of its association with the 
harmful dichotomies of modern philosophy, this term can be fruitful for feminist projects. 
In this essay, Heldke offers what she claims is an odd definition of objectivity in which 
objectivity is defined as “responsibility to the context of inquiry.”i Practicing objectivity 
under Heldke’s definition requires that inquirers perform the following three tasks: first, 
they must work to acknowledge the other participants in the inquiry (even nonhuman 
participants), second, inquirers must work to fulfill their own responsibilities to the 
context of the inquiry, finally, inquirers must work to “expand the bonds of responsibility 
in any given inquiry context.”ii   Heldke goes on to claim that, when objectivity is defined 
as responsibility, it both upholds and requires a feminist ontology that views subjects as 
radically interdependent and reality as created through interactions between the subject 
and the world, “including the interaction we call inquiry.”iii Heldke argues that, when 
inquirers work to be objective, they recognize and emphasize the interdependence and 
that inquirers will, as a result, take the relationships between each other and their own 
relationships with the world “very seriously.”iv 
In this chapter, I argue that Heldke’s account of objectivity as responsibility is 
extremely fruitful for understanding how to take account of conflicts in the context of 
feminist inquiry. However, I also argue that to “work to acknowledge, fulfill, and expand 
the bonds of responsibility in any given inquiry context,”v in other words, to work 
towards objectivity in Heldke’s sense, requires developing methods of error sensitivity. I 
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claim that Royce’s account of error, especially as it is articulated in his 1913 “Error and 
Truth” essay helps us to develop an understanding of how to situate error sensitivity in 
the context of a pluralist ontology and a model of feminist inquiry that is useful in 
instances of conflicting claims. 
In “Error and Truth,” Royce defines error as an unwillingness to recognize one’s 
 
own scope as limited. Rather than 
 
An error is the expression, through voluntary action, of a belief. In case of an 
error, a being, whose ideas have a limited scope, so interprets those ideas as to 
bring himself into conflict with a larger life to which he himself belongs. This life 
is one of experience and of action. Its whole nature determines what the erring 
subject, at his stage of experience, and with his ideas, ought to think and to do. He 
errs when he so feels, believes, acts, interprets, as to be in positive and decisive 
conflict with this ought. The conflict is at once theoretical and practical.vi 
 
In this definition, error is the problem of a limited, finite perspective asserting itself as the 
 
perspective of a whole. This definition signifies an element of Royce’s that is harder to 
see in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy; instead the practical understanding of error is 
that it is a process in which a finite agent is either unwilling or unable to recognize her or 
his limitations. 
Examining Royce’s works prior to “Error and Truth” reveals a change in 
emphasis over time. While Royce’s concept of error remains consistent, his earlier work 
attempts to explain the nature of the Absolute and his later work emphasizes the human 
experience of the Absolute. J.E. Smith explains this development in Royce’s thought: “in 
the course of his philosophic development Royce never lost his view concerning the 
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insufficiency of a purely voluntarisitc solution of the problem concerning the Absolute 
and hence the necessity for a concrete as distinct from an abstract or ideal universal, he 
ultimately came to think of it in terms of an infinite community.”vii Just as Royce 
emphasizes an “infinite community” in order to maintain his focus on a concrete 
universal, he emphasizes particular situations in order to describe how error can be 
detected. For Royce, error occurs within particular situations. In order to recognize and 
prevent the type of error that Royce defines in “Error and Truth,” it is not enough for 
inquirers to have a vague commitment to an abstract ideal of truth because error, to use 
Heldke’s terms, consists of avoiding the responsibility that “emerges from some 
understanding of, and commitment to, an ontological conception of the context of 
inquiry”viii Hence, recognizing error requires recognizing one’s own situation within a 
community. 
In Error: On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong, Nicolas Rescher 
develops an account of error with references to Royce, G.E. Moore, Descartes, St. 
Thomas Aquinas, and Plato, and analyzing Rescher’s account of error highlights how 
Royce’s commitment to communal situations is vital to the possibility of error sensitivity. 
Throughout his work, Rescher focuses on the relationship between the concept of error 
and the existence of an external reality. He claims that an account of error necessitates a 
commitment to realism: “The very idea of error involves subscribing to some sort of 
realism.”ix Rescher defines realism as merely a belief that there is a reality outside of 
one’s own thought. He is careful to note that there is nothing inherent about idealism that 
conflicts with realism. So idealists, such as Royce, who contend that the universe is 
fundamentally thought but that this thought is real outside of the thought of individual 
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inquiry should be committed to realism. It does not matter whether the substance of the 
external reality is material or thought, only that the inquirer is committed to the claim that 
there is some external reality. 
Like Royce in his early work, Rescher’s primary interest in error is its ability to 
provide a basis for a belief in an external reality. Rescher envelops Royce’s early account 
of error under his own description of error. Under Rescher’s account, an error can be 
classified in one of three ways: A cognitive error which “arises from failures in the 
attainment of correct beliefs”; a practical error which “arises from failures in relation to 
the objectives of action”; and lastly “axiological error appertains to mistakes in regard to 
evaluation.”x  For Rescher, cognitive errors lead to practical errors because “where our 
 
thoughts go wrong, so will the action that we inevitably guide by them; and wrong 
actions, of course, prove to be very hurtful indeed.”xi While Rescher’s account of error 
envelops Royce’s account from The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, he never 
acknowledges how Royce’s concept error develops throughout his career. The idea that 
cognitive errors are harmful because they lead to practical errors is already a divergence 
from Royce’s theory, in which errors are always both practical and theoretical. 
Hence, Rescher’s account of error suffers from his neglect of the triadic structure 
that is needed for truth and error to have meaning. While Rescher utilizes Royce’s 
account to highlight how the existence of the possibility of error predicates the existence 
of an external reality, he neglects the more interesting aspect of Royce’s account (as it 
exists throughout his career). In order for an error to have meaning, there needs to be 
more than simply a judgment  that aims towards reality and comes up short; there needs 
to be a wider view that can recognize the aim (here, the reality of the situation), the 
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judgment, and the failure. The existence of an external reality does us as human beings 
little good if we have no access to it outside of our own perceptions of it. A single 
knower does not have access to the reality, the judgment, and the failure all at once, for if 
she did, she would not have erred in the first place. Rescher’s account ultimately views 
error as a failure in the dyadic relationship between a judgment and a reality that is 
external to the inquirer. This concept on its own lacks meaning. 
The Possibility of Error in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy and The Sources of 
 
Religious Insight 
 
In the chapter “The Possibility of Error” from The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 
error occurs when a judgment does not agree with its object. All judgments have an aim 
and, for those who are trying to make an accurate judgment about something in the world, 
the aim of the judgment is to present the subject of the judgment as it is in reality. Scott 
Pratt clarifies this in “‘All our Puzzles will Disappear’: Royce and the Possibility of 
Error,” “there are two conditions that are necessary for an act to be an error, whether the 
act is an assertion, a judgment of value, or an attempt to realize some result: first, the 
actor or agent must have some intention or purpose in mind. Second, the claim 
made must say something about the thing or relation or result that does not hold.”xii If I 
 
make a judgment that the dog outside of my window is a golden retriever, my judgment 
is in error if the dog is actually a yellow lab. My judgment of the dog as a golden 
retriever disagrees with the reality where the dog is a yellow lab. Although referring to a 
yellow lab as a golden retriever could just be a lie or an otherwise false statement, if the 
aim of my judgment was to say something about the real dog outside of my window, my 
judgment is in error. 
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According to Royce, the truth or error of judgments cannot have any meaning in 
isolation. Sitting by myself in front of my window, I have no way to determine if my 
judgment is in error or not. I have an idea of the dog in my mind, and this idea might 
change if, for example, I get a better look at the dog; however, I only have access to my 
own thought of the dog. I can disagree with my earlier thought that the dog is an afghan 
and now make a judgment that it is a golden retriever, but without any other account of 
the dog, I am left with no way of knowing if I am in error or not. Alternatively, if I call 
down to the woman walking the dog and ask if the dog is a golden retriever, she can give 
me some insight into my error. She presumably has a fuller view of the dog, since she is 
closer, is the dog’s caretaker, and has access to the dog’s American Kennel Club records 
that contend that the dog is a registered purebred yellow lab. She can compare my 
judgment that the dog is a golden retriever with her own judgment that the dog is a 
yellow lab. 
However, when taking into account the commitments of feminist epistemology, 
the third party’s job may become far more in-depth than simply providing AKC records. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Code argues in Ecological Thinking that better 
knowing requires tracing how structures of power have worked to define terms and 
structure knowing. In this example, the third party might be motivated to establish the 
AKC’s definition of the dog’s breed but then complicate this idea as well by questioning 
the AKC’s authority to define these terms or the history of dog breeding itself that has 
created the contemporary yellow lab and dictated formal guidelines for the breed’s 
characteristics. Moreover, the third party may go forward and further investigate how 
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these factors have harmed dogs in the past and continue to sustain animal abuses through 
degrading breeding practices. 
Royce claims that the possibility for meaningfulness in either truth or error only 
arises through the addition of a third party into a situation of judgment (in the example 
above, the woman becomes the third party in a situation involving myself and the dog). 
An individual, alone in her own thoughts, is unable to attain any kind of judgment: “The 
substance of our whole reasoning about the nature of error amounted to the result that in 
and of itself alone, no single judgment is or can be an error. Only as actually included in a 
higher thought, that gives to the first its completed object and compares it therewith, is 
the first thought an error.”xiii In addition to noting that a judgment cannot be in error until 
 
it is “included in a higher thought,” Royce explains that, in order to be in error at all, the 
object in question has to be one with which we are already familiar. This means that 
judgments are always social. Judgments are voluntary expressions that involve engaging 
with a social setting. 
Royce uses an example of two people knowing each other to illustrate his early 
concept of error. By first claiming “mere disagreement of a thought with any random 
object does not make the thought erroneous. The judgment must disagree with its chosen 
object,”xiv Royce explains that if two people are placed in a room together and asked to 
make judgments about each other on no other basis than their individual experience at 
that moment, then they will never be able to make either a truthful or erroneous account 
of one another. This is because when the first person—in Royce's account, “John”— 
makes a judgment about the second person, “Thomas,” he is not making an assessment of 
 
truthfulness or error in regards to the real Thomas, but rather in light of his own 
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immediate idea of Thomas. In this case, John singly expresses the idea he has of Thomas 
relative to that very idea.  It cannot be in error since it is only a report of what John 
already believes.  For John to be in error about Thomas, there needs to be a third 
perspective, a spectator who can compare John’s claims to Thomas, not just to John’s 
idea of Thomas.xv In his early work, Royce describes the ultimate spectator as the 
Absolute, and he relies upon the Absolute to provide meaning for the notions of truth and 
 
error. In other words, Royce’s early concept of error requires the possibility of an 
 
Absolute in order to be meaningful. 
 
In order to understand why Royce moves to the Absolute for error’s meaning, it is 
helpful to return to the example of the yellow lab. If I ask the dog’s caretaker if her dog is 
a golden retriever, she can correct me and say, no, that it is indeed a yellow lab. This 
woman’s situation as the dog’s caretaker will give her a fuller view of the dog than I am 
able to attain from my window. However, even as the dog’s caretaker, this woman’s view 
of the dog remains incomplete and, therefore, fallible. If this woman lacks a complete 
knowledge about the characteristics that mark a yellow lab, she might overlook a 
variation in the dog’s coloring, or a height that is taller than is common with yellow labs. 
Moreover, if the paper work from AKC had been forged by the seller of her dog when 
she bought it as a puppy and she never discovered this deceit, she could be unaware of 
the dog’s actual lineage. No matter how much more she knows about her own dog than I 
do, she will always have, in some way, an incomplete view of the dog and may, in fact, 
never become aware that, in reality, her dog is an Irish wolfhound and border collie mix. 
Human finitude prevents anyone from having a complete account of any idea, 
whether that idea is of the real Thomas, a dog that is not a yellow lab, or a scientific 
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claim. Therefore, while a third party might be able to lead an observer to a better fuller 
account of an idea, no human insight will ever be enough to fully decide if a judgment is 
in truth or error. Thus, Royce claims that our ability to be in error requires the existence 
of an Absolute unity of thought: 
[L]et us overcome all our difficulties by declaring that all the many Beyonds, 
which single significant judgments seem vaguely and separately to postulate, are 
present as fully realized intended objects to the unity of an all-inclusive, 
absolutely clear, universal, and conscious thought, of which all judgments, true or 
false, are but fragments, the whole being at once Absolute Truth and Absolute 
Knowledge. Then all our puzzles will disappear at a stroke, and error will be 
possible, because any one finite thought, viewed in relation to its own intent, may 
or may not be seen by this higher thought as successful and adequate in this 
intent.xvi 
 
For Royce, the concept of the Absolute is an inevitable conclusion. Practically speaking, 
error must be possible, but no “single significant judgment” is self-contained enough to 
be assessed with any definitive finality. Every “higher thought” against which it is 
possible to evaluate the “fragments” that constitute initial judgments simply points 
toward an even higher thought. Thus, if judgments are only true so long as they reach the 
intended aim of their objects (usually to portray a subject as it actually is in reality), then 
there must be a final destination, an Absolute, for “truth” to have any meaning. 
After contending that truth and error are only meaningful if an Absolute contains 
the unified sum of all judgments, Royce goes on to elaborate the qualities of an error: 
“What, then, is an error? An error, we reply is an incomplete thought, that to a higher 
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thought which includes it and its intended object is known as having failed in the purpose 
that it more or less clearly had, and that is fully realized in this higher thought. And 
without such higher inclusive thought an assertion has no external object, and is no 
error.”xvii In this passage, Royce continues to discuss error in terms of an initial 
judgments relationship with a higher thought while introducing some of the terms that 
 
will characterize errors throughout his work. First, by referring to an error as “an 
incomplete thought,” he suggests that thoughts have their own impetus toward 
completion. Although he does not address it here, this idea implies that it possible for 
finite humans to cause errors when they interrupt a thought’s drive toward completion. 
Second, by using the term “purpose,” Royce clarifies that the “intended object” of a 
judgment is not necessarily prescribed; instead, his language implies that there must be an 
agent making the judgment, a knowing subject with a reason, or purpose, for doing so. 
Finally, by reiterating that the absence of a “higher inclusive thought” means there is “no 
external object” that can establish truth and error, Royce restricts the range of judgments 
that can be in error. He is not interested in evaluating nonsense. He is interested in how 
judgments made in earnest fail to reach their aims. Throughout his career Royce 
continued to teach his students this argument for the possibility of error, and as Frank 
Oppenheim notes in Royce’s Mature Ethics, this suggests that as late as 1916, Royce’s 
original conception of error had a seminal place in his theory.xviii 
In the 1912 The Sources of Religious Insight, written twenty-seven years after The 
 
Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Royce holds on to the concept of an all-inclusive, super- 
human insight for the necessity of error. In this work, Royce argues, “True is the 
judgment that is confirmed by the larger view to which it appeals. False is the assertion 
84  
that is not thus confirmed. Upon such a conception the very ideas of truth and error 
depend. Without such a conception truth and error have no sense.”xix He goes on to state, 
“if there is no wider insight, our opinions have neither truth nor error, and merely 
meaningless.”xx The common sense understanding of error leads us to seek a wider view 
than our own to discover if we are in truth or in error; it is only on the basis of some 
wider view that truth and error have any meaning. Yet, while we can seek a wider view 
through comparing our insights with each other or comparing our own insights over time, 
Royce argues in Sources as he did in Religious Aspect that, in order for any of these 
methods to have any meaningful relationship to truth, there needs to be an ultimate 
inclusive insight. Royce states this idea in The Sources of Religious Insight when he 
claims, “The true rational warrant for this confidence of ours lies in the fact that 
whatever else is real, some form of such a wider insight, some essentially super- 
individual and superhuman insight is real.”xxi Although this statement maintains many of 
the ideas first presented in Religious Aspect, it builds upon those ideas by introducing the 
notion of “confidence” and shifting from an emphasis on “higher thoughts” to an 
emphasis on “wider insight.” By introducing the idea of “confidence,” Royce provides 
some insight into why we want to retain the meaningfulness of truth and error. Without 
truth and error—and, therefore, without the “super-individual and superhuman insight 
that makes them possible”—we could not have confidence necessary to act. This idea 
contributes to his argument that the concept of error has both theoretical and practical 
importance. Smith summarizes, “From the outset, Royce was concerned with the problem 
of the concrete or actual infinite, and that problem had, for him, both a practical and a 
theoretical aspect. In its theoretical aspect the problem of the actual infinite presented 
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itself to Royce as a problem both in metaphysics and in the theory of knowledge. On its 
practical side it appeared as a problem of ethics and religion.”xxii When Royce discusses 
absolute thought in terms of the Beloved Community, he emphasizes the ethical element 
of this concept and its role in shaping relationships between individuals and communities. 
Royce retains much of this definition of error in his later work “Error and Truth” 
however, he changes his emphasis, and his change in emphasis gives his seemingly 
abstract concept a more obvious practical effect, which he signals by referring to it as “at 
once theoretical and practical.”xxiii While both the earliest and latest definitions of error 
locate the source of error in the finitude of the knowing subject, the earlier definition 
emphasizes when and how a judgment may be in error. In contrast, the later definition 
emphasizes when and how a knowing subject may be in error. While the first definition 
indicates that error occurs when an initial thought is compared to “a higher thought, that 
gives to the first its completed object,”xxiv the later definition notes that an error is an 
“expression, through voluntary action, of a belief.”xxv  Despite this shift in emphasis, 
 
Royce’s later work highlights the consistent theme that truth and error refer to a real 
world, but their meaning is dependent upon a social setting. 
The Concept of Error in “Error and Truth” 
 
In “Error and Truth,” Royce outlines the meaning of “error” under the 
correspondence theory of truth, the pragmatic concept of truth, and finally under 
Absolute Idealism. In the introduction to this essay, Royce claims that the popular use of 
the term error refers to not just false opinions but also practical failure. Royce goes on to 
claim that theoretical errors, or false opinions, are largely inseparable from practical 
errors. Practical errors usually fall into what Royce calls “blunders.” Blunders “must 
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involve actions which do not attain their goal.”xxvi   Practical errors are always failures 
related to volition. False opinions are errors that are related to belief. In the moral world, 
it is impossible to fully separate these two forms of error. 
Yet, Royce argues that, when we look at formal logic, we can attain a separation 
between practical and theoretical errors. Theoretical errors in formal logic mistake a false 
proposition for a true one. Practical errors will involve volition and therefore will be 
outside of the realm of formal logic. Formally, truth and falsity are closely related and 
always imply each other. Royce explains, “True and false are, for the formal logician, 
predicates belonging to propositions, quite apart from any questions as to whether 
anybody believes or asserts those propositions.”xxvii For a proposition to be true in formal 
 
logic, it must follow that the contradiction of that statement is false. While knowing the 
truth of a proposition implies knowing what the corresponding false proposition is, Royce 
claims, “A being can be supposed to know the truth and falsity, and their distinctions and 
relations without having any tendency to fall a prey to error. At all events, no purely 
formal logical reasons, such as for the moment concern us, can be given for supposing 
that a being who is capable of knowing truth should be capable of falling into error.”xxviii 
 
Because formal logic cannot give an account of how someone may fall into error, yet it is 
an obvious, common phenomenon, Royce abandons a formal understanding of error. 
Instead, Royce moves on in this essay to explore the definitions of error from the 
three leading concepts of truth, the correspondence theory of truth, the pragmatist 
understanding of truth, and the Absolute Idealist theory of truth. Royce argues that, under 
correspondence theory, which he claims is the most prominent theory, there are four 
definitions of truth. The first is the theory most prominently articulated by Spinoza. 
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Under this theory, error is defined in the negative as being merely a lack. Most people do 
not know about themselves, God, or the world, yet they still make judgments. According 
to Spinoza, “Men fill the void with errors.”xxix Under this account, error is ignorance. 
Royce rejects this claim by claiming that error, even error that results from ignorance, is 
not in itself ignorance because being able to make an error requires at least some level of 
knowledge about the facts that one is in error about. For example, Royce claims, “I 
cannot in a speech, make grammatical blunders of whose existence I have never 
heard.”xxx The second correspondence theory definition of error comes from the 
Scholastic tradition. Under the Scholastic tradition and famously articulated by Descartes, 
 
error occurs when a person wills something that exceeds her intellect. Under this account, 
error is a marker of the interplay between free will and finitude, two of the most 
important markers of humanity in the Scholastic tradition. Royce states, “From this point 
of view an error is a willful assertion of a false propositions…False beliefs are thus due to 
a combination of ignorance with the will to believe.”xxxi The third and fourth definitions 
of error from the correspondence theory of truth claim that error is the result of a kind of 
 
failure in the mind of the erring subject. In the third definition, error is the result of an 
erring subject accepting a false proposition because it fits within preconceived notions or 
somehow fits the interest of the subject. Error “is a false opinion which, because of its 
appeal to the sentiments, the feelings, the prejudices, of the erring subject, because it is 
harmonious with his social interest or his private concerns, win the subject over to the 
state of mind called belief.”xxxii In the fourth definition, error is caused by a lack of ideas 
 
standing in the way of a false proposition: “an error is a false proposition whose assertion 
 
is forced upon the erring subject through the mechanism of association.”xxxiii 
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As Royce explains, the correspondence theory of truth relies on a concept where 
the representative idea and the object are as separate as a “a man and his portrait.”xxxiv 
Ultimately, this separation between the object and the representative idea is an 
insurmountable chasm for Royce. When correspondence theorists presume that an error 
has taken place, there is an implicit claim that those marking the error have some access 
to the real object outside of the representative idea. Royce claims that it is impossible to 
account for “how the critic of human truth and error has himself acquired his assumed 
power to see things as they are.”xxxv Although they do not usually claim to have a special 
power to see a pure reality, people do still make distinctions between clear ideas and 
ideas that are more and less likely to be in error. Royce claims that the instinct to make 
judgments between truth and error is good and tells us more about the nature of error than 
the correspondence theory can. He rejects the correspondence theory of truth in this 
article on three grounds. The first is that it is impossible for anyone to compare an idea to 
the reality of an object in order to determine that an error has taken place. Secondly, it is 
impossible for someone to differentiate fully between the real object and the associations 
or sentiments that might be clouding one’s own judgment. Finally, Royce rejects the 
correspondence theory of truth because it only views the cognitive process as 
representing reality. Cognition, Royce claims, is far loftier. Rather than merely 
 
representing reality, cognition requires us “to come into a living unity with [reality]”xxxvi 
 
After rejecting the correspondence theory of truth and its accounts of error, Royce 
turns his attention to the pragmatist theory of truth. As Royce describes it, in the 
pragmatist account, truth is workability and error is the failure of an idea to provide a 
suitable model for action: “If the idea agrees with its expected workings, that idea is true, 
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and with the proposition which accepts that idea as suited to its own ends is true; 
otherwise the idea and the proposition are erroneous.”xxxvii Under this account, truth is not 
absolute or permanent, and in relation to this, error is also never fixed or concrete; 
instead, truth and error are such within the context of expectations and anticipated 
consequences. 
Pragmatism, according to Royce, accepts the same psychological accounts of how 
we often fall into error as theorists of the correspondence theory of truth. However, their 
accounts of error differ in that under pragmatism, “propositions live only as opinions in 
the process of being tested.”xxxviii Royce goes on to argue that this condition of 
pragmatism means that it gives an inadequate account of error. If propositions live as 
opinions, then determining whether or not the propositions are in error requires that 
inquirers compare propositions to their current situations: “But this assumption requires 
the truth of the proposition that the meaning, the object, the purpose, the definition of the 
ideas, and expectations of one moment or period of time, or person, not only can be but 
are identical with the meaning, object, purpose, definition of the ideas and expectations of 
another moment, temporal region, or person.”xxxix This task is too large for any person to 
be able to do. Therefore, Royce argues that pragmatism’s definition of truth and its 
corresponding definition of error imply a unity that is not possibly testable. 
After dismissing the correspondence theory and pragmatism’s accounts of error, 
Royce goes on to base his own account of error in the theory of truth offered by Absolute 
Idealism. Under this account, truth and falsity are not fixed categories or two sides of an 
opposing dichotomy, but rather truth is a process of attaining the largest possible view of 
an idea. Royce claims, “[i]f one accepts such a theory of the ‘degrees of truth and falsity,’ 
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and of truth as the harmony or organic unity between a partial view and the ideal whole 
of experience or of reality, the essence of error—that is, of false opinion must receive a 
new interpretation.”xl Royce distinguishes between Hegel’s account of error and more 
recent idealists such as Bradley. Under Hegel’s account, error is an inevitable stage of 
history. Error under this account is a partial view that “regards[s] itself as the total and 
final view.”xli Mistaking a partial view for the final view for Hegel is the inevitable stage 
of abstraction. Under this account, error is not an ultimate failure, a final resignation into 
falsity, or a turn away from a fixed truth forever, but rather error is a necessary step in 
attaining the highest possible degree of truth. 
Royce places himself in communion with the more recent idealists. These 
theorists, like Hegel before them, contend that error is a partial view that sees itself as 
whole view. A view is false to the extent that it is partial, but it transforms from a false 
view into an error when the partial view mistakes itself for the whole view. Truth, under 
this account, happens when the partial view is put into harmony with the total view of 
experience. At this point, Royce claims that this modern idealist approach itself is 
incomplete. Royce ends “Error and Truth” with seven conditions for a possible solution 
to the problem of error, which Oppenheim suggests address his anxiety surrounding the 
“disharmony between the demands of any partial interpretation of experience and that 
which is revealed and fulfilled by the whole of experience.”xlii 
 
First, a satisfactory theory of error must maintain a sharp distinction between 
formally true propositions and their formally false contradictions. Second, this theory of 
error must “take account of the actual unity of the cognitive and volitional processes.”xliii 
Royce claims that both pragmatists and Hegel do this when they argue that “every insight 
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or opinion is both theoretical and practical”xliv and that generally insights and opinions are 
tested by how they are successful in life. Third, a successful theory of error must 
acknowledge that the meaning of a proposition is related to the experience of the idea and 
the meaning of a proposition is not defined by a relationship with objects outside of 
experience entirely. Fourth, Royce argues that a satisfactory theory of error must place 
the success of ideas, hypotheses, and opinions in relationship to the whole of experience 
and the whole of life as much as possible. Fifth, a successful theory of error must 
understand that error, evil, individuality, and conflict are all the inevitable result of 
finitude. Sixth, “[t]heoretical error cannot be separated from practical error.”xlv Finally, 
Royce argues that a successful theory of error will combine Hegel’s dialectical method 
with pragmatism and the methods of logic to address the problem of error. When these 
three accounts are combined, people are in error when their limited ideas force them into 
conflict with their larger life. The individual subject “errs when he so feels, believes, acts, 
interprets, as to be in positive and decisive conflict with this ought.”xlvi 
Error and Royce’s Pluralist Ontology 
 
In the previous chapter, I claimed that, in order to take advantage of 
epistemologically privileged testimony, feminist inquiry needs a conception of 
individuals as both originating from overlapping structures of power and developing 
through voluntary commitments in their communities. With regards to Heldke’s claims 
about the interdependence between feminist epistemology and feminist ontology, these 
twin traits correspond to her descriptions of acknowledging and being responsible toward 
the other participants in the inquiry and fulfilling their own responsibilities to the context 
of inquiry. Furthermore, Heldke’s stipulation that the interdependence between feminist 
92  
epistemology and feminist ontology also creates the responsibility to constantly expand 
the scope of inquiry anticipates and informs the possibility that Royce’s philosophy could 
benefit feminist inquiry. Hence, having established that Royce’s definition of error calls 
for the pursuit of an ever-wider view, I contend in this section that Royce’s definition of 
error, conjoined with Heldke’s concept of objectivity as responsibility, creates the 
necessity for a method of error sensitivity in order to promote pluralistic communities 
without eliding the role of conflict in communal inquiry. 
In “The Experience of Pluralism,” Scott Pratt claims that in Western philosophy, 
pluralism has traditionally been seen as the counterpoint to monism, as in pluralism 
implies that the world is made of several individual perspectives rather than one, but this 
account pales in comparison to the account of pluralism that comes through American 
philosophy. In this tradition, which Pratt says can be seen through William James’s late 
works, but could include Royce’s work as well, pluralism signifies not just that there are 
multiple things making up the world but that experience shows both plural knowledges 
and plural realities. Through experience, we recognize both perspectives and things as 
separate and irreducible; yet, we also recognize that different things relate to and interact 
with each other across these different perspectives. Pluralism in the American tradition 
means not just that there is a difference in the things that make up the world but rather 
that these things exist in relationships of connection and disconnection. To focus on 
pluralism then means to focus on the relationships between points of difference.xlvii 
 
When understood as a focus on relationships between differing things and 
perspectives and the necessary components of interaction, pluralism becomes more than a 
call for more inclusive theories; it forces epistemology to recognize ways of knowing as 
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interrelated and communally situated. Ways of knowing that promote pluralism must 
understand “things” as separated but also able to be unified. When we look at pluralism 
as something that is experienced as both separate knowledges and plural realities that 
interact with each other, we can begin to conceive of pluralism within communities that 
takes account of differences and use relationships across these differences to undermine 
rather than uphold unifying structures placed on communities by institutions of power. 
In order to do this, pluralism has to be understood as something that builds 
connections but does not result in a monolithic society. Heldke explains this kind of 
interdependence by explaining how responsibility should be conceived of within the 
context of a medical research project: 
Recognizing that all these participants are interdependent and have mutually 
constitutive responsibilities to each other leads us to recognize that there is more 
than one ‘research agenda’ in place—the medical researcher’s agenda to develop 
an anticancer drug is not the only operative. The subjects of the study have 
agendas and responsibilities—to themselves, to the scientists conducting the 
study, to future cancer patients—and these responsibilities may or may not neatly 
coincide with those of the medical researcher. A context of inquiry in which 
participants acknowledge each other’s interests, agendas, and resulting 
responsibilities is a complicated and messy context—but it is also likely to be a 
context that addresses the interests of participants differently situated, with 
different amounts of power and control in the situation.xlviii 
 
In the model of inquiry described by Heldke, the pluralistic group that constitutes the 
research community—the researcher, the assistants, the subjects, the potential 
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beneficiaries, and the families, etc.—is not reduced to a multitude of voices contributing 
to the single, authoritative view of the researcher. 
Likewise, the concept of pluralism that follows Royce throughout his work 
conceives of the many as potentially one through relationships while maintaining the 
individuation of the many. Pluralism in Royce’s account is framed as a response to the 
problem of the one and the many. In “The Moral Order” from World and the Individual, 
Royce explains the Absolute as being both the One and the Many: “this Absolute purpose 
is not only One, but also infinitely complex so that its unity of many Wills, each one of 
which finds its expression in an individual life while these lives, as lives of various 
Selves have an aspect in which they are free, in so far as each, while many aspects 
determine, is still its own measure a determiner of all the rest.”xlix Royce relies on a 
metaphysical pluralism throughout his work, and the Absolute provides a unity, the 
connection between individual selves, wills, and ideas. While never subsuming them, the 
Absolute acts as the larger framework that puts differing wills into connection with each 
other. 
By The Problem of Christianity, discussions of the Absolute change. In The 
Problem of Christianity Royce emphasizes a humanistic account of the Absolute. In this 
work the Absolute takes the form of an ultimate community that secures the widest view 
possible, “This essentially social universe, this community which we have now declared 
to be real, and to be, in fact, the sole and supreme reality, — the Absolute, — what does 
it call upon a reasonable being to do?”l Communities in general, and the Beloved 
 
Community in particular, provide the connection that relates individuals together into 
communities and communities together for the ideal of the ultimate community. Royce 
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argues that while James’s concept of compounding of consciousness from “A Pluralistic 
Universe” varies significantly from his own concept of the idea of the community, 
“James’s final opinions…tended to show, better than would otherwise have been 
possible, where the true problem [of the one and the many] lies.”li James’s pluralism and 
Royce’s pluralism are similar until we reach their end point. While James conceives of 
compounding of consciousness, Royce purposes the community. Royce contrasts the 
pluralism of James and himself with what he calls the dominant social pluralism of the 
day. The dominant pluralism, Royce claims, is focused on the separation of individual 
consciousness and entities. However, this dominant model misses for Royce the 
experience of our social lives in communities: 
 
Our ordinary social pluralism leads us to conceive the individual streams 
of consciousness as if they were unable to share even a single pang of pain. No 
one of them, we have said, can directly read the secret of a single idea that floats 
in another stream. Each conscious river of individual life is close shut between its 
own banks, like the Oregon of Bryant’s youthful poem that roles, ‘and hears no 
sound but his own waves.’ 
But in our actual social life,--in the market-place, or at the political 
gathering, or when mobs rage and imagine a vain thing, in the streets of a modern 
city, the close shut-in streams of consciousness now appear as if they had lost 
their banks altogether. They seem to flow together like rivers that are lost in the 
ocean, and to surge into tumultuous unity, as if they were universal tides.lii 
The experience of life within the community, “the complicated and messy context” 
 
described by Heldke, is actually Royce’s greatest reason for understanding pluralism as 
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relationships between differing entities rather than entities separated from each other. 
Importantly for Royce’s conception of community, these pluralist relationships are based 
within situations of difference and conflict. 
While understanding pluralism as relationships across difference and conflict 
within communities, Royce’s work also provides us with a requirement for communities 
to maintain this kind of pluralism. Ultimately, in order for communities to relate the 
many individuals into a unity of the community, the community must cultivate error 
sensitivity, just as Heldke’s inquirers must be responsible to the context of inquiry in 
order to work toward objectivity. When Royce defines error as a finite agent asserting her 
perspective as the perspective of the whole when the rest of her community has no 
opportunity to dissent, he focuses on the results of an agent failing to recognize her 
limitations. When an agent joins a community, she must acknowledge the limits of her 
own perspective. In Heldke’s example, the medical researcher must acknowledge the 
limits of her own authority when she solicits subjects for her research. Similarly, in a 
sexual assault case, a man must acknowledge the limits on his understanding of the 
effects of patriarchy, and a white woman must acknowledge the limits on her 
understanding of the effects of racism, even to the extent that patriarchy and racism are at 
work in their own claims about the incident. An agent who isolates herself from her 
community loses a degree of error sensitivity because she has no larger perspective to 
provide comparison. Thus, the method for recognizing error is a process that takes into 
account a larger perspective, and Royce calls this process “interpretation.” Interpretation 
puts multiple perspectives into relationships with each other and creates a larger 
perspective. 
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Without interpretation, there is no way to recognize error because an agent’s 
limited perspective exhausts the possibilities. Royce claims that individuals and 
communities cannot find meaning in truth and error without a triadic relation. A 
community of interpretation is a relationship among three or more participants wherein 
the third party plays the role of a mediator. The three or more parties create what Royce 
calls a “community of interpretation.”liii Under this model, the two conflicting parties 
 
lack a larger perspective. They experience conflict with each other but there is no larger 
view that can mediate their conflicting accounts. The interpreter works with both sides of 
the conflict to create a new, larger view. Because this interpretation requires a new 
creative action, determining who is in error is no longer about finding a fixed truth to use 
in order to disregard one account or the other, nor is it about one account subsuming the 
other; rather, differing perspectives work with each other to make the community more 
inclusive. 
Community plays both an ethical and a metaphysical role. Smith formulates this 
dual role by describing “real” communities of interpretation and “true” interpretations: 
“The interpretation offered is real only if the community of interpretation serving as its 
basis is real, and it is true only if that community attains its goal.”liv For Royce, these 
communities of interpretation are a necessary component of all larger communities. In 
order to be sensitive to error, Royce claims that a mediator must act with a “loyalty to 
loyalty”lv that, as a guiding principle, commands her to adopt a larger and larger view. 
This commandment parallels Heldke’s stipulation that inquirers must expand the scope of 
inquiry, except, where Royce uses the language of “loyalty,” Heldke uses the language of 
“responsibility.” Communities of interpretation never terminate this project of an ever- 
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expanding view, even though the community of interpretation can create a temporary 
consensus. However, all interpretations that come out of communities of interpretation 
remain up for reinterpretation. For example when a community develops a larger view of 
a conflict through the passage of time they may find that the consensus reached by the 
original community of interpretation is in error and needs to be negotiated.lvi 
In order for truth and error to have any meaning there has to be a larger 
 
perspective from which to judge individual claims. This larger perspective for Royce is 
the community, and the largest community of all is the Beloved Community. By 
practicing loyalty to loyalty, those within communities of interpretation aim their 
community towards the Beloved Community. If individuals and communities do not 
commit to a larger aim, then judgments are framed either by dogmatic rules of authority 
or judgments that are radically relativist and lack any meaningful relationship to truth and 
 
error. Royce compares the Beloved Community to the bonds of friendship: “When 
friends really join hands and hearts and lives, it is not the mere collection of sundered 
organism and of divided feelings and will that these friends view as their life. Their life, 
as friends, is the unity which, while above their own level, wins them to itself and gives 
them meaning.”lvii Royce argues that the Beloved Community establishes a higher 
purpose for all communities. It presents the possibility that diverse communities can join 
together, and this more inclusive community can provide a perspective on the way to the 
largest “absolute” perspective. The result is a process of ongoing interpretation that 
generates new perspectives. 
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Contemporary Accounts of Error and Ignorance 
 
From his early account of error in The Religious Aspects of Philosophy to his 
account in “Error and Truth” Royce maintains that that error stems from a conflict that 
“is at once theoretical and practical.”lviii While error is the natural result of our human 
finitude, we have a deep ethical obligation to avoid it. In order to maintain loyalty to 
loyalty and fulfill our commitments to each other, we must continually strive towards a 
wider perspective. Errors do not necessarily stem from passive failures to recognize the 
truth; they often stem from active reluctance to recognize the limits of one’s view or seek 
a wider viewpoint. The contemporary concept of epistemology of ignorance highlights 
this harm in reference to structures of oppression. While multiple scholars working in 
feminist epistemology such as Shannon Sullivan, Nancy Tuana, Lorraine Code, and 
Linda Martín Alcoff have discussed epistemology of ignorance over the past decade, the 
term comes from Charles Mills’s 1997 The Racial Contract.lix  The term refers to “an 
examination of the complex phenomena of ignorance, which has as its aim identifying 
different forms of ignorance, examining how they are produced and sustained, and what 
role they play in knowledge practices.”lx As Mills explains, epistemology of ignorance is 
“a straight forward corollary of standpoint theory: if one group is privileged, after all, it 
must be by comparison with another that is handicapped.”lxi Dominant groups cultivate 
 
an ignorance about the lives of those whom they oppress and the structures of oppression 
that support their own social privilege. Just as it is in the interest of those who are 
oppressed to recognize structures of oppressive society, it is in the interest of dominant 
groups to maintain ignorance. 
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Mills explains one formation of this in “White Ignorance,” where African 
Americans have “been forced to become lay anthropologists,”lxii studying and learning 
white culture in order to survive and avoid violence. He notes, “[t]he white delusion of 
racial superiority insulates itself against refutation.”lxiii For Mills, this phenomenon of 
white ignorance is so strong of a factor “even seemingly straightforward empirical 
perception will be affected… the concept [of white supremacy] is driving the perception, 
with white aprioristically intent on denying what is before them.”lxiv White ignorance has 
the power to affect seemingly race neutral observations because it structures white 
perception itself. While this power is seemingly unstoppable, Mills contends, “white 
ignorance is not indefeasible (even if it sometimes seems that way!), and some people 
who are white will, because of their particular histories (and/or the intersection of 
whiteness and other identities), overcome it and have true beliefs on what their fellow 
whites get wrong.”lxv White ignorance is a strong cognitive tendency that is supported 
and reinforced continually by white supremacist societies. However, even though this 
 
tendency has the power to drive perception itself, it is not an epistemological destiny. 
Rather, it is a strong but potentially subverted force. Mills closes this essay with the 
claim, “[o]nly by starting to break these rules and meta-rules [of white ignorance] can we 
begin the long process that will lead to the eventual overcoming of this white darkness 
and the achievement of an enlightenment that is genuinely multiracial.”lxvi Here, Mills 
language clearly reflects Harding’s claim that privileged individuals can, and must, 
cultivate a view from below. 
Drawing on Mills work, as well as feminist standpoint theory and Code’s account 
of subjectivity and responsible knowing, Alcoff argues that “[t]he idea of an 
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epistemology of ignorance attempts to explain and account for the fact that such 
substantive practices of ignorance—willful ignorance, for example, and socially 
acceptable but faulty justificatory practices—are structural.”lxvii For Code, ignorance is 
similarly situational, much like epistemological privilege is situational. Alcoff explains, 
“knowers are at once limited and enabled by the specificities of their locations…. That is, 
the fact that we are all situated does not give us reasons to classify any given situation as 
ignorant in and of itself; rather, a given epistemic situation may be advantaged or 
disadvantaged.”lxviii While ignorance is situational for Code, it is, according to Alcoff, 
broader for Harding. Under Harding’s account of feminist standpoint theory, ignorance is 
a feature of social groups “simply because groups will sometimes operate with different 
starting belief sets based on their social location and their group-related experiences, and 
these starting belief sets will inform their epistemic operations such as judging coherence 
and plausibility.”lxix In other words, social groups do not just limit the information 
available to their constituents but also the ways in which their constituents validate or 
invalidate any given notion as knowledge. 
In this regard, works in epistemology of ignorance highlight the ways power 
operates to produce errors. The erroneous beliefs that permeate white supremacist 
cultures about the lives and experiences of African Americans leads to myths of Black 
sexuality, while the same power of ignorance limits the corrective power of African 
American testimony: “Even when such fears [of lynching and other forms of racially 
motivated violence] are not a factor, and blacks do feel free to speak, the epistemic 
presumption against their credibility remains in that it does not for white witnesses.”lxx At 
 
the same time, women’s testimonies of sexual assault are also discredited to maintain a 
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standard of male ignorance. Epistemology of ignorance accounts for the ways in which 
power limits knowledge, however, it also relies on the concept that truth and error have 
meaning. Works about the epistemology of ignorance investigate how and why power 
structures limits knowing, but they do not, on their own, give us a means of recognizing 
the error that results from structural ignorance. Thwarting the power of strategic 
ignorance requires an aim towards an ideal of clearer, fuller, knowing. This aim cannot 
be an ahistorical, raceless, sexless ideal of pure knowing but rather an actualizable 
account of a given situation that carefully considers the context and relation of a given 
claim to structures of power. 
Error Sensitivity and Testimony 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, developing a method of error sensitivity will 
enable feminist inquiry to retain the value of epistemologically privileged testimonies 
because communities of interpretation, unlike conventional juries, do not need to base 
their decisions on dualistic notions of true and false. Instead, they can evaluate which 
testimonies possess the greatest degree of truth or the greatest degree of error by 
establishing the widest view possible, one that accounts for situations, contexts, and 
responsibilities. When a community of interpretation establishes the widest view 
possible, it can recognize error in testimony and respond to it without labeling someone’s 
testimony as either willfully deceitful or blatantly wrong. For example, a community of 
interpretation could recognize that a man is in error when he testifies that a woman 
consented to sexual intercourse through her body language without asserting that the man 
is lying about the events in question or that he is wrong about the woman’s body 
language. Instead, they can acknowledge that the man’s limited perspective caused him to 
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err in his understanding of how patriarchy has shaped definitions of consent. However, 
this recognition is only possible if communities of interpretation are prepared to confront 
structures of power. Hence, in the next chapter, I explore how Royce’s concept of loyalty 
to loyalty promotes destabilizing oppressive power structures in order to promote 
progress toward the Beloved Community. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
INTERPRETATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION: COMMUNITIES OF 
 
INTERPRETATION IN ROYCE’S MATURE PHILOSOPHY 
 
In the last chapter, I claimed that a concept of error sensitivity is a necessary part 
of what Heldke terms “a responsibility to the context of inquiry.”i In this chapter, I argue 
that adopting this responsibility requires a specific account of what inquiry within a 
community ought to look like. A common commitment of feminist epistemology is the 
inclusion of previously ignored and disregarded perspectives in what counts as 
knowledge. At its core, feminist epistemology asks for more inclusive, more balanced, 
and overall more pluralistic approaches to attaining knowledge. By focusing on Royce’s 
definition of error as the willful presentation of a partial view as a whole, I argue that 
error sensitivity requires an account of feminist inquiry that includes Royce’s triadic 
model of interpretation. However, incorporating an account of error sensitivity as a 
component of feminist epistemology involves not merely fitting a triadic model of 
interpretation onto existing methods of feminist epistemology but rather reimagining 
communal inquiry with error sensitivity at its core. 
A holistic reimagining is necessary because developing error sensitivity requires 
accounting for the concepts I discussed at the end of the previous chapter, “loyalty to 
loyalty” and the Beloved Community, as well as the extensions of these concepts that I 
describe in the first section of this chapter, “loyalty to interpretation” and the 
aforementioned triadic model of interpretation. Although accounting for these concepts 
will require a significant shift from existing models of feminist inquiry, they are, as I 
contend in the second section of this chapter, consistent with the four commitments of 
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feminist epistemology that I described in the second chapter. After assessing how 
Royce’s concepts are consistent with the commitments of feminist epistemology, I 
provide a closer analysis of how these concepts promote error sensitivity. In particular, I 
consider the importance of viewing truth as incomplete and growing, accepting a 
communal commitment to interpretation, and developing an unwavering focus on being 
as inclusive as possible. In the conclusion, I review the concrete application of this model 
by returning to the example of an interracial rape case and discuss the Navajo court 
system. 
Royce’s Triadic Model of Interpretation 
 
In the previous chapter, I described the development of Royce’s theories about 
error and truth. Ultimately, the development of these theories resulted in the development 
of Royce’s mature model of interpretation as well. In his later works, War and Insurance, 
Problem of Christianity, and the unfinished “The Spirit of the Community,” Royce 
develops a model of interpretation that makes sense of responding to an incomplete, 
growing truth in a communal setting. For Royce, interpretation is always a social 
endeavor. It operates in concrete situations and within particular contexts. As Oppenheim 
explains, “Royce cautioned his audience that they must counter their habit of defining 
truth and reality in merely conceptual terms. If his argument [for the existence of an All- 
Knower] were to function for them, they would have to shift to a concrete interpretive 
context and consider truth and reality in their essentially social setting.”ii Oppenheim 
 
goes on to explain that as Royce’s thought matures over time interpretation plays a larger 
role: “Even if Royce himself in 1883 had not yet shifted his mode of thinking explicitly 
to an interpretive epistemology, he had surely done so by 1915. At this later date, he 
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stressed the need ‘to revise our metaphysical ideas’ this occurred if one shifted one’s 
habits of thinking from primarily conceptual or perceptual mode of thought into a 
primarily interpretational mode.”iii In particular, Royce’s shift toward an “interpretive 
epistemology” resulted in his concept of communities of interpretation. 
Royce’s 1914 work War and Insurance provides his clearest model of what he 
calls the community of interpretation. In chapters three and four of this work Royce 
explains that when people or nations relate to each other only in terms of pairs any 
consideration for each other ultimately fades and produces an adversarial and 
antagonistic relationship. This piece, written three years before the United States entered 
World War I, is Royce’s most prominent political writing. In this piece he proposes that 
nations form an international mutual insurance to prevent global war. Royce’s logic being 
 
that if multiple nations had an interest in being loyal to a mutual peace and each other 
then they would be less likely to allow individual disputes between nations develop into 
wars. iv 
Royce’s explanation of interpretation in this piece then is used to explain how 
 
nations can develop long lasting peace. Thus, when he argues that relationships of pairs, 
or dyadic relationships, are dangerous, he goes so far to claim “War itself persists 
because the nations still cultivate dyadic relationships too exclusively.”v Royce argues 
that whenever there is a pair of two people, they are just as likely to approach each other 
with love as with antipathy, and when they come together for a task, such as debating, 
buying and selling, or gathering food, they are capable of maintaining a loving 
relationship. However, when the individual task has passed, this pair will eventually 
become antagonistic because they are two separate beings who are likely to develop two 
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separate sets of interests: “We naturally [hurt each other] not because we are by nature 
either mainly selfish or primarily malicious or even greedy. We do all this merely 
because, if taken in pairs, we are, in each pair, two different and contrasting people or 
groups.”vi Royce goes on to claim that the self-consciousness of individuals requires that 
they are able to contrast themselves against others within a community. Our ability to 
contrast ourselves against others is therefore a crucial part of our identity. However, this 
need to contrast ourselves ultimately means that we will interrupt, bore, and collide with 
each other when we are in pairs.vii 
For Royce, we escape the harms of the dyadic relationship by focusing mutual 
 
love on something else. This something else can be a mutual cause between comrades, a 
community for neighbors, or a mutual interest in peace for warring nations. The third 
entity that unites the previously dangerous two entities must be something that moves the 
community towards a wider perspective than before.viii While a dyadic relationship is 
always a socially dangerous relationship, the specifics of what should intervene to make 
the dyadic relationship a triadic one depends on the context of the relationship. Royce 
argues that one common example of a triadic relationship is the professional relationship 
of a principle, agent, and client. Each member of this community has an interest that 
depends upon the interests of the other two members because of this, it is “naturally a 
peace-loving community.”ix In business terms, such as Royce envisions the most basic 
form of the relationship, the principle and the client are inaccessible to each other even 
though they require each other for a particular task. The agent builds the relationship 
between the principle and the client. While the principle, agent, and the client remain 
individual separate agents, they together form a new community consisting of the triad. 
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Royce claims that this relationship provides the basic model for all communities of 
interpretation.x 
In War and Insurance, Royce focuses on nations as the potential members of 
communities of interpretation and claims that his contemporary political tensions are the 
result of dyadic relations between nations. However, in his unfinished 1914 work, “The 
Spirit of Community,” Royce claims that the dyadic relationships are not just harmful in 
social and global settings but also that the ideal dyadic relationships that underlie much of 
western philosophy creates antagonistic and ultimately underproductive philosophy. In 
this essay, Royce sets out to create an account of mediation that fulfills what he sees as a 
void in philosophy: ”Both philosophy and religion have suffered in the past from the 
tendency to think of mediation too exclusively in terms that presuppose some sort of 
quarrel which is to be settled.”xi   In “Josiah Royce on ‘The Spirit of the Community’ and 
 
the Nature of Philosophy: An Interpretive Reconstruction,” Kelly Parker summarizes key 
ideas from the unpublished essay. In this essay, according to Parker, Royce argues “that 
the traditional conception of philosophy and philosophical method, deriving from 
Socrates and Plato, is overly narrow, a deformation of genuine philosophy.”xii    Royce 
distinguishes between dyadic mediation and triadic mediation. Dyadic mediation is 
philosophical inquiry that is based on an antagonistic relationship between two real or 
ideal parties. Philosophical questions are examined and settled through what Parker calls 
“verbal combat.” The Socratic method encourages forms of dyadic mediation. The 
Socratic method, Royce argues, “gives a permanent expression to the idea that 
philosophical inquiry consists in a sort of disputatious game, played between a pair of 
 
contending philosophers.”xiii Royce goes on to claim that inquiry ends when either both 
112  
parties agree or one party is silenced. In this account, he claims, the mediator of inquiry is 
supposed to be history or thought itself. 
Royce, then, accounts for the other most famous account of mediation in western 
philosophy, the Hegelian dialectic.  Royce summarizes the Hegelian dialectical method: 
“The familiar Hegelian generalization of the dialectical method undertakes to substitute 
for all such views of philosophical mediation the thesis that the solution of each 
philosophical clash of contrary opinions lies in some higher synthesis, wherein the 
opposed opinions are at once annulled, and fulfilled, and united.”xiv  While Royce does 
 
not offer an extensive rejection of Hegel’s method here—though he does claim that it is 
inadequate in “Error and Truth”—he contends that the topic of meditation is too complex 
and too important to philosophy to be reduced to either the Hegelian or the Socratic 
method. Royce claims, “The Hegelian union of contraries or contradictories in a higher 
synthesis is not the only type of rational mediation either in philosophy or in practical 
life.”xv From this point, Royce goes on to illustrate his own account of mediation wherein 
 
the community relies on certain third parties to come into connection with parties to 
create relationships. 
Parker explains Royce’s triadic model of mediation by contrasting with the dyadic 
models preferred by Socrates and Plato. In the Socrates-Plato model “the direct 
confrontation of two conflicting positions” leads to a “course of criticism and 
argument”xvi and concludes when either only one of the two positions remains viable. 
 
Parker suggests that this process constitutes mediation to the extent that the conflict itself 
disappears at the conclusion. However, unlike the disputants in the Socrates-Plato model, 
the conflicting parties in Royce’s triadic model do not need to confront one another 
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directly. Instead, the “Roycean public philosopher” uses “the art of inquiry, a sound 
understanding of the science of logic, and systematic knowledge of the range of 
philosophical ideas that have been advanced throughout history by others”xvii to create a 
healthy exchange of ideas between the two parties, one that does not necessarily require 
an adversarial relationship.xviii 
Royce’s 1913 work The Problem of Christianity gives the most cohesive view of 
 
his mature philosophy. In this work Royce develops his metaphysical account of 
community. In his early work, notably The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Royce claims 
that the meaning of truth and error requires the existence of an all-encompassing view. In 
these early pieces this largest view is the view of an Absolute.xix Royce maintains a form 
of absolute idealism throughout his entire career. However, over time the language that 
he uses to describe the Absolute changes. In The Problem of Christianity Royce claims 
that the meaning of truth and error requires the all-encompassing view of the “Beloved 
Community.” The Beloved Community is Royce’s ideal of an end where all communities 
are joined together under the common causes of “loyalty to loyalty.”xx The Beloved 
Community acts as the ideal aim for all interpretation in The Problem of Christianity. 
Community members strive to develop better interpretations and develop greater error 
sensitivity as part of the larger ethical, metaphysical, and spiritual striving towards unity. 
This concept provides an aim for inquiry. As Oppenheim explains, “Interpretation, then, 
is essentially social but also teleological—that is, it possesses ‘a directed ‘sense’,’ the 
bearing of one minded being toward another intended mind.”xxi Hence, when 
communities strive towards the Beloved Community, inquiry itself acquires the ethical 
aim of unity. 
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Yet, in order for communities to strive for unity as an ethical aim, they must be 
genuine communities. Jacquelyn Kegley succinctly explains the distinction Royce makes 
between “genuine communities” and involuntary, “parasitic” communities.xxii She notes 
that genuine communities are “those communities that foster genuine, moral selves.”xxiii 
 
In order to help individuals develop “genuine, moral selves,” communities must provide 
“the context for self-interpretation, for self-planning, and for moral action.”xxiv Kegley’s 
explanation emphasizes some of the important attributes of Royce’s genuine 
communities. First, genuine communities must be voluntary. In order for individuals to 
develop themselves through loyalty, their loyalties must be freely chosen. Involuntary 
communities, such as the families we are born into and the locations we may be forced to 
live in due to financial circumstances, may play a role in structuring our lives, but unless 
we actively choose to make these communities our causes, they are not genuine. Second, 
genuine communities are connected by a common cause, but they must respect 
individuals as unique entities, and they must protect the freedom of the individual to 
continue to choose her own causes. Royce explains the importance of this quality: “a 
community does not become one, in the sense of my definition, by virtue of any 
reduction or melting of these various selves into a single merely present self, or into a 
mass of passing experience.”xxv Here, Royce maintains that genuine communities must 
respect and preserve the integrity of individual experiences. Third, genuine communities 
must aim towards loyalty to loyalty. In other words, genuine communities must be open 
enough to engage in inquiry with those outside of the community in order to build 
relationships and commitments with other communities. Likewise, they must allow their 
own members the freedom to be committed to other causes and, if need be, leave the 
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community to commit themselves to a new ultimate cause. To the extent that 
communities close themselves off from interpretation with other communities, and to the 
extent that communities restrict their members’ abilities to voluntarily pursue their own 
causes, communities become parasitic and violent. In The Problem of Christianity, Royce 
argues that individuals require relationships within communities for meaning. The self for 
Royce is only understandable, for example, when it can be contrasted with other selves. 
Goals can only be established amongst neighbors and spiritual salvation is only possible 
for the whole of a community. Meaning requires not just the existence of others but also 
an active love and commitment to others. Royce states, “When friends really join hands 
and hearts and lives, it is not the mere collection of sundered organism and of divided 
feelings and will that these friends view as their life. Their life, as friends, is the unity 
which, while above their own level, wins them to itself and gives them meaning.”xxvi   For 
 
Royce, this central commitment towards others is manifested through loyalty to loyalty. 
Royce’s pluralism maintains that our commitments to each other are fundamentally 
commitments to respecting each other’s loyalties. This commitment of loyalty to loyalty 
transcends differences between specific  loyalties. 
As with War and Insurance and “The Spirit of Community,” Royce defines 
interpretation in The Problem of Christianity as a triadic relationship where the third 
party mediates between the conflicting starting parties.  Also like the two works of the 
following year, in The Problem of Christianity, Royce credits C.S. Peirce with 
developing the triadic model of interpretation. He notes that “Charles Peirce cannot be 
held responsible for the use that [he] shall here make of his opinions” before delving into 
his description of perception, conception, and interpretation with the acknowledgement 
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that “I should never have viewed as I now view them without his direct or indirect 
aid.”xxvii With this acknowledgement, Royce draws upon Pierce to explain, “For neither 
perception nor conception, nor any combination of the two, nor yet their synthesis in our 
practical activities constitutes the whole of any interpretation.”xxviii Here, Royce 
distinguishes his model of interpretation from those that rely on dyadic relationships like 
those presented by Henri Bergson and James. Where Royce views their models as 
defining the problem of knowledge in terms of the tensions between perceptions and 
conceptions, he believes that these dynamics, no matter how they are cast, are too limited 
to capture the full range of human experience. In particular, they fail to capture the social 
experience of knowers in communities. 
For Royce, perception and conception remain important, but they present dyadic 
relationships between perceivers and the objects perceived and conceivers and the ideas 
conceived. However, because human knowledge only has value in communal settings, it 
is not enough for individuals to reconcile their own perceptions and conceptions with the 
objects and ideas perceived or conceived. Instead, individuals must reconcile their 
perceptions and conceptions with those of their neighbors, and while it may be possible 
to communicate conceptions so that “they can be regarded, with a high degree of 
probability, as identical,” the process of passing “our own concepts to our own percepts” 
remains highly individual and inhibits “mutual understanding.”xxix As a result, knowers 
 
must engage in a third process, interpretation. Royce explains, “Interpretation, however, 
is what we seek in all our social and spiritual relations; and without some process of 
interpretation, we obtain no fullness of life.”xxx In this statement, Royce emphasizes that 
humans never experience the problem of knowledge as isolated individuals and that 
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acquiring the larger view, which enables individuals to avoid error and find meaning in 
truth as I explained in the previous chapter, requires the act of interpretation. 
Having established that the social and spiritual components of knowledge creation 
require a process of interpretation, Royce describes its triadic relation: “Thus an 
interpretation is a relation which not only involves three terms, but brings them into a 
determinate order. One of the three terms is the interpreter; a second term is the object – 
the person or the meaning or the text – which is interpreted; the third is the person to 
whom the interpretation is addressed.”xxxi Here, Royce provides the clearest statement of 
 
his formula for the triadic model of interpretation. From this formula, it is evident that the 
triadic model does not necessarily require three separate agents—the borrower, the 
lender, and the banker or the two disputants and a philosopher. Instead, it requires a 
relationship with three points. Royce even specifies that it is possible for an individual to 
interpret herself to herself as long as she puts herself into a relationship with three terms, 
her past self, her present self, and her future self.xxxii In this regard, it is also important to 
recognize that three physically or socially discrete units would not necessarily constitute 
three separate parties for Royce. In order to operate as a triadic relationship, the three 
parties must maintain distinct perspectives while sharing a commitment to a common 
cause. In other words, if Lynn and Sarah come into conflict and Ellen supports Lynn’s 
position against Sarah, there are still only two parties, and it remains a dangerous dyad. 
Furthermore, just as three parties can fail to be a triadic relationship for Royce, his 
description of triadic relationships does not suggest that only three parties can or should 
be involved in any given inquiry. Instead, it suggests that communities of inquiry that 
involve the spirit of interpretation will lead to further inquiry amongst several different 
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individuals and groups, with groups constantly forming new triangulations in pursuit of 
new creative acts of interpretation. 
While Royce indicates that it is possible for interpretation to take place without 
three independent subjects, his examples continue to focus on interactions between 
separate knowers because he contends that the motivation for the process of interpretation 
stems from the value offered by social relationships. He explains, “Life is essentially, in 
its ideal, social. Hence interpretation is a necessary element of everything that in life, has 
ideal value.”xxxiii For Royce, within social settings, the process of interpretation that 
 
provides the “ideal value” he describes depends upon an ideal motivation called “The 
 
Will to Interpret.” Parker explains how the Will to Interpret functions as an ideal motive: 
The "spirit" of any community of interpretation is simply the "Will to Interpret," a 
will of which all the community's members are possessed. A member may at any 
time personally take up the task of interpretation as a means of mediating among 
diverse views within the community, and in doing so aim toward that "ideal 
event,--the spiritual unity of our community"--that all seek. Such a member 
embodies the Spirit of the Community, makes it active and effective in a 
particular context, and in doing so becomes its ‘incarnation.’xxxiv 
Parker’s explanation highlight’s Royce’s view that all good motivations are aimed toward 
 
the cause of greater unity. Yet, as Parker explains, unity, for Royce, cannot be created 
through coercion or deceptions. Real unity depends upon truth: “Royce’s ‘will to 
interpret’ intends to unify these communities of interpretation by promoting truth in them. 
Only through such a truth-seeking, unity-promoting will can these communities become 
and remain ethical.”xxxv Hence, Royce’s mediators act selflessly as part of the community 
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and do more than settle conflicts in favor of one party or the other; they guide the 
community toward a new and better understanding of the issues at hand. 
Royce describes how the Will to Interpret enables people to derive value from 
social and spiritual knowledge:  “Loyalty to a community of interpretation enters into all 
the other forms of true loyalty. No one who loves mankind can find a worthier and more 
significant way to express his love than by increasing and expressing among men the 
Will to Interpret.”xxxvi In this passage, Royce identifies the importance of the Will to 
Interpret for both the community and the interpreter. For Royce, adopting the role of the 
mediating interpreter is the highest spiritual calling for any individual. In this sense, 
interpreting knowledge is not just a mechanism for allowing people to coexist without 
violence; it is a matter of ethical, metaphysical, and spiritual importance. As Oppenheim 
explains, “This ethical life was to be energized (and in part guided) by the community- 
members’ moral will to interpret and be interpreted.”xxxvii The fact that Royce’s will to 
interpret is not just a guiding principle for epistemology but also for ethical concerns 
highlights how these two concepts are never separate for Royce. Epistemological 
concerns are ethical concerns, and this is part of the idea that all errors are both practical 
and theoretical. 
Royce’s Model of Interpretation and the Commitments of Feminist Epistemology 
 
Although Royce did not develop his theories with an explicitly feminist 
perspective, those surrounding error sensitivity—communities of interpretation, the 
triadic model of interpretation, the Beloved Community, loyalty to loyalty, and the Will 
to Interpret—as well as his philosophy in general are compatible with the four 
commitments of feminist epistemology that I described in the second chapter: first, 
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conventional epistemology has depended upon myths that maintain existing power 
structures; second, better knowing must participate in destabilizing systems of 
oppression; third, better knowing is situated within the lived experience of those on the 
peripheries of power; and fourth, feminist inquiry should be able to adjudicate between 
conflicting accounts from below. First, Royce’s description of the dangerous pair aligns 
with the ways in which conventional epistemology depends upon the myths that maintain 
existing power structures. Second, since interpretation, for Royce, is the process of 
building communities and seeking wider views, it is always going to destabilize systems 
that exclude the knowledges of those who are oppressed. Third, the in-between identity 
of the mediator corresponds with the border identity of the mestiza identity, the Will to 
Interpret, the desire for greater spiritual unity, that motivates the mediator resembles the 
loving perception that the mestiza can undertake. Fourth, Royce’s emphasis on creating 
knowledge within communities led him to devise a concept of error that community- 
oriented feminist epistemologists can draw upon for adjudicating between conflicting 
claims. 
Feminist epistemologists have been critical of binary logic structures, such as the 
dichotomies that often create us versus them mentalities, and dyadic models of 
interpretation often promote binary structures. In “A Paradigm of Philosophy: The 
Adversary Method,” Janice Moulton claims that canonical western philosophical 
reasoning, which shapes conventional epistemology, has been defined by what she calls 
the “Adversary Method.”  Moulton claims that philosophical debate and scientific 
reasoning is dominated by the idea that, in order to get at the truth of an argument, one 
must prove another’s argument wrong. Under this model, the philosophical claim that 
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“wins” in an antagonistic debate is determined to be the most truthful claim.xxxviii 
Moulton claims that any philosophical approach or work that does not fit into the 
Adversary Method will either be disregarded and ignored or misinterpreted in order for 
proponents of the Adversary Method to fit it into their existing paradigm. In particular, 
she describes how the Socratic Method is the most notable example of a philosophical 
approach that has been misinterpreted to fit the Adversary Paradigm.xxxix 
The Adversary Method is troubling to feminists for two key reasons: in many 
 
Western communities, women are socialized to be less aggressive, less confrontational, 
and less confident with their positions. Thus, if doing good philosophy requires besting 
an adversary in a debate, women in these communities will be at a remarkable 
disadvantage to men who have been socialized to excel under the Adversary Method.xl 
Second, the Adversary Method restricts the philosophical issues that can be addressed to 
ideas that can be put into terms of deductive reasoning. Arguments that cannot fit into 
deductive reasoning are often labeled unreasonable, emotional, too personal, or not 
philosophical.xli As mentioned in chapter two, feminist epistemologists like Code argue 
that the move to turn all discussions into abstractions in the name of being philosophical 
has prevented the experiences of those who are in some way socially oppressed from 
being seen as appropriate sources of knowledge. 
Western philosophy’s emphasis on the Adversary Method is troubling to Royce as 
well. However, where Moulton claims that something like the Socratic method has only 
been misconstrued as adversarial, Royce would argue that any philosophical inquiry that 
relies on only two participants will become antagonistic. As such, the disregard for 
another’s positions, oversimplification of ideas, and destructive flight towards abstraction 
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that Moulton describes as consequences of the Adversary Method will inevitably happen 
in any interaction limited to two parties. In this regard, Royce’s triadic model of 
interpretation resists the masculinist myth that the truth will stand out as the superior 
position in any discussion and helps individuals disinclined towards conflict to participate 
in the knowledge-making process. Furthermore, Royce’s emphasis on the community’s 
pursuit of greater unity, epitomized by the non-adversarial triadic model of interpretation, 
rejects the myth of an isolated knower finding truth through the exercise of pure reason. 
By resisting the myth of an isolated knower, Royce’s triadic model of 
interpretation also resists the “S knows p” model of knowing that Code criticizes. 
Because Royce’s model of interpretation never assumes that an object of knowledge 
could be known outside of a relationship, it does not promote the kind of dangerous 
objectification that a reliance on only perception and conception often does in the “S 
knows p” model, as I explained in the second chapter. Code’s criticisms of this 
objectification note that, when women, colonized peoples, and people of color have been 
“known” by a socially privileged position, they have not been asked to participate in the 
process of creating this knowledge. As a result, knowledge within the “S knows p” model 
becomes a form of domination and contributes to systems of oppression. Thus, Royce’s 
insistence on creating relationships between the three terms of interpretation corresponds 
with feminist epistemology’s endeavors to undermine systems of oppression. 
In order to reject the “S knows p” model, feminist epistemologists have contended 
that good knowing must embrace the purpose of overcoming oppression. While 
conventional epistemologies that call for pure knowledge untainted by political concerns 
cannot accept the idea that knowing should have a social purpose, Royce’s contention 
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that knowledge only acquires meaning within communities automatically gives good 
knowing the purpose of building communities within his model of interpretation. In this 
regard, the Will to Interpret is not just an epistemological motivation; it is an act of love 
towards the community that, ultimately, promotes a more united and inclusive 
community. As such, the Will to Interpret undermines systems of oppression that rely on 
a process of knowledge making that is either solitary or divisive. 
While Royce’s concept of the Beloved Community provides a potential basis for a 
 
concept of error that remains consistent with many feminist epistemologists’ objections 
to the Adversary Method and the myth of the isolated knower, the “loyalty to loyalty” 
that brings communities together, and therefore has the potential to establish the Beloved 
Community, also connotes the kinds of totalizing accounts of communal identity that 
many feminists have criticized. In Dislocating Cultures, Uma Narayan argues against 
analytic moves within Western discussions of Third World cultures that provide 
totalizing descriptions of both Third World and Western cultures. In particular, Narayan 
contends that contesting the assumptions about “culture,” “tradition,” and “national 
identity” perpetuated by Western theorists is a vital part of “Third-World feminist 
perspectives.”xlii In other words, Narayan’s claim suggests that pushes for greater unity, 
 
such as some claims that various aspects of Indian feminist culture are the results of 
 
“Westernization,” threaten to undermine the importance of the “particular.”xliii 
 
Narayan goes on to explain that the “theoretical frameworks and conceptual 
assumptions” that determine who is included and who is excluded from analyses of 
cultures or groups of any kind carry “problematic implications”: 
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The terms ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’ are not, in one sense, pure opposites. Since 
feminist analyses that did not explicitly concern themselves with the applicability 
and relevance of their analyses to ‘women on the margins’ often perceived 
themselves as applicable to all women, that form of ‘exclusion’ was 
simultaneously a problematic form of ‘inclusion.’ Attending specifically to 
problems affecting women in Third-World contexts, as Daly does, is a form of 
‘inclusion’ and is, in one respect preferable to simply assuming that one’s 
feminist perspective applies to all women. However, the terms in which such 
analyses are carried out might still be embedded in theoretical frameworks and 
conceptual assumptions that have problematic implications.xliv 
Here, Narayan’s analysis draws attention to the possibility that a concept like the Beloved 
 
Community that relies on the language of unity could exclude, or at least greatly 
diminish, various groups and unique problems from consideration in its effort to be all 
inclusive. 
In Feminism Without Borders, Chandra Mohanty also argues that cross-cultural 
feminist scholarship has often produced Eurocentric, universalizing methodologies.xlv 
However, Mohanty goes on to contend that her argument in “Under Western Eyes” for 
“grounded, particularized analyses linked with larger, even global, economic political 
frameworks” drew “inspiration from a vision of feminist solidarity across borders.”xlvi In 
this instance, and in arguments throughout her book, Mohanty’s claim that a vision of 
cross-cultural solidarity can provide inspiration for feminists resembles the ways in 
which feminists could use the ideal of the Beloved Community as a source of inspiration 
when they are engaged in acts of inquiry. In particular, Mohanty cites the need for “a 
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shared frame of reference” among feminists across cultures.xlvii Her description of “a 
shared frame of reference” provides a potential response to the inclusion-exclusion 
problem described by Narayan and useful way of understanding “the widest view 
possible” provided by the Beloved Community. Conceived of this way, the pursuit of the 
Beloved Community is not the pursuit of a monolithic vision of the universe; rather, it is 
the pursuit of a coherent frame of reference that would facilitate communication between 
its members about their diverse perspectives. 
Indeed, “loyalty to loyalty,” as conceived by Royce, requires a commitment to 
pluralism. It requires a commitment to maintaining a community that supports and 
nurtures loyalty to different causes. In this regard, Mohanty’s definition of “solidary” 
resembles Royce’s concept of “loyalty to loyalty”: 
I define solidarity in terms of mutuality, accountability, and the recognition of 
common interests as the basis for relationships among diverse communities. 
Rather than assuming an enforced commonality of oppression, the practice of 
solidarity foregrounds communities of people who have chosen to work and fight 
together. Diversity and difference are central values here—to be acknowledged 
and respected, not erased in the building of alliances.xlviii 
 
Like Royce, Mohanty focuses on people coming together and building communities 
around shared commitments and causes, rather than shared conditions, such as shared 
oppression. Amrita Banerjee summarizes Mohanty’s approach to solidarity in terms of 
building agency in response to difference: “A concept such as ‘common oppression,’ on 
the contrary, stipulates identities without regard for whether or not it is taken up by actual 
agents…. this account [is] untrue to these women’s experience as Mohanty points out.”xlix 
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In order to help people build communities around shared commitments and causes, 
Roycean mediators must not try to erase differences between groups or individuals. 
Instead, they undertake a creative action that builds the potential for a common cause by 
maintaining a pluralist community that protects the ability to commit oneself to differing 
causes. 
As they promote more unified and inclusive communities, the mediators in 
Royce’s triadic model must bring the lived experiences of those on the peripheries of 
power into process of interpretation. The ways in which Royce’s mediators stand in 
between not just different points of view but different worlds of experience resemble the 
way that mestiza consciousness exists on the border between identities. In “Border 
Communities and Royce: The Problem of Translation and Reinterpreting Feminist 
Empiricism,” Celia T. Bardwell-Jones illustrates this connection while drawing on the 
work of feminist empiricism, mestiza consciousness, and Royce. In this piece, Bardwell- 
Jones claims that the necessary third party of Royce’s model of interpretation can 
illuminate the role of mestiza consciousness. While she is drawn to Nelson’s work in 
feminist empiricism because it offers an account of feminist epistemology that is well 
guarded against relativism, she claims that this project is limited because it is based on 
Quine’s holism, which is a dyadic process. Bardwell-Jones argues that the dyadic model 
of Quine (via Nelson) is incapable of taking into account “recalcitrant experience.”l 
 
One of the most valuable concepts from the literature on mestiza consciousness is 
the concept of incommensurability. While this concept can be found throughout the work 
of Lugones and Anzaldúa, it is clearest in Schutte’s work. Incommensurability is the 
cultural differences that are not apparent in intercultural dialog. Schutte argues that 
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instances of incommensurability cannot be overcome by simply acknowledging cultural 
difference; rather, incommensurability creates a sense of strangeness and displacement. 
Attempts at cross-cultural understandings fail and become harmful when the dominant 
culture tries to avoid this sense of strangeness and displacement by subsuming cultural 
difference under a totalizing rationality.li 
The second concept that Bardwell-Jones draws on from mestiza literature is the 
 
concept of intersectionality. Intersectionality in the sense that Bardwell-Jones discusses it 
refers to the places, both physical and metaphorical, where two or more cultures overlap. 
Those whose lives are lived in the borderlands of cultures, as is in the case of mestiza, are 
able to tolerate contradictions and recognize differences between cultures. The 
experience of intersectionality itself then challenges binary modes of understanding.lii 
 
Bardwell-Jones claims that mestiza consciousness develops a triadic model of 
interpretation: “In this sense, the negotiation of seemingly contradictory cultures becomes 
a ‘third element’ in the mestiza consciousness. The third element amounts to a new 
consciousness born amid differences [that] creatively acts to wholly understand the 
complexities of the culturally fractured self.”liii Bardwell-Jones’s argument indicates why 
individuals with mestiza consciousness could be uniquely well suited to act as Roycean 
mediators. Since they are already practiced in interpreting their own identities within a 
triadic model, they may be prepared to exercise this model in communal settings. For 
Royce, interpretation is always a creative act that does not need to reject the displacement 
or strangeness caused by incommensurability in order to fit multiple views into an 
existing rationality. A mediator should never be satisfied with simply assimilating one 
party’s view into the other’s. Rather, genuine interpretation creates both a new 
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community—a community of interpretation—and an entirely new view beyond the 
original scope of the original parties’ views. 
The role of creativity in Royce’s model of interpretation connects it to the final 
commitment of feminist epistemology, the ability to adjudicate between conflicting 
claims from below. As I explained in chapter two, feminist epistemologists’ efforts to 
avoid essentializing the experiences of oppressed peoples and acknowledge the complex 
and conflict-ridden dynamics within communities has produced an emphasis on 
understanding the situations in which claims come into conflict and evaluating them on a 
case-by-case basis; however, it has not produced a satisfying means for this kind of 
evaluation. Because Royce’s triadic model of interpretation produces original knowledge 
rather than forcing claims into a preexisting, dominant rationality, it is well suited for 
responding to conflicting claims on a case-by-case basis. Likewise, Royce’s descriptions 
of interpreters throughout The Problem of Christianity, War and Insurance, and “The 
Spirit of the Community” illustrate the ways in which they must form a thorough 
understanding of all parties’ situations. Since Royce’s model of interpretation fulfills the 
existing demands of feminist epistemology for adjudicating between claims, his 
definition of error provides a sound starting for developing a feminist method of inquiry 
that contains error sensitivity at its core. 
Error Sensitivity as the Core of Interpretation 
 
While Royce’s theories are compatible with the commitments of feminist 
epistemology, incorporating them fully into a model of feminist inquiry requires 
identifying the strands of both Royce’s theories and feminist epistemology that situate 
error sensitivity at the core of interpretation. In order for us to begin developing error 
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sensitivity, we need a form of inquiry that accepts truth as incomplete and growing. 
Accepting this requires both that communities commit themselves to the ongoing process 
of interpretation and that they develop an unwavering focus on trying to be as inclusive 
as possible without sliding into assimilation. Oppenheim explains “Because Royce’s 
argument [for the existence of an All-Knower] calls for a series of judgments, it cannot 
function in the atemporal atmosphere of mere precepts or concepts. When a person shifts 
from an erroneous to a true judgment, he or she has to grasp the temporal process 
involved in this interpreted shift.”liv Errors are always situated within the passage of time. 
We have to acknowledge that time has passed and that the community has learned 
something new or understood something that happened. When a community does so, it 
also demonstrates that it prefers truth to error. Time may pass but an interpreter will only 
discover an error if she is actively aiming towards trying to discover the truth. 
In the previous chapter, I analyzed one form of error articulated by Royce, the 
partial view presenting itself as the view of the whole. This particular account of error is 
one of the most important ideas for developing error sensitivity within a community. For 
Royce, truth is always expanding and incomplete. In An Idealistic Pragmatism, Mary 
Briody Mahowald defends Royce against the charge that he is an out-of-date idealist by 
arguing that his philosophies are truer to the principles of pragmatism than his critics 
believe and analyzing his concept of truth. She explains, “Truth ‘changes’ for [Royce], 
not in the sense that it alters, but in the sense that it increases or grows. Truth is relative 
in that it is inevitably partial or limited, incomplete-while-completing itself.”lv While 
 
Royce rejects the skeptical argument that truth is relative and instead holds firm to the 
claim that truth and error need to have meaning, he contends that finding the truth and 
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producing knowledge must be anti-dogmatic acts. Because we need others in order for 
truth and error to have meaning, the process of changing truth or allowing truth to grow is 
always a social endeavor. It is the ongoing process by which we correct our limited 
engagement with others. In this regard, Royce’s account of truth is ideal for situating it 
within a discussion of feminist inquiry. Truth is not fixed and accessible by pure reason, 
but it is also not relative. There are better and worse accounts of the world for Royce. 
Yet, the act of interpreting the world, of understanding the truth, must be a never-ending 
process. 
For feminist standpoint theory, feminist empiricism, and ecological thinking, 
better knowing always marks a fuller account of the world. In particular, under all of 
these approaches, feminist epistemology gives us a “more true” account of the world than 
traditional epistemology because it actively incorporates marginalized perspectives to get 
a fuller view of concepts like racism, sexism, homophobia, and classism. Worse accounts 
of the world are not accounts that fail to be reasonable per se or miss a pure truth; worse 
accounts are those that provide no room for, or actively exclude, marginalized 
perspectives. Hence, Royce’s account of good interpretation and feminist accounts of 
good knowing share something in common: accounts of the world are better when they 
are inclusive. 
However, Royce’s account of truth as ever expansive and incomplete also 
provides the basis for a method of error sensitivity, an idea that is not found in feminist 
standpoint theory and ecological thinking. If truth is ever expansive and ever growing, 
anything that blocks interpreters’ recognition of this expansion is in error. Because truth 
is infinitely expansive and human communities, including communities of interpretation, 
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are finite, all interpretation is destined to produce error to some extent. Nonetheless, 
when truth is understood as ever expanding and growing, then the aim of interpretation, 
Royce’s Will to Interpret, will always be focused on getting as expansive of a view as 
possible in order to make it possible to recognize existing errors and avoid future errors. 
An incomplete, expanding truth demands a commitment from communities to a 
constant process of interpretation. When communities do not acknowledge the ongoing 
process of interpretation or accept an interpretation as a fixed truth, they inhibit their 
ability to recognize error because they make it possible for a partial view to pass as a 
complete view. In “Feminist Empiricism and Royce,” Bardwell-Jones claims that when 
there “is no interpretive process to translate the cultural differences between the two 
speakers [. . .], incommensurable experience becomes assimilated unreflectively.”lvi Her 
 
claim highlights Royce’s argument that it is destructive to only look at perception and 
conception as ways of creating knowledge because these accounts are based on dyadic 
structures and provide no means of completely sharing our perceptions with others; yet, 
they enable us to make the mistake of believing that our neighbor’s process of conception 
is identical to our own.lvii Believing that our neighbor’s process of conception is identical 
to our own is one manner of committing the error of misrepresenting our own partial 
view as the whole view of our neighbors and ourselves. 
 
For Royce, when we take interpretation seriously and try to recognize the 
differences between our processes and those of our neighbors, we undertake an active 
spiritual endeavor because the process of creating knowledge in communities through 
acts of interpretation is always occurring whether or not we acknowledge it. Thus, when 
we take the process of interpretation seriously, we also recognize something beyond our 
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finite capacities: “We try to solve the problem of learning how to exchanges the values of 
our own lives into the terms which can hope to pass current in the new or foreign spiritual 
realms whereto, when we counsel together, we are constantly attempting to pass.”lviii 
Without an account of interpretation, we still make interpretations, such as interpreting 
our neighbors’ process of conception as our own; however, we are unable to reflect upon 
this interpretation as a new and creative action. As a result, instead of aiming towards the 
most inclusive account possible and building a relationship with those whose knowledge 
or experiences we are interpreting, we quickly assimilate their unique perspectives into 
our own. In cases of cross-cultural communication, this inclination to assimilate others’ 
views into our own is not only an example of bad knowing but also serves as the basis for 
oppressive action. 
Maintaining a communal commitment to an ongoing process of interpretation is 
impossible without a concerted effort to develop an increasingly inclusive view. For 
Royce, developing the will to interpret and adopting the role of the mediator is the 
greatest act of love that an individual can perform for the community.lix Genuine 
interpretation for Royce always has to be an action of loyalty and dedication to the 
community. Interpretation is vital to the community because it is the key process for 
moving individual communities towards the largest, all-inclusive Beloved Community. 
Royce states, “we can readily see that the Beloved Community, whatever else it is, will 
be, when it comes, a Community of Interpretation.”lx   In this way, interpretation aims 
towards an ultimate community while utilizing finite communities as the means of getting 
 
at a larger perspective. 
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Striving towards the Beloved Community makes error sensitivity possible and 
necessary by directing the focus of interpretation away from the desire for specific 
preconceived goals. These goals may manifest as abstract ideals, such as the most 
logically coherent interpretation, the most compelling interpretation in an adversarial 
context, or the interpretation most consistent with an existing, dominant model of 
rationality. They may also manifest as concrete ends to communal inquiries, such as 
interpretations that support existing patriarchal or racist myths and interpretations that 
reward assimilationist mentalities. Instead of focusing on specific preconceived goals, 
communities of interpretation must seek the largest perspective of the issue that is being 
interpreted. Seeking the largest perspective requires not only involving as many parties as 
possible but also abandoning codified restrictions on what constitutes knowledge and 
accepting traditionally marginalized viewpoints that draw upon emotions and experiences 
as potentially valuable sources of knowledge. In order to involve as many parties as 
possible in the knowledge-making process and seriously consider traditionally 
marginalized viewpoints, communities of interpretation cannot accept the generalizations 
that lead to a limited view to standing in for the whole. Likewise, communities of 
interpretation striving for the widest view possible will always create new triads as they 
resolve initial interpretations, encounter new parties, and invite new mediators. By 
constantly seeking new, creative interpretations from fresh mediators, communities avoid 
falling into the assumptions that could prevent them from recognizing the errors produced 
by deeply ingrained myths. 
Since Royce’s model of triadic interpretation with its corresponding error 
 
sensitivity can help communities recognize harmful myths, it is the ideal mechanism for 
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adjudicating between conflicting claims from below, such as those presented in the 
example of an interracial sexual assault case. In these cases, the triadic model of 
interpretation helps to adjudicate between claims without ignoring the incommensurable 
positions of the accuser and the accused. All cross-cultural encounters include a level of 
incommensurability and, therefore, can easily become places of assimilation and error. In 
an example of an interracial sexual assault case, there are multiple levels of 
incommensurability. The effects of the black rapist myth may not fully translate to a 
white audience, and the way in which sexual assault and the fear of sexual assault 
construct white femininity might not be fully understandable to a male audience. 
However, these are necessary considerations for gaining a larger view through 
interpretation. Instead of making assumptions about the epistemic privilege of either 
white women or African American men at the onset, communities must interpret these 
situations on a case-by-case basis. This requires acknowledging that either side can make 
claims that are in error with regards to the events in question. 
Without error sensitivity, communities cannot perform these kinds of 
interpretations. As the natural result of human finitude, error is the inability to understand 
the whole of any given situation. While error is inevitable to an extent, joining into larger 
perspectives, most notably by inquiring as communities, provides the best way to 
recognize and avoid error. In the example of a sexual assault case, the judge and jury 
interpret the event in context of the community. The role of the interpreter is not 
necessarily to reconcile the accuser and the accused; rather, it aims towards a larger 
perspective of the event in question and then interprets that event through a judgment to 
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the community. In this regard, communities of interpretation will not perpetuate the 
forms of mediation and reconciliation commonly criticized by feminist scholars. 
By accepting the purpose of identifying error, the court shifts its agenda away 
from judging the accused's guilt or innocence and toward judging what is in error in 
accounts of the event in question. In an example of a white woman accusing a man of 
color of rape, a community of interpretation may judge the accuser's testimony to be in 
error if it determines that the woman only believed she had been raped after feeling 
pressure from her community to disavow a sexual identity which involves interracial 
relationships. In this instance, her error results from a limiting racist perspective of 
sexuality. In another instance, a community of interpretation may judge the accused's 
testimony to be in error if it determines that he believed that, having consented to a 
sexual encounter once, the woman had tacitly consented to further sexual encounters. In 
this instance, his error results from a limiting patriarchal perspective of what constitutes a 
woman's consent. By considering these claims in the context of the largest view 
available, the court, acting as a community of interpretation, develops the means to 
identify these kinds of errors in competing claims. 
When the court as a community of interpretation delivers verdicts in these 
instances, it must not attempt to conform to preexisting understandings of sexual identity 
or consent. If the judge and jury are acting as interpreters for the community, they must 
also make decisions that reflect a creative knowledge-making process. Thus, while they 
strive for the widest view possible to determine errors and lies, the decisions handed 
down remain judgments made at a moment in time; they call for certain kinds of actions, 
but do not record fixed truth that can never be reexamined. One implication of this might 
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be that the court may decide that it is better for the community to privilege the woman’s 
testimony. The court might conclude that her perspective is more accurate because the 
man’s perspective is in error as a result of the restrictions to his perspective that 
patriarchy has caused. However, this decision is far different than assuming, before 
taking into account both parties’ testimonies, that the perspective of the woman is always 
 
more accurate in circumstances of sexual assault. 
 
Furthermore, this decision does not establish a basis for adopting the same 
perspective in the future because the ongoing process of interpretation will always 
develop a new, wider perspective for each subsequent case. For Royce, interpretation is 
an infinite process that only stops with arbitrary interruptions: 
But interpretation both requires as its basis the sign or mental expression which is 
to be interpreted, and calls for a further interpretation of its own act, just because 
it addresses itself to some third being. Thus interpretation is not only an 
essentially social process, but also a process which, when once initiated, can be 
terminated only by an external and arbitrary interruption, such as death or social 
separation.lxi 
By recognizing its judgments as arbitrary interruptions in the ongoing process of 
 
interpretation, the community will be able to avoid falling into error of presenting its 
judgments as the whole view of the issue. Recognizing this requires that communities 
look towards their pasts and continue examining the judgments that mark arbitrary 
interruptions in the process of interpretation. In this regard, far from establishing 
precedents for future judgments, existing judgments establish the basis for the creation of 
new knowledge. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
NEW VISION OF FEMINIST INQUIRY 
 
Josiah Royce’s concepts of communities of interpretation and the Beloved 
Community are sometimes interpreted as too abstract by many feminist theorists. 
Theorists such as Sandra Harding, Lorrain Code, and Patricia Hill-Collins have claimed 
that overly abstract theories conceal and reinforce existing structures of power while 
convincing those who lack social power that their knowledge is invalid unless they can 
translate it into academic or professional jargon. If feminist epistemology focuses on 
examining the ways in which a knower’s unique relationship with structures of power is 
irrevocably linked to their ways of knowledge, and if we read Royce’s concepts as purely 
abstractions then feminist epistemologist should approach his theories with caution. Yet, 
a great deal of contemporary Royce scholarship interpret Royce’s works as compatible 
with contemporary discussions of important social issues. When we read Royce like 
scholars such as Cornel West, Judith Green, and Jacqueline Kegley, do, we can imagine 
how Royce’s work could contribute to a new account of feminist inquiry. 
Potential Feminist Objections to Royce and his Concept of Error 
 
The first major objection feminist theorists might raise to incorporating Royce’s 
account of error into feminist inquiry could be Royce’s unwavering position as an 
absolute idealist. In an absolute idealism like Royce’s, all individuals, actions, matter, 
and endeavor exist as the thoughts of an absolute. While Royce’s work in The Problem of 
 
Christianity and “Error and Truth” is not a fully embedded in the language of the 
absolute, much of his earlier work, as well as his later Sources of Religious Insight, still 
fit into the category absolute idealism that Royce never explicitly dismissed. Absolute 
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idealism is a totalizing metaphysics. In this manner, it might seem like Royce’s work 
leaves no room for examining how reality changes and develops through structures of 
power, or changes in relationship to standpoints. Totalizing accounts in general have been 
troubling since they tend to naturalize and obfuscate the ways in which power creates 
how people encounter reality. In “Situating Knowledges,” Donna Haraway criticizes both 
objectivism and relativism, claiming that they are both oppressive to the extent that they 
are totalizing. Code is critical of naturalized empiricism and ethics, such as the works of 
Quine and Nelson, as well as the work of Mark Johnson, because the process of 
naturalization is a totalizing act that reduces knowing, ethics, and embodiment to 
“something natural,” and in the process, these theories protect themselves from criticism 
that might question their objectives or effects. 
Another concern feminist theorists might raise to using Royce’s work within a 
feminist project is that while he was influenced by theorists like Jane Addams who have 
strong feminist credentials, Royce himself never developed an account of gender, never 
explained how his theories might differ in relationship to women, and in his major works, 
never explicitly advocated for women’s suffrage. By not explicitly addressing the 
situation of women and by not explicitly acknowledging the existing systems of power at 
work in his own time, Royce’s work is potentially subject to the same criticisms as a lot 
of historical philosophy: Any theorists who fail to recognize their place within patriarchy 
risk promoting an ideal of an uncomplicated humanity that naturalizes male dominance. 
For Royce, individuals are all finite creatures aiming for something larger, and they 
possess the same needs for loyalty, community, and humility. He never explains how 
one’s gender changes these aims and needs. 
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With the plethora of contemporary feminists addressing epistemology, it may 
seem, at best, simply unnecessary to draw a male figure from the early 20th century into 
the conversation. At worst, using Royce’s work to address feminist epistemology could 
become a way of discrediting the work of feminist epistemologists by escaping back into 
the acceptable work of a male historical philosopher whose theories, on surface, do not 
address the concerns of feminists. Throughout the past decades, feminist theorists have 
seen their concerns belittled, diminished, and trivialized by the claims that their concerns 
have already been answered by male philosophers. Bringing Royce’s work into 
conversation with contemporary feminist epistemology—especially as a means of 
critiquing existing feminist theories—risks repeating philosophy’s common disregard for 
feminist work. Why draw on Royce’s work when several contemporary feminists have 
contributed work that is underutilized? 
Aside from feminist concerns about utilizing Royce’s work in general, feminist 
epistemologists could also be legitimately concerned about incorporating a concept of 
error into a project of feminist epistemology. Claiming that someone is in error has often 
been a way of ending discourse. In fact, arguments that emotion, personal investment, 
and a lack of academic education lead to error have been used suggest that the insights of 
those on the peripheries of power are erroneous. When feminist epistemologists warn 
against the harms of maintaining an ideal of a fixed and complete truth, it would seem 
that the idea of error is complicit in those harms. Instead, feminist epistemologists argue 
that good knowing comes from engaging in more inclusive inquiries, and acknowledging 
that participants in the inquiries could be in error seemingly creates the paradoxical 
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possibility that better knowing could be equally dependent upon excluding some views 
while drawing in as many views as possible. 
Furthermore, feminist theorists might be wary of utilizing Royce’s method of 
error sensitivity for feminist inquiry because, in order to recognize one’s own error, one 
has to look outside of oneself. Royce’s method of error sensitivity necessitates the 
existence of a third party. Individuals must turn away from themselves as the sole 
standards of truth and, to some extent, grant authority to another party. Historically, 
women have been told that their internal perceptions are wrong, that their understandings 
of their own experience lack the status necessary to be trusted, that their lives, emotions, 
sexual impulses, and political interests prevent them from being able to decide what is 
true for them and what is in error. Women have often been told that in order to recognize 
truth and error they must defer to a third party’s authority. Feminist theorists have 
rightfully pushed back against this thinking, and many feminist theorists have argued that 
women need to locate good knowing within their own personal, internal understanding of 
their experiences. 
In feminist discourse surrounding sexual assault, the movement to recognize 
sexual assault as a philosophic topic worthy of investigation has relied upon validating 
the feelings of survivors as well as encouraging survivors to trust their own 
understandings of their experiences. When discussions on sexual assault fail to start at the 
place of women’s own experiences, the incidences are often reduced to “bad dates,” 
misunderstandings, or a failure of communication. Furthermore, when theorists do not 
prioritize survivors’ internal understandings of sexual assault, they often generalize 
sexual assault as something too easily understandable. Under these conditions, sexual 
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assault is often understood as just like any other type of violent assault, but one that 
utilizes specific body parts.i Feminist theories of sexual assaults, in particular feminist 
phenomenological accounts, have developed valuable understandings of the unique and 
horrific nature of sexual assault. This would not have been possible if they had not started 
with the insights of individual survivors. 
Feminist theorists would have good reason to be wary of basing a model of 
feminist inquiry solely on the work of Josiah Royce. Unmitigated, Royce’s work presents 
an abstract idealist philosophy that is deeply rooted in concepts like Christianity and a 
mother-father-child family that have traditionally oppressed women. Both contemporary 
philosophy and historical American philosophy have a plethora of figures who actively 
addressed issues of gender oppression and concepts of power. Royce was not one of these 
figures. Moreover, Royce’s account of error sensitivity requires that we look outside 
ourselves to understand the truth and errors in our own understandings. This move to an 
outsider to detect the errors of our internal understandings is a historically utilized tool to 
deny Others, including women, the ability to state their knowledges as valid and 
worthwhile. If we only took these accounts of Royce’s work into consideration then error 
sensitivity, communities of interpretation, and the Beloved Community would all seem 
like wrong turns in developing a new account of feminist inquiry. 
The fact that Royce is an underutilized, absolute pragmatist, who never explicitly 
addressed systems of power makes him an unlikely fit with contemporary feminist 
epistemology. However, for the past two decades several scholars have gone back to 
Royce’s work for inspiration on contemporary accounts of issues of social justice.  Many 
of these scholars highlight Martin Luther King Jr.’s use of Royce’s concept of the 
145  
Beloved Community as the most famous use of Royce’s work for social justice projects. 
King’s popularization of the Beloved Community envisioned this ideal as an achievable 
end when people came together in love and practiced nonviolent activism.ii Royce’s 
influence on King’s conception of the Beloved Community is the most recognizable 
example of Royce’s work being utilized for social justice, but theorists such as Cornel 
West, Judith Green and Jacqueline Kegley have discussed several inspirational elements 
of Royce’s work. 
One of West’s most important contributions to contemporary American 
philosophy is his concept of prophetic pragmatism. West claims that, in order for 
philosophy to be relevant in the contemporary world, there needs to be a model of 
philosophy that maintains an ethical aim, is based in hope, and can account for and 
recognize the intense horror and tragedy of systemic oppression. In order to accomplish 
these goals, West develops prophetic pragmatism, which draws upon classical 
pragmatism, contemporary pragmatism, Marxism and African-American Christian 
theology.iii He claims that prophetic pragmatism contains a “sense of the tragic character 
 
of life and history. This sense of the tragic highlights the irreducible predicament of 
unique individuals who undergo dread, despair disillusionment, disease and death and the 
institutional forms of oppression that dehumanize people.”ivAccording to West, American 
pragmatism suffers from its inability to make sense of tragedy; however, he claims, “[t]he 
one pragmatist who understood this tragic dimension is Josiah Royce.”v In “Pragmatism 
and the Sense of the Tragic,” West argues that Royce is a crucial figure for American 
philosophy because he is the only American philosopher who is able to account for the 
tragic element of human finitude. Even though West goes on to claim that Royce’s sense 
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of the tragic is not as satisfactory as Anton Chekhov’s sense of the tragicomic, he 
nonetheless suggests that Royce’s combination of pragmatist principles, especially 
voluntarism, fallibilism, and experimentalism, with an understanding of the tragic nature 
of human life and a deep sense of the evil conveyed by certain actions is a resource for 
future philosophy. He argues that Royce’s work offers an important element that many 
accounts of pragmatism miss when they ignore his work. He concludes that, by looking at 
“Royce’s efforts to sustain the strenuous mood in the face of the deep sense of evil,”vi we 
 
can develop richer sense of pragmatism that provides a better starting point for 
encountering the future.vii 
In deep democracy, Judith Green sets out to “frame the kind of philosophy of 
deep democracy that can guide individual and social transformation as we address our 
urgent contemporary problems and opportunities.”viii Green draws on the work of 
classical pragmatists, contemporary communitarians, and various social activists to claim 
that contemporary social issues involving racism, sexism, classism, homophobia, and 
religious conflict require a communitarian commitment to transformative and diverse 
democratic communities. Royce is one of the many theorists that Green highlights. In 
particular, Green explicates Royce’s concepts of loyalty and communities of 
interpretation. Drawing on the persuasive critique of communitarianism offered by Iris 
Marion Young, Green acknowledges that communitarianism often reinforces existing 
structures of power and forces unity though assimilation. While Green admits that 
communitarianism can result in assimilation, she argues that Royce’s concept of 
communities of memory and hope create unity that not only accepts diversity but 
encourages it. Like my comparison between Royce’s Beloved Community and 
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Mohanty’s call for a shared frame of reference, Green argues that Royce’s concept of 
loyalty to loyalty is an important resource for contemporary theories that want to develop 
diverse unity: “Royce’s conception of ‘loyalty to loyalty,’ is enjoying a renaissance of 
posthumous influence, in large part because of his transformative insights about the path 
to achieving democratic unity amidst diversity through respectful cooperation among 
culturally differing individuals and groups.”ix While Green claims that the concept of 
 
loyalty to loyalty has transformative power, she also claims that King’s adoption of the 
 
Beloved Community illustrates its transformative power.x 
 
In addition to claiming that Royce’s concepts of loyalty to loyalty and the Beloved 
Community can play an important role in developing a new account of deep democracy, 
she draws inspiration from Royce’s concept of communities of interpretation. Green 
claims that Royce’s account of interpretation illuminates a moral and metaphysical 
epistemology that can work as part of a movement to develop deep democracy: “Royce’s 
alternative metaphysical, epistemological, and moral interpretive framework expresses a 
transactionally mediated objectivity that reflects our experience that, just as we 
participate within and contribute to the shape of reality through an inescapable 
interpretive process, reality also pushes back.”1xi As we go through this process of 
interpretation, for Royce, we are constructing “a shared, interactively developing, 
interpretive phenomenology of our lived experience as individual members of historical 
and cultural communities of memory and hope.”xii Since Royce’s epistemology is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1Green’s use of the word “objectivity” in her discussion of Royce’s epistemology is potentially 
problematic; however, she does not suggest that she is referring to the kind of codifiable standard for 
knowledge that this project rejects. Instead, she seems to be indicating that Royce’s epistemology includes 
a rigorous evaluation of claims. 
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morally guided, communally situated, and potentially transformative, it provides unique 
advantages in social justice projects. 
Finally, Kegley is one of Royce’s most vocal and unwavering contemporary 
advocates. She claims that Royce’s work establishes the exact model of public 
philosophy that contemporary philosophy needs. At the close of Royce in Focus, Kegley 
claims that there are four areas where Royce’s work is especially valuable for 
contemporary philosophy: “bringing purpose and meaning back into individual lives; 
creating functional, fostering, supportive families, building bridges through 
interpretation; and renewing and revitalizing democracy through individual and 
communal action.”xiii Eleven years prior to publishing Royce in Focus, Kegley published 
 
Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities. In this work, Kegley argues that Royce’s 
work is valuable because it clearly and fully breaks down the construction and harms of 
liberal individualism.xiv 
The work of West, Green, and Kegley highlight some of the significant 
 
contributions that Royce can make to contemporary scholarship because these three 
authors utilize Royce’s work for contemporary social justice goals. However, these 
scholars are not the only ones utilizing Royce’s work for contemporary goals. Previous 
chapters have already noted creative contemporary interpretations of Royce’s work from 
Scott Pratt, Celia Bardwell-Jones, and Kelley Parker. These authors differ in how they 
interpret Royce specifically, but they all read his work as something that cannot be 
reduced to out of date and esoteric abstraction. In the following sections, I contribute to 
this body of work by noting how Royce’s theories can clarify, supplement, and facilitate 
the goals and attributes of feminist inquiry. 
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Visualizing an Error Sensitive Feminist Inquiry 
 
Feminist epistemology’s goal, as I describe it, is to explore the ways in which 
structures of power—including but not limited to gender dynamics—construct, organize, 
and affect ways of knowing and what is validated as knowledge. Feminist inquiry is a 
method of gaining new knowledge. For the feminist epistemologists that I have drawn 
from in this work, feminist inquiry works to provide a larger view than what institutions 
of power have already accepted. For feminist standpoint theory this means including the 
view from below, looking towards those whose understanding has been excluded from 
traditional accounts of good knowing. For feminist empiricists, such as Nelson, striving 
for a larger view requires that communities of knowledge production, in particular the 
sciences, view themselves along with their results. In Code’s account of ecological 
thinking, finding a larger view requires looking beyond a myopic view the individual 
situation in question and mapping out the structures of power that manipulate and 
determine the given situation. 
In my own conception of feminist inquiry, I maintain the commitment to striving 
for the largest view possible, the view that will provide the greatest framework for a 
shared frame of reference; however, I also argue that inquiry requires a method of 
interpretation that provides it with error sensitivity in order sustain the largest view 
possible within a real, complex, and conflicted community. When we incorporate such a 
method, moments of conflict, instances when multiple accounts directly contradict one 
another and communities require decisions in order to move forward, can be adjudicated 
without the inquirers relying on traditional models of fixed truths or uncomplicated 
accounts of objectivity. Rather than limiting inquirers’ views, providing feminist inquiry 
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with a method of error-sensitive interpretation will force communities to become more 
reflective about their own limitations and push communal inquiry even farther towards 
the widest perspective. 
Defining My Method of Feminist Inquiry 
 
Like feminist standpoint theory and ecological thinking, the goal of this method 
of inquiry is ultimately to create more just and more inclusive communities. Better 
inquiry does not just give us answers that are closer to truth itself but rather it enriches 
communities by attracting the perspectives of those who are often left out of the 
conversation. Doing this does not just create an epistemological advantage but also 
subverts existing structures of power. However, these advantages diminish if inquirers 
cannot mediate between conflicting accounts, and within lived experience, multiple 
accounts of the same event often conflict. While feminist standpoint theory can tell us 
whose perspectives needs to be included and ecological thinking can tell us how we 
ought to trace structures of power in order to advocate for these perspectives, neither of 
these accounts can tell us what amounts to better truths after we have followed these 
steps. With these accounts, we reach a stopping point when we run out of ideas for 
making the perspective bigger. Better knowing might present itself to us, but we have no 
way of judging it as such. In contrast, traditional accounts of objectivity and disinterested 
knowing offer clear methods of determining the best knowledge amidst conflicting 
claims. The best possible knowledge is that which can be phrased in such a way that it 
fits within the particular language of an institution of power. The best knowledge in the 
natural sciences is traditionally the knowledge that can most thoroughly be situated in the 
scientific method; therefore, the best knowledge is the knowledge that leads to the most 
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repeatable results. For history, better knowledge is a fidelity to the evidence presented; 
therefore, good knowing denies anachronistic explanations or sentimental accounts that 
can render historical research political. For the legal system, the best knowledge is that 
which can be fit into the structures of acceptable evidence. The best knowledge is that 
which can be supported by expert testimonies, physical evidence, and a logically crafted 
narrative. Juries and judges do their jobs well when they remain unaffected by any factors 
outside of these criterions of good knowing and then apply the law as an absolute. All of 
these traditional ways of knowing rely on the idea that there is some kind of attainable 
truth and that personalization, emotion, and political interests taint that pursuit. 
Since feminist epistemology rejects the notion that there is a pure truth to attain 
after stripping away emotion, political interests, and one’s acknowledgement of his or her 
own situation in structures of power, taking these factors into account, finding the better 
knowledge and detecting when we have gone wrong in feminist inquiry must be a more 
nuanced and complicated endeavor than it is under these traditional approaches. All of 
these traditional approaches decide between better and worse knowing by limiting what 
counts as knowledge. The personal experience of being raped keeps a woman off of a 
jury in a sexual assault case; the incommensurability of the experience of physical pain is 
left out of medical research, and the contemporary political ramifications of an account of 
history cannot be taken into account if the historical analysis is to remain pure. However, 
when the ultimate goal of feminist inquiry is to build larger more expansive perspectives 
as a means of building more expansive and just communities, then determining good 
knowing and recognizing error cannot rely on such limiting moves. Hence, feminist 
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inquiry requires a method of error sensitivity that aligns with the overarching goal of 
building more inclusive communities. 
In order to ensure that feminist inquiry maintains its commitment to the nuanced 
and complicated process of developing more expansive perspectives while remaining 
sensitive to error in a way that does not silence or discount claims, knowers must begin 
with a source of motivation that is more complex and nuanced than “truth for truth’s 
sake.” Traditional forms of epistemology view any motivations for pursuing knowledge 
other than “truth for truth’s sake” as suspect because they threaten to taint the purity of 
supposedly neutral, objective claims. In contrast, feminist epistemology recognizes that, 
because knowledge claims are never neutral, the motives for inquiry must be more 
transparently situated. With regards to an error sensitive feminist inquiry, knowers’ must 
be motivated by love because they must be prepared to construct knowledge through 
relationships that are neither antagonistic nor reductive. Moreover, without the inspiration 
love provides, knowers may develop a myopic focus on the problem at hand because love 
provides the motivation for them to conduct their inquiry as a means of promoting social 
justice holistically and not just resolving the current situation. 
The Attributes of My New Feminist Inquiry 
 
As a source of motivation, love is the first of the attributes of feminist inquiry 
described below. The other attributes include taking subjectivity into account, 
recognizing the limitations that structures of power place upon our understandings, and 
ensuring that decision making takes place within the real lives of those on the periphery. 
In this section, I argue that inquiries defined by these attributes and conducted through 
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acts of error-sensitive interpretation will fulfill the commitments of feminist 
epistemology outlined in chapter two. 
The idea that inquiry should be motivated by love is not new to feminist 
epistemology, and Patricia Hill Collins’s work in Black Feminist Thought, along with the 
work of Marilyn Frye and María Lugones, provides a foundation for understanding what 
love as a source of motivation and a component of inquiry looks like. In Black Feminist 
Thought, Collins states “[i]n this alternative epistemology, values lie at the heart of the 
knowledge validation process such that inquiry always has an ethical aim.”xv While 
 
maintaining an ethical aim for inquiry similar to the aim outlined above and championed 
consistently throughout feminist epistemologies, Collins outlines four dimensions that 
she claims constitute the framework for Black feminist thought: maintaining lived 
experience as a criterion of meaning, the use of dialogue in assessing knowledge claims, 
the ethics of care, and the ethics of personal accountability. While all of these dimensions 
are consistent with the commitments of feminist epistemology, Collins’s description of 
her third dimension, the ethics of care, provides unique insight into the relationship 
between love and inquiry. 
As Collins outlines the components of the ethics of care, she illustrates how 
inquiry motivated by love can help knowers construct knowledge through relationships, 
rather than isolation, by enabling them to recognize the validity of their experiences, 
acknowledge the meaningfulness of emotions in dialogue, and broaden their perspectives 
through empathy. Collins claims that African-American women have maintained an 
ethics of caring as an important aspect of inquiry. She explains that the ethics of care 
“suggest that ideas cannot be divorced from the individuals who create and share them. 
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This theme of talking with the heart taps the ethic of caring.”xvi In addition to upholding 
the idea that all knowledge claims must be situated, this explanation illuminates the idea 
that knowledge claims situated within interpersonal relationships draw upon forms of 
experience that cannot be codified, categorized, or universalized. These forms of 
experience include impressions, feelings, attachments, and aversions, and accounting for 
themes of “the heart” such as these requires intense care by all parties involved in the 
knowledge making process. 
Hence, Collins defines three interrelated components of the ethics of care. The 
first of these “is the emphasis placed on individual uniqueness.”xvii An ethics of care 
requires a fundamental respect for the unique perspectives and individual expressions of 
the subjects involved in the inquiry. For Collins, these subjects are African-American 
women, and she contends that they maintain emphasis already within their culture; 
however, this emphasis would benefit any form of inquiry with a liberatory aim. Quoting 
Alice Walker, Collins describes this component: “[Walker] never doubted her powers of 
judgment because her mother assumed they were sound.”xviii By maintaining a respect for 
individual expression, Black feminist thought can account for more diverse perspectives 
than other forms of epistemology. By encouraging African-American women to trust and 
value their own perspectives, the ethics of care not only maintains respect for these 
perspectives in the course of inquiry but also draws more perspectives into that inquiry. 
Without maintaining this respect and without drawing in these perspectives, it would be 
impossible for any method of inquiry to build knowledge through relationships because 
individuals would isolate themselves, not out of a desire for purity but out of a sense of 
self-preservation. 
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The second component of Collins’s ethics of caring is a respect for emotions 
within dialogues. Under Black feminist thought, a person’s emotions in dialogue do not 
signify that her perspective is tainted or unreliable. Rather, for Black feminist thought, 
emotions within dialogue signify that the speaker has an intense connection with her 
position. Since we need to respect each other in dialogues, we are required in Black 
feminist thought to respect the emotions of the other speakers. Often intense emotion in 
dialogue grants a meaning to the statement that an uninvolved delivery could not 
convey.xix When knowers accept emotion as an integral part of the process of inquiry, 
 
they can begin to empathize with experiences that are incommensurable to them without 
trying to dissect and assimilate those experiences. Without this kind of empathy for 
incommensurable experiences, knowers cannot expand their perspectives through 
communal relations beyond the most basic of shared experiences. In this regard, any 
method of inquiry that involves shared, communal knowledge must be dedicated to 
developing empathy as part of the process of inquiry. 
The final framework for Black feminist thought’s ethics of care expands upon the 
importance of the knowers’ capacity for empathy. Collins draws on the work of African- 
American women who have written about gaining understanding of others through 
empathy. In particular, she draws on the work of Sherley Anne Williams. In Dessa Rose, 
Williams’s main character, an African-American slave named Dessa, discovers that the 
white character, Rufel, has been raped. By developing empathy with Rufel, Dessa 
develops a better understanding of the extent of male violence. Before sympathizing with 
Rufel, Dessa only understood rape as something that happened to her and other African- 
American women; when she is able to recognize that Rufel has undergone  the same 
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violence as herself, she gains a better understanding of male oppression and builds a 
relationship with Rufel. This example illustrates how empathy acts a precursor to 
knowledge in the process of inquiry. Before she developed a relationship with Rufel, 
Dessa was satisfied with her understanding of sexual violence as a weapon exclusively 
against African-American slave women. In order to pursue inquiry beyond the first 
potentially satisfying answer, knowers must feel motivated to not only satisfy their own 
curiosities but also fulfill their obligations to their communities. This additional 
motivation is especially important in light of the overwhelming influence of structures of 
power to limit complex and time consuming inquiries. 
In addition to promoting feminist inquiry’s goal of supporting inclusive, pluralist 
communities by enabling knowers to maintain respect for themselves and others as 
uniquely valuable participants, incorporate incommensurable experiences into the 
process, and continue the process even after they develop satisfying answers and 
encounter significant opposition, love as a source of motivation helps knowers avoid the 
oppressive harms perpetuated by other motives. In her 1983 “In and Out of Harm’s Way, 
Arrogance and Love,” Marilyn Frye distinguishes between arrogant perception and 
perceiving with a loving eye. As explained in chapter two, arrogant perception involves 
trying to understand a subject without involving the subject in the process or 
acknowledging the similarities between the subject and the knower. This kind of 
perception is often practiced by knowers interested in maintaining objective standards for 
knowledge, and it prevents them from identifying with others. As a result, when they 
perceive arrogantly they become unable to empathize with those they perceive. The 
arrogant perceiver can only understand others as a means to an end, and as a result, she 
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subjects those being perceived to oppression. This oppression occurs both during the act 
of perception and as a consequence of the perceiver’s claims about her observations. Frye 
claims that women in particular are the victims of arrogant perception. Thus, in order 
strive for the betterment of women’s situations, knowers must abandon arrogant 
perception and develop what she calls a “loving eye.” Without a loving eye, it would be 
impossible for knowers to construct communal knowledge through the bonds of equal 
relationships. Moreover, knowers would be unable to recognize their own limits. 
Frye’s 1983 essay influenced the later work of Maria Lugones, Mariana Ortega, 
Sarah Hoagland and Nancy Tuana. In “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving 
Perception,” Lugones argues that women ought to start at loving perception as a way to 
build solidarity between women across race, class, and nationality. Encouraging loving 
perception involves empathizing with those who we are trying to understand and, for 
Lugones, in some way entering their “world.” Entering the “world” of another involves 
acknowledging the ways in which one’s own life is intertwined with theirs. Lugones 
argues that when white feminists actively pursue loving perception, they are in the best 
situation to learn from women of color and to build solidarity amongst women. In this 
way, love as a motivation for inquiry initiates a self-perpetuating process of developing 
better knowledge through ever-expanding relationships that push knowers to not just 
answer questions but also reexamine those answers in acts of empathy with their fellow 
knowers. 
These concepts from Collins, Frye, and Lugones illustrate that inquiry ought to be 
an action of developing caring relationships. Rather than requiring distance and 
disinterest, the kind of inquiry that is required for building a shared commitment has to 
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involve genuine care in the process. For Royce, this love or care is a crucial part of the 
will to interpret. Throughout his work, he uses the concepts of “love” and “loyalty” 
synonymously. Hence, in order to sustain loyalty to loyalty, third party mediators in 
inquiry must operate with a loving commitment towards the potential larger community. 
Error sensitivity, in this regard, requires that better inquiry include love, empathy, and 
care to the community at large. 
Taking Subjectivity into Account 
 
In “Being Knowingly, Lovingly Ignorant: White Feminism and Women of Color” 
Mariana Ortega argues that even when attempting to practice loving perception white 
feminists (such as myself) often fall into a form of arrogant perception called loving, 
knowing ignorance. Ortega explains this concept with the following example: at a 
feminist conference, a committee of white feminists kept earnestly discussing the issue of 
how their organization and conference could draw on the voices and experiences of 
women of color. Finally, a light-skinned woman of color states to the committee from the 
audience “you keep talking about us as if we aren’t even here.”xx Ortega claims that this 
 
may have been the result of the white feminists’ not knowing that this woman and other 
women in the audience were women of color due to stereotypes of appearance and skin 
tone or it could have been because the idea to talk directly with women of color in the 
audience did not occur to the committee members as a possibility or priority. In either 
case the good intentions, even if they are loving intentions, result in white feminists 
making dangerous assumptions about the identities of women of color. 
Ortega’s account highlights that even when those with social privilege attempt to 
 
maintain loving perception, their good intentions are not enough to maintain open and 
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honest inquiry across structures of power. For this reason, feminist inquiry must take 
subjectivity into account. In other words, feminist inquirers must leave space for the 
subjects with whom they create relationships to exercise their own agencies. While at 
first this attribute may appear both self-evident and easily heeded, it creates hazards that 
even the best intentioned inquirer may prefer to ignore. In order to avoid reinforcing 
existing hierarchies and, thereby, promote the goals of feminist inquiry, feminist inquirers 
must promote relationships in which everyone is empowered to account for their own 
oppression. In accordance with Royce’s warnings against two-party relationships, 
sometimes dubbed “the dangerous pair,” feminist inquirers should see it as their 
responsibility to attempt to triangulate these forms of relationships. 
In this regard, feminist inquirers may act as the kinds of advocates that Code 
describes. Rather than using their privilege to tell others about their oppression and what 
to do about it, feminist inquirers must work with others to build a joint understanding of 
the situation at hand. In her description of advocacy, Code focuses on how individuals 
with institutionally privileged professional knowledge, such as nurses and legal aides, can 
help those on the periphery of power negotiate oppressive power structures and 
institutional expectations while developing better knowing through this process; however, 
the fundamental elements of Code’s theory extend beyond the realm of professional 
expertise and demonstrate how anyone can participate in the process of inquiry while 
being mindful of others’ subjectivities. Code suggests that advocacy involves recognizing 
that someone else’s perspective is valuable even if that person cannot articulate it 
according to an established standard, acknowledging the obstacles confronting that 
person, working with that person to navigate those obstacles, and finally entering that 
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person’s perspective into a larger communal conversation. Professionally certified skills 
may facilitate this process, but the most important part for feminist inquirers is the 
emphasis on helping someone else contribute her perspective to the conversation. 
Advocacy is just one of the relationships that feminist inquirers may develop 
when they understand their inquiry as part of loyalty to a cause. Shared loyalty to a cause 
helps people build relationships while accounting for each other’s subjectivity because, 
when people see their fates entwined, it is easier for them to recognize one another as full 
subjects. Royce explains how the shared past and shared future that loyalty to a cause can 
create for a community helps individuals recognize one another as subjects: 
When love of the community, nourished by common memories, and common 
hope, both exists and expresses itself in devoted individual lives, it can constantly 
tend, despite the complexity of the present social order, to keep the consciousness 
of the community alive. And when this takes place, the identification of the loyal 
individual self with the life of the community will tend, both in ideal and in 
feeling, to identify each self not only with the distant past and future of the 
community, but with the present activities of the whole social body.xxi 
 
We live in complex communities where structures of power can establish rigid definitions 
of relationships, and these definitions can limit our abilities to recognize other people’s 
subjectivities. When individuals become our grocery clerks, our custodians, our doctors, 
and our local legislators, we focus on their usefulness to us. Their existence becomes 
either a convenience or an annoyance for us, and we miss the opportunity to recognize 
them as fully embodied subjects. This problem is exacerbated by asymmetrical 
relationships between genders, races, and classes. 
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In the above passage, Royce suggests that forming communities from shared 
loyalties can help us see past these definitions, “the complexity of the present social 
order,” and recognize “each self” in the community as a “loyal individual” with a past 
and a future. In order to reduce people to their use values, we must see them as 
interchangeable; one grocery clerk is the same as another if all we want is a carton of 
eggs. However, when a shared loyalty leads us to recognize that our grocery clerks, 
custodians, doctors, and legislators have sufficiently deep internal lives to engage with 
their histories and form hopes for their futures, then they cease to be interchangeable. The 
doctor who shares our loyalty to the cause of resisting gendered oppression, who shares 
our memories of sexual harassment and our hopes of ending sexual violence, does more 
than provide us with useful diagnostic services; she broadens our perspectives. In this 
regard, unless we recognize their internal lives, we can never practice genuine loyalty 
because we will only be able draw upon our own memories and our own hopes. 
Royce explains the relationship between recognizing the agency of other subjects 
and broadening our own perspectives in The World and the Individual: 
Our fellows are known to be real and have their own inner life, because they are 
for each of us, the endless treasury of more ideas. They answer our questions, 
they tell us news, they make comments, they pass judgments, they express novel 
combinations of feelings, they relate to us stories, they argue with us, and take 
counsel with us. [. . .] Our fellows furnish us the constantly needed supplement to 
our own fragmentary meanings.xxii 
 
Here, Royce indicates that taking subjectivity into account is about more than respecting 
the agency of others; it is also about acknowledging and compensating for our own 
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finitude, “our own fragmentary meanings.” When we turn others into components of our 
lives instead of the subjects of their own, we inextricably cast ourselves as components 
too. We become consumers, litterers, patients, and voters, and we play each of these 
fragmented roles one at a time from interaction to interaction. In order to move beyond 
these roles, we must be able to engage with other subjects whose answers, news, 
comments, judgments, feelings, stories, arguments and counsel can both address our own 
need for meaning, not just information, and surprise us. A grocery clerk without agency 
can only give us information about the price of milk, but a woman who shares our 
commitment to seeking justice for wrongfully imprisoned African Americans and 
happens to be a grocery clerk can broaden our limited perspectives by supplementing our 
fragmented understanding of the issues involved with her own. 
Recognizing the Limits of Our Understandings 
 
The connections that Royce draws between shared loyalty to a cause and knowers’ 
abilities to account for one another’s subjectivities relies on some degree of 
interchangeability between subjectivity and agency. In order for us to acknowledge one 
another as fully realized subjects, we must share loyalty to a cause, but in order for us to 
share loyalty to a cause, we must have sufficient agency to adopt the cause in the first 
place. Because Royce does not address the influence that structures of power can exercise 
over our decisions, he does not consider whether or not it is possible for knowers to adopt 
causes voluntarily. As I suggested in chapter two, some post-structuralist feminists have 
objected to communitarian models in philosophy as a foundation for overcoming social 
ills because, they argue, communitarian solutions will always reproduce oppressive 
structures of power. 
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In particular, Iris Marion Young argues in “The Ideal of Community and the 
Politics of Difference” that Western dualistic logic inevitably taints communitarian 
efforts by casting individuals as the inferior counterparts to communities.  Judith Green 
succinctly summarizes Young’s argument in her 1999 deep democracy: “Community, 
[Young] claims, is frequently posed as the polar opposite of the inferior ideal of the 
individualism, understood as the modern problem to be overcome. Moreover, she claims, 
the ideal of community ‘exhibits a totalizing impulse’ and ‘denies difference’ in 
privileging face-to-face relations unmediated by time and distance, and in contrasting the 
problematic present with a utopian future without specifying a transformational process 
that links them.”xxiii For Young, communitarian philosophies deny individuals agency 
because any system that relies on unmediated, “face-to-face relations” fails to 
acknowledge that, despite the symmetrical phrasing, such relations are skewed in favor of 
the parties with the most preexisting privilege. In other words, communitarian 
philosophies that espouse idealized concepts of interpersonal relations only really grant 
agency to the most powerful subjects in the community. Furthermore, Young’s criticism 
of the utopian dreams that inspire communitarian philosophies underscores the possibility 
that communal hope for the future could be the basis for suppressing individual agency in 
the present. 
At first glance, Young’s criticisms, which were originally aimed at theorists like 
Sandel, appear damning to Royce’s philosophies as well. Royce promotes the ongoing 
community as a mechanism for the salvation of the finite individual. He emphasizes the 
importance of relationships within the community, and he describes a utopic Beloved 
Community, for which individuals and communities must always strive but never attain. 
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However, as Green suggests, a deeper look at Royce’s philosophies reveals that they 
provide a model of the community that is more complex than the concept addressed by 
these criticisms. First, Royce’s model of communities requires that communities never 
establish fixed identities. Communities must always expand and reevaluate, and 
sometimes even die. Far from subverting individual agency in the name of communal 
unity, Roycean communities require individuals to exercise their own agencies in order to 
avoid deathly stagnation. 
Second, while power structures will inevitably enter into communities and will 
having limiting effects, Royce’s stipulation that all genuine communities need to be 
motivated by ever expanding loyalty to loyalty requires that communities readjust their 
interpretations of the past and, thereby, undercut existing privileges in favor of a broader 
perspective. Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, for Royce, the ultimate loyalty to 
a community is the loyalty to interpretation. Royce’s triadic model of interpretation not 
only avoids the harms that Young identifies in asymmetrical face-to-face relations by 
involving a third party but also seeks to highlight the ways in which the current 
perspectives in a community are limiting. Structures of power are extraordinarily 
limiting; they restrict who can be considered full community members; they restrict 
relationships with other communities; and most importantly for Royce’s model of 
interpretation, they restrict the possible insights available to inquiry. While Royce never 
claims that communities cannot go astray—in fact he claims that they often do—the fact 
that they are motivated by the call to encourage the loyalties of all others means that 
interpreters within Roycean communities ought to take note of the role structures of 
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power place on their own communities and communally reflect on ways to overcome 
these structures of power. 
In addition to avoiding the harms that Young ascribes to face-to-face relations, 
Royce’s model of triadic interpretation creates a unique space in which individuals can 
exercise their own agencies. In the previous chapter, I drew upon Bardwell-Jones’s 
account of the relationship between Royce’s triadic model of interpretation and theories 
of mestiza identity in order to establish the ways that the concepts of incommensurability 
and intersectionality could benefit Royce’s philosophies about interpretation. The same 
connection between a triadic model of interpretation and mestiza identities also presents a 
foundation for understanding how individuals can retain agency within the process of 
communal inquiry, despite the overwhelming influence of existing structures of power. 
When we view inquiry as happening in pairs, such as knower and known, then we 
are likely to fall into the same “S knows p” relationship that Code rejects for its potential 
to mask subjectivity. What Royce refers to as the “dangerous pair” marks these 
relationships. If left to their own devices, the knower and known will always maintain an 
adversarial relationship. This same binary issue arises when we only view structures of 
power as institutions that establish the oppressors and the oppressed. In the same way that 
Bardwell-Jones claims that Royce’s triadic model of interpretation creates a space for 
borderland identities, the triadic model can also create a space between the oppressors 
and the oppressed in which individuals can exercise agency. 
 
Traditional models of an oppressor and an oppressed are harmful, in part, because 
neither party has an ability to see past their own perspectives of the other. However, 
when a third party enters into this relationship, all parties gain an opportunity to widen 
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their views beyond the dualistic relationship and to construct another kind of identity. Of 
course, it would be difficult for any oppressor to willingly decide to give up the privilege 
that maintains their status as an oppressor, but the hope of a wider view is that it will 
reveal how the reality of the oppressor and oppressed’s relationships harms both parties. 
Instances of when those with privilege were able to see the harm of their own privileges 
and create a new identity include examples of so called “race traitors,” male feminists, 
and straight allies whose work and existence highlights both the possibility of seeking an 
identity outside of the binary relationship of oppressor and oppressed and the potentially 
transformative power of these identities. Under Royce’s model of interpretation, those 
who have given up their own social privileges for transformative identities can serve 
valuable roles as mediators and as elements that move their communities towards more 
just ends. Additionally, this triadic model of interpretation provides a clearer space for 
making sense of identities that are both oppressed and privileged. White women, African- 
American men, wealthy lesbians, and Christian laborers all have identities that cannot be 
fully understood within dyadic models of interpretation. The space between that inspires 
Bardwell-Jones can also be useful in providing a space for these identities. 
Practicing Error-Sensitive Interpretation within the Lived Experiences of Those on the 
 
Peripheries 
 
Love as a source of motivation, taking subjectivity into account, and ensuring 
space for agency within structures of power are essential attributes of feminist inquiry 
because without them, it is impossible to perform acts of error-sensitive interpretation. 
Harding, Collins, and Code all argue that good knowing requires locating inquiry in the 
lived experiences of those on the peripheries of power. Those on the peripheries have an 
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understanding of the effects of power that are unavailable to those with social privilege; 
they have developed methods of inquiry that have been largely ignored by formal 
epistemology, and in order to create a more just society, inquiry that is aimed at creating 
better communities must start with the desires of those on the peripheries for improving 
their own lives. 
However, when taken too innocently, looking to the lives of those on the 
peripheries can often mean that those in power take an uncomplicated and patronizing 
view that assimilates diverse cultures and experiences. Looking towards the real lives of 
those on the peripheries of power requires the recognition that all real lives are lived 
through complex structures, framed by often conflicting loyalties, and filled with the 
potential for experiencing intense hope and tragic loss. No real lives can be fully 
embodied within abstract and fixed principles. This reality requires, first, that the scope 
of inquiry be based on individual situations and the individual communities involved. 
Doctrines like “always look towards the view from below” will not always fit into 
situations where it is impossible to determine “the view from below” and cannot account 
for when that view from below is itself restrictive. Looking towards real lives also 
requires a method of inquiry that can account for the inevitable conflicts that arise when 
multiple views from below conflict. 
In short, as I have argued throughout this work, looking at real life for inquiry 
requires a method of error sensitivity, a way to decide between conflicting accounts, a 
way to recognize the limitations of even the best intentioned views and views from the 
peripheries. However, this method of error sensitivity cannot be a ridged set of 
requirements that inquirers take from one situation to the next. Rather, feminist inquiry 
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requires a way to recognize the unique errors that arise within the particular conflicts of 
lived experience. As described in chapters three and four, Royce’s conception of error as 
mistaking a partial view for a whole view, combined with his triadic model of 
interpretation, gives us a model for conducting this kind of inquiry without ignoring the 
subjectivity of those on the peripheries of power 
Yet, the error-sensitive process of interpretation, as Royce would have imagined 
it, does not provide a satisfactory method of feminist inquiry on its own. The attributes 
outlined above will ensure that the interpreters called upon to resolve the conflicts that 
inevitably arise during the ongoing process of inquiry will guard against the ways that 
contemporary power structures promote error. Everyone who participates in the process 
of feminist inquiry must expect that these attributes will inform the results, and everyone 
who joins a community of interpretation in order to examine conflicting responses to 
inquiries must incorporate these attributes into their deliberations. 
As outlined above, each of these attributes promotes the widening of a view. 
When we understand error as a partial view that is mistaken for a whole view, then 
communities of interpretation must maintain these attributes as means of enriching error 
sensitivity. When we motivate inquiry by love, we can open our communities to empathy, 
care, and patience. Without these aspects, we run the risk of mistaking the partial 
thoughts that someone articulates for the whole of her understanding and experiences. 
Lugones claims that we practice loving perception by entering each other’s “worlds.” An 
inability to lovingly perceive prevents us from knowing another’s world and “without 
knowing the other’s ‘world,’ one does not know the other, and without knowing the other 
one is really alone in the other’s presence because the other is only dimly present to 
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one.”xxiv Without locating inquiry in love, we are left with only partial views of each 
other and an inability to recognize when others are promoting partial views. 
Interpreters must take subjectivity into account to enrich error sensitivity because 
it is the only way to recognize the other members of our relationships as human agents. If 
we fail to recognize the subjectivity of our community members, we mistake our partial 
views of their usefulness in our lives for a complete understanding of their own rich, 
internal lives. In this situation, we can neither develop relationships with them that 
promote genuine interpretation nor understand the consequences and obligations of those 
relationships. Moreover, recognizing the subjectivity of others is what compels us to seek 
their perspectives in inquiry. In order to expand the view of the community, we need to 
ensure that as many perspectives as possible are welcomed, and this requires 
understanding those with whom and about whom we inquire as human beings. 
Along with taking subjectivity into account, communities of interpretation need to 
sustain the agency of individuals and groups within power structures or they will mistake 
their partial group for the whole community. Living in a place of privilege limits a 
person’s account of the prevalence and effect of structures of power. Feeling lost without 
agency within structures of power prevents people from vocalizing their view points and 
needs. Both of these conditions severely limit the perspective of communities. Moreover, 
it is important that those with understandings from situations of oppression are the ones 
who have the opportunity to represent themselves in interpretation. In “The Project of 
Feminist Epistemology: Perspecitves from a Nonwestern Feminist,” Uma Narayan warns 
against relying on sympathetic individuals who have social power to speak for those in 
positions of oppression, for example, “it is common place that even sympathetic men will 
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often fail to perceive subtle instances of sexist behavior or discourse.”xxv When 
interpretation does not actively try to subvert existing power structures, only those who 
already enjoy social privilege will be able to participate; this severely limits potential 
views, especially since those with privilege will never fully be able to understand and 
represent the unique perspectives of specific groups on the peripheries of social privilege. 
Using Feminist Inquiry to Fulfill the Commitments of Feminist Epistemology in a Sexual 
Assault Case 
 
The recent trial of New York Police officers Ken Moreno and Franklin Mata 
enlivened discussions about the roles that social power plays in sexual assault. In this 
case, a white, twenty-seven year-old woman claimed that she was sexually assaulted by 
Officer Moreno after he and his partner, Officer Mata, escorted her home while she was 
intoxicated. Throughout the trial, the alleged victim endured accusations that she was out 
for money and the prosecution’s comparison of her genitals to a Venus flytrap.  The 
media questioned her character due to her intoxication and sexualized her through 
salacious references to her underwear. Questions arose about whether or not an 
intoxicated women could be trusted to remember being raped, or even be raped at all. 
Stories circulated about the apparent epidemic of men who were accused of rape after 
consensual sex, especially when alcohol was involved.xxvi 
 
At the same time, sexual assault survivor support groups came to her defense. 
Feminist media sites, such as Feministing.com, highlighted the ways in which her story 
was an allegory for the mistreatment of rape victims in the court system. Moreover, 
several organizations argued that this was another example of New York City police 
officers abusing their power and that this woman’s account fit into a system of police 
171  
brutality. From the beginning, many people mistrusted Moreno and Mata because they 
 
had called in a fabricated emergency to return to the alleged victim’s home. 
 
Eventually, the jury acquitted both Moreno and Mata. Some saw this as a triumph 
for police officers who consistently put themselves in harm’s way to protect others. Some 
saw this as a triumph for a justice system that requires clear and distinct proof of a crime 
before putting someone in jail. However, many saw this acquittal as a stunning display of 
how imbedded patriarchy is in the justice system and how sexual assault survivors must 
demonstrate an inhumanly virtuous character in order to have their bodies protected by 
the law. 
 
Ultimately, the divisions between the responses exemplifies the ways in which the 
adversarial system within U.S. courts functions as a dangerous dyad, even though 
multiple groups (the accuser, the accused, the judge, the jury, the witnesses, etc.) seem to 
be involved. Parker elaborates on this situation: “[t]he court will ultimately resolve the 
dispute by rejecting one or both of the conflicting positions. This forensic community is 
at bottom nothing more than two primary opponents (plaintiff and defendant) who 
happen to be buffered from one another by an intermediate mutual opponent (the 
judge).”xxvii Because dyadic relationships are bound to be antagonistic, a court system 
that maintains this dyadic relationship will not be able to develop a creative action that 
can overcome antagonism. Since the growth of the community at large depends upon the 
creative action of triadic inquiry, maintaining these dyadic relationships prevents 
communities from being able develop more error sensitivity. 
Hence, the discussion of sexual assault cases, police authority, and the 
requirements and demands of the existing legal system that stemmed from the trial of 
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Moreno and Mata highlights the ways in which the existing legal system fails to uphold 
the commitments of feminist epistemology. Thus, regardless of the guilt or innocence of 
Moreno and Mata, as well as the likely possibility that the defendants, the accuser, or 
both may have actively lied during their testimonies, the reaction to this trial nonetheless 
demonstrated that sexual assault cases are about more than two parties, the accuser and 
the accused; rather, they play out social expectations of gender, power dynamics, and 
often institutional racism. Although thousands of people blogged, analyzed, and protested 
about these issues in relationship to this case, the justice system maintained through its 
representatives and pundits that the jury must not take these factors into account. In an 
interview with The Associated Press, John Finck, one of the jurors, said, "the jury's job is 
very precisely and narrowly defined, and it's not anything about sending an ideological 
message to the cops or to women's groups or to life in the city, to bar culture. ... Our job 
wasn't to go to the macro issues at all." The article continued: 
No DNA evidence tied the officers to the scene, and experts debated whether an 
internal mark on the woman could be seen as evidence of rape. ‘It would have 
been so much easier had there been physical evidence, but in the absence of that, 
you had to go into the more subjective realms of credibility, of witnesses, of 
corroborating testimony,’ Finck said. ‘I think the general feeling was both parties 
acted very irresponsibly,’ but the woman's compromised memory created enough 
questions to acquit the officers of the most serious charges, he said. ‘The 
reasonable-doubt standard carried the day,’ he said.xxviii 
 
While the larger implications for this case played out in the media, the jury seemed to 
have focused only on narrow concerns and standards of evidence. 
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Fink’s description of the jury’s process in the Moreno and Mata case reflects the 
common expectations for American juries. Good evidence is standard, corroborated, and 
objective. Good evidence is “scientific evidence,” such as DNA samples. Good evidence 
requires experts to explain and judge. Ideally then, the most fair verdicts are reached by 
the most myopic view of the case possible. All that matters in a decision is “the facts” of 
the incident, and the only things that are worthy of “fact” status fit within strict 
parameters. 
The approach to good knowing that is expected of juries as Fink described it is 
vastly different than the approach that this model of feminist inquiry advocates. Chapter 
two outlined four basic commitments of feminist epistemology: First, these 
epistemologies maintain that conventional epistemology and knowledge-making has 
depended upon myths that maintain and reproduce social structures of power. Second, 
better knowing will not just look beyond or question harmful structures of power but 
actually destabilize them, and in doing so, good knowing will be part of a liberatory 
social project. Third, better knowing requires that knowledge-making institutions look to 
the lived experiences of those on the peripheries of power. Finally, in order to maintain 
the liberatory social effects of feminist epistemology, a new account of feminist inquiry 
must be able to distinguish between and judge between conflicting accounts within 
communities. 
The jury’s approach as described by Fink fails under the first commitment. 
Maintaining a faith in only certain kinds of supposedly more objective evidence sustains 
the myth that subjective evidence, emotion, and personal testimony are all insufficient 
because they cannot be codified the way physical entities, such as DNA evidence can be. 
174  
The fact that physical evidence can be manipulated, planted, removed, or tampered with 
does not register as a reason for viewing it as inadequate as more subjective forms of 
evidence. Moreover, the idea that it is possible for jurors to remove themselves from the 
larger issues of police power, gender dynamics, and “bar culture” encourages them to see 
their own views as views from nowhere. 
In contrast, feminist inquiry would require an interpretation of the event that 
would look very different from the approach of the jury. Royce’s model of interpretation 
would certainly require that the community of interpretation look intensely at the specific 
instance in question. However, since interpretation remains sensitive to error by 
establishing a perspective, limiting the view of the interpreter, in this case the jury, to 
only certain kinds of evidence would be counterproductive. Moreover, since developing a 
view from nowhere limits one’s own ability to recognize the limits of her own 
perspective, this model of interpretation would discourage such thinking. Rather than 
limiting the scope of the interpretation to the narrow view that only the facts of one 
evening and the actions of three people matter, Roycean interpretation would require 
taking into account much more in order to achieve the widest view possible. This would 
include taking into account the social structures at work in the case. 
The second commitment of feminist epistemology is that good knowing ought to 
destabilize systems of power. While the jury upheld an important edict that the benefit of 
the doubt should go to the accused, the trial itself reinforced harmful social practices. 
When the prosecution focused their case on calling into question the character of the 
alleged victim, they perpetuated the social norm where sexual victims are disregarded, 
ignored, or blamed for their own attacks. Assuming that the alleged victim was lying or 
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in error about the encounter does nothing to keep her treatment by the prosecution and 
certain media sources from having horrific effects on all sexual assault survivors, who 
will now have a clear image of what fate might befall them if they attempt to prosecute 
their abusers. 
A Roycean inspired feminist approach to interpretation could not rely on such a 
harmful action. In order to operate in a real world where people do sometimes lie and 
people are often in error, interpreters must rigorously discuss the accounts of both the 
alleged victim and the alleged perpetrator. However, since the goal of this account of 
feminist inquiry is to create more expansive and just communities, communities of 
interpretation would have an obligation to empathize with both sides and carefully ensure 
that other survivors will seek out interpretation rather than silencing themselves. 
By refusing to look at any larger issues of power, the jury was unable to fulfill the 
third commitment of feminist epistemology, to take adequate account of the ways in 
which these structures work into the lived experience of those on the peripheries. If the 
jury accounted for the realities of women’s lived experiences, such as the double bind of 
femininity both encourages women to display themselves as sexually available while also 
maintaining sexual purity, it would understand an encounter like the one described by the 
alleged victim in vastly differently terms. Moreover, when power has such an influence 
over the way someone lives her gender or how a police officer sees his duty, it is 
impossible to understand the lived experience without taking these ideas into account. 
In contrast, communities of interpretation would take the lived experience of 
those on the periphery into account. For example, one could imagine bringing in other 
sexual assault survivors to explain their stories and community activists to explain the 
176  
ways women’s lives are structured through their sexuality. Moreover, fellow police 
officers could be invited into the conversation to explain the unique challenges of 
protecting citizens in situations like the one Moreno described. Taking the lives of those 
on the periphery into account may often require looking at the experiences of others 
besides just the individuals involved in the event in question. This method of 
interpretation would welcome this, but there seems to be little space for it in the current 
American court system. 
The final commitment of feminist epistemology is that it must maintain an ability 
to distinguish between conflicting accounts and note ways in which various accounts can 
be in error. The outcome of the Moreno and Mata case clearly accomplished the first part 
of this commitment according to the terms of the American legal system. The jury made a 
firm decision that the evidence against Moreno and Mata was not sufficient to warrant 
criminal charges. However, with its strict “yes” or “no” approach to standards of 
evidence, the jury did not have to account for aspects of Moreno’s and Mata’s 
testimonies that may still have been in error. Furthermore, the jury’s acquittal did not 
produce an interpretation of the alleged victim’s testimony that accounted for why she 
may have been in error about her own recollections. Although this approach was able to 
decide between conflicting accounts, it failed to uphold the first three commitments of 
feminist epistemology, and it failed to provide a satisfying account of where testimonies 
erred. Without this account, the jury’s verdict does not improve our understanding of 
sexual assault. Instead, it forces existing knowledge about sexual assault, as well as 
gender dynamics, police ethics, and bar culture, onto a unique situation. 
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By seeking a larger view of the situation and tracing the limitations of the views 
presented, a Roycean model of interpretation would be able to point the community to 
instances where testimony may be in error because a partial view is being confused with 
a whole view. In a situation like this one, communal interpretation would have to rest at 
some point. Neither party could delay their lives indefinitely; the community itself would 
need to reflect on the incident, and steps would need to be taken to ensure that risks of 
future sexual assaults were addressed. However, this decision would never be treated as a 
fixed declaration. Rather, the purpose of being able to detect error would be to ensure that 
the community could move forward from the incident and grow more unified with new 
knowledge and new understandings about sexual assault and the myriad of circumstances 
that surround it. 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout this work, I have argued that the concept of epistemic privilege 
remains valuable for promoting more inclusive knowledge-making communities, which 
can resist the oppressive power structures that restrict knowers’ views. In order to 
maximize the usefulness of epistemic privilege within real, pluralistic, and often 
internally conflicted communities, I have proposed that feminist epistemologists 
supplement the concept of epistemic privilege with a method of error sensitivity that 
would help communities evaluate conflicting knowledge claims from differently 
oppressed individuals. My primary example, a sexual assault case involving an African 
American man and a white woman, not only illustrates how existing power structures 
limit the views available to communities by perpetuating oppressive myths and 
essentializing individuals’ sexualities but also demonstrates why a method of error 
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sensitivity is necessary for resolving conflicts that involve different interpretations of 
what an action signifies, not just whether or not an action took place. Hence, I have 
concluded that Royce’s account of error, with its emphasis on Communities of 
Interpretation working toward a shared purpose, provides a reasonable basis for a method 
of error sensitivity consistent with the commitments of feminist epistemology. 
To this point, my primary example has served to highlight the deficiencies within 
the existing legal system and its adherence to ostensibly power-blind interpretations of 
the law and justify a theoretical need for a method of error sensitivity that accounts for 
unique situations. Thus, it remains for me to consider how a legal system influenced by 
the commitments of feminist epistemology and Royce’s accounts of error, Communities 
of Interpretation, and loyalty may respond to a sexual assault case that involves 
conflicting claims from differently oppressed individuals. While it would be impossible 
for any number of reasons for me to outline all of the ramifications that this kind of 
reprioritization could have on the existing legal system, I will conclude this project with a 
discussion of the Navajo court system, which has demonstrated that it is possible to 
address legal concerns without relying upon an adversarial structure. Although the 
Navajo courts do not fully engage all of the concerns outlined by this project, they 
embrace a justice system based on a horizontal model of power and recognize that 
responding to legal cases involves more than two parties (the plaintiff and the defendant); 
instead, it involves and affects an entire network of relationships. Moreover, without an 
adversarial structure, the Navajo courts direct their attention toward healing the 
community and reestablishing relationships, rather than doling out punishments. 
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The Navajo peacemaking courts continue to operate in the Navajo Nation, which 
shares territory with parts of Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona. The current Navajo Nation 
Court System was established in 1958 by the Navajo Tribal Council, but its blending of 
traditional Navajo law and non-Indian legal methods takes its precedent from the Navajo 
Court of Indian Offenses for the Navajo Nation established by the Bureau for Indian 
Affairs in 1892, and its guiding precepts extend much farther back in history.xxix The 
 
Navajo Peacemaker Courts, in particular, were established in the 1980s as part of a wide- 
ranging reform of the Navajo Nation’s judicial and political system, and they were 
designed to emphasize Navajo common law much more than the tribal courts established 
in 1958.xxx Raymond Austin describes the values that inform Navajo common law in 
Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law. He refers in particular to three intertwined 
fundamental concepts: “hózhó (glossed as harmony, balance, and peace); k’é, (glossed as 
kinship unity through positive values); and k’éí (Navajo kinship or clan system).”xxxi He 
explains that, in accord with these concepts, the Peacemaker Courts enact “a horizontal 
system of justice” that uses “the traditional procedures of persuasion, ‘talking things out,’ 
and consensus to find solutions” in contrast to the Western courts that enact a “vertical 
system of justice,” which relies on powerful authority and forceful coercion.xxxii 
Implicitly, the Western courts’ vertical system reflects a separate set of values—the same 
values that have been critiqued throughout the previous chapters—including disinterested 
impartiality and adherence to precedent. Although the values and methods of the Navajo 
Peacemaker Courts do not perfectly match the form of inquiry proposed in the previous 
chapter, they do offer a comparable example of how a legal system can account for 
unique situations and continue to function. 
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In “Navajo Conceptions of Justice in the Peacemaker Court,” Barbara Wall 
 
outlines the process of the peacemaking courts: 
 
1.   prayer 
 
2.   a community peacemaker 
 
3.   willingness of disputants to seek the Peacemaker Court for resolution 
 
4.   reestablishing communication lines 
 
5.   a decision by the disputing parties to resolve the dispute through a process of 
consensus 
6.   a signed contract of solidarity that is legally binding in the tribal courtxxxiii 
 
Wall’s outline overlaps with the method of feminist inquiry that I sketched in the 
previous chapter in several ways.2 First, the peacemaker’s role as both a legal expert and 
an acknowledged member of the same community as the disputants resists the faulty 
ideal of the judge as a disinterested arbiter of the law. Wall provides an example of a 
Peacemaker Court session involving a mother who brings her son to court for substance 
abuse and domestic violence in which the peacemaker used her own experiences with 
substance abuse to guide the proceedings. It is difficult to imagine a system that goes into 
an uproar when a Supreme Court nominee simply suggests that her experiences as both a 
woman and a Latina may help her promote a wider view on issues than, implicitly, 
another white man could promote would accept this kind of personal intervention from its 
judiciaries. 
Second, in addition to encouraging the Peacemaker to act as a member of the 
 
community as well as a legal expert, the Peacemaker Courts prioritize communal 
 
 
2 Wall also notes that individuals can decline using the Peacemaker Courts in favor of the more Western- 
inspired tribal courts and that individuals who fail to abide by previous peacemaking agreements may be 
denied the option of utilizing the courts again. 
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knowledge-making by inviting other members of the disputants’ communities to 
participate in the process of resolving the dispute. By drawing a wider community into 
the process, the courts can reestablish “communication lines” without promoting 
potentially detrimental acts of reconciliation between the disputants. Drawing in a wider 
community is also a way of recognizing that sexual assault cases, especially sexual 
assault cases involving acquaintances, affect more than just the disputants; they hurt the 
entire community, fracturing relationships and heightening political tensions. 
Encouraging members of the community to share their insights about the incident and 
make suggestions about the appropriate course of action, rather than restricting their 
comments before the court to their first-hand, empirical experiences or expertly certified 
conclusions, simultaneously creates a wider perspective on the event and promotes 
greater unity among the effected communities. 
Third, the notion that disputants would willingly seek resolution in court is 
entirely foreign to a system that has made “settling out of court” a common practice. Yet, 
in sexual assault cases involving acquaintances and issues of consent, settling out of court 
can undermine a community’s purpose of developing a wider view. In order for a sexual 
assault victim’s suffering or an accused man’s innocence to be validated, all related 
parties must share as much knowledge as they can pertaining to the incident. However, 
when a system prioritizes finding concrete reasons to dismiss someone’s claims (she was 
drinking, he has a history of violence, drugs were involved), it discourages individuals 
from contributing their knowledge. Furthermore, a trial system that involves definitive 
“wins” and “losses” through its adversarial structure encourages individuals to withhold 
any information that may be detrimental to their cases. Hence, a system that abandons 
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standardized punishments in favor of heeding the full details of everyone’s claims may be 
 
appealing to disputants and communities seeking validation and not just retribution. 
 
Finally, the Peacemaker Courts conclude by having participants sign a contract 
that has been composed in light of the concerns of everyone who contributed to the 
process. Unlike a formal sentence in a U.S. court, such a contract does not exist prior to 
the convening of the peacemaking court. Instead, the courts develop such contracts in 
response to the unique situations that each new case presents. In this regard, the courts 
have the ability to take into account the specific experiences of both parties. This may 
include accounting for the ways in which race and gender influence the situations in 
question. Furthermore, the contracts enable the courts to involve more than just the 
accuser and the defendant in the resolution of the case. Depending on how the terms of 
the contract are arranged, other members of the community may take some responsibility 
for the future behavior or protection of either party. Hence, through the contracts, the 
courts are not only able to acknowledge that communities are affected by such cases but 
also give communities the ability to respond to them in positive ways. 
All of these strategies—employing a mediator from within the community instead 
of a disinterested arbitrator, promoting communication between parties within the 
community instead of requiring witnesses to make unilateral claims to an unresponsive 
judge or jury, encouraging disputants to share all of their knowledge willingly rather than 
just disclosing the information that best supports their “cases,” and developing a unique, 
contractual response that involves all of the parties rather than just sentencing or 
releasing the accused party—could help communities of interpretation develop a wider 
view of the events. By developing a wider view of the events, a community of 
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interpretation could become more sensitive to error. In particular, concluding the court 
proceedings by signing a contract that was prepared by, and make demands of, an entire 
community is a way to avoid allowing a single claim—the accuser’s, the defendant’s, or 
the judge’s—to represent the view of the entire group. In this way, these strategies may 
not only help communities of interpretation detect errors in testimony but also help them 
avoid making new errors through judgment. 
While the Peacemaker Court model could provide a basis for an alternative to the 
adversarial model of conventional U.S. courts, Sarah Deer’s article “Decolonizing Rape 
Law: A Native Feminist Synthesis for Safety and Sovereignty” implies that there are 
ways in which, as they exist now, the Peacemaker Courts could undercut epistemic 
privilege. Although she does not explicitly address the concept of epistemic privilege, 
Deer criticizes both conventional U.S. courts, which cannot respond to the history of 
colonialism that is linked to rape in Native American communities, and the Peacemaker 
Courts, which could put pressure on sexual assault victims to create unwanted 
relationships with their attackers. In particular, she notes that the Peacemaker Courts 
deemphasize personal responsibility and favor restorative justice, which assumes that 
there is some degree of preexisting equality between the parties. Yet, as Deer notes, a 
rape survivor and her attacker are not on equal footing. 
Deer’s response to this problem resembles Code’s arguments about the 
importance of advocacy. She recommends training female elders, particularly those who 
have survived sexual assaults, to respond to the unique needs and perspectives of the 
women involved in sexual assault cases, and she contends, “Native women who have 
survived rape and who have advocated on behalf of rape victims should be at the center 
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of the response to sexual violence. Our voices will guide communities in developing 
appropriate response that take into account both safety and dignity for survivors.”xxxiv 
Like Code, Deer suggests that informed advocates could not only help individual victims 
but also promote better knowledge within the community. 
With regards to the possibility of error-sensitive feminist inquiry and its 
relationship with Royce’s Beloved Community, Deer’s arguments serve as reminders that 
when we take the concept of error seriously, there can never be a complete, final model 
for legal inquiry. Royce’s concept of error requires us to challenge and revise models of 
inquiry, such as the court system, constantly. Deer’s critique also indicates the 
importance of identifying third parties that will be both willing and able to take broader 
concepts like colonialism and the political force of sexual assault into account when 
interpreting claims. Furthermore, her claims reiterate the importance of never allowing 
any particular view to become the final interpretation for an entire community. 
In the example of a sexual assault case involving an African American man and a 
white woman, strategies derived from the Peacemaker Courts and Deer’s critiques could 
help a community of interpretation avoid reproducing errors perpetuated by oppressive 
systems of power by promoting communally based inquiry that recognizes the value of 
epistemic privilege without allowing an individual view to stand in for the view of the 
whole. Unlike state-sponsored legal authority, a mediator’s motivation is not primarily 
professional responsibility, but rather communal loyalty. Since the mediator is acting out 
of loyalty to the community, she has an investment in the resolution of the case because it 
will affect the well-being of the community. This investment may incite her to consider 
and respond to factors that are limiting the involved parties’ views of the situation, such 
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as racist or sexist assumptions. Furthermore, multidirectional communication between 
participants creates room for more information to enter the discussion than just the 
information explicitly asked for by legal authorities. Giving legal authorities control over 
the entire flow of information inevitably bolsters any inequities that exist within the legal 
system. When participants contribute information that does not seem to fit within a 
preexisting system for evaluating knowledge claims, it can expose the limitations of such 
a system, which gives the community an opportunity to consider why such limitations 
exist and possibly address them. Finally, constantly developing unique responses for each 
new case means that communities are in constant states of inquiry, especially when those 
responses require communities to take action. When a community remains in a state of 
inquiry, it becomes harder for the community to accept racist and sexist myths that rely 
upon silence and tacit consent. Instead, the process of constant inquiry will help 
communities erode the myths that limit their perspectives. As they develop wider 
perspectives, communities will be able to move closer together and progress toward 
Royce’s Beloved Community. 
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